


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ALGERIA

FFS Leader Announces Readiness to Form Coalition

91P40208A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
30 Mar 91 pp 1,4

[Report by Qasiy Salih al-Darwish]

[Text] Paris, Algiers—Hussein Ait Ahmed, the secretary general of the Socialist Forces Front [FFS], has accused the Algerian authorities of turning public opinion in their favor by taking advantage of the fundamentalists' strategy of attacking public security. [He said that they do this] by propagating the idea that the ruling party is the last resort and only alternative to the fundamentalist threat.

Ait Ahmed also criticized the electoral bill now being discussed by the deputies of the National People's Assembly and called for a coalition of all advocates of democracy against this law.

Ait Ahmed had been determined to keep silent in the beginning, because the electoral bill serves his interests, as well as the government's, by increasing his representation in the National People's Assembly to much more than his real influence. However, Ait Ahmed, who has raised the banner of democracy, was compelled to disassociate himself from the party consensus in order to criticize a bill that he considers undemocratic.

As for his accusing the authorities of exploiting the Islamic Salvation Front's [FIS] intimidating behavior in bringing radical fundamentalists to power, this happened after he criticized the same leadership because it did not do anything to stop the fundamentalists and stand up to their tendency to call for terrorism and violence.

But what is new is Ait Ahmed's statement that "the FFS is prepared for discussions and, at the same time, for forming coalitions capable of stopping the fascist forces during the upcoming elections so as to achieve real democratic changes."

These words hold a clear signal from Ait Ahmed to the current regime about forming a political coalition to participate in a post-election government, whether with the [current] regime or with Ahmed Ben Bella. However, the second choice seems unlikely.

As for the nonfundamentalist forces other than the three "FLN-Ben Bella-Ait Ahmed" parties, they do not represent a force capable of stopping an FIS victory.

EGYPT

NDP Reportedly Reorganizing Executive Committees

91AA0249A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
12 Mar 91 p 5

[Article: "Ruling Party in Egypt Turns to Interest in Domestic Problems After End of Gulf Crisis"]

[Text] Cairo (AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT Bureau)—Responsible sources in Egypt's ruling National Democratic Party [NDP] told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that for the first time since the party was formed in the late seventies new elections to shape the party's main organizations will be held this April following the conclusion of the Gulf crisis, now that it has become possible to balance domestic and foreign interests.

The sources said that balloting for candidates is expected to take place under the supervision of neutral consultants inside party headquarters to guarantee impartiality and honesty and to remove any suspicion of interference in the elections by any supporters of the candidates.

The sources added that the elections come in the wake of instructions issued by Egyptian President Husni Mubarak in his capacity as head of the party. Their purpose is to select personnel who can work to promote the linking of the party base to citizens, to find personnel who can bring about coordination between party bases, and to eliminate personnel who cannot work with the general public.

The sources indicated that these elections will take place at the regional level in each governorate, district, and village, and at the level of governorate party secretaries and members of the secretariat in each governorate. They explained that an opportunity will be afforded for all members, including the party's deputies in the Egyptian Parliament and Shura Council, to fill leadership positions in accordance with the election rule. This will create linkage and coordination between the party and the two representative bodies, thereby strengthening party work along various axes. A suitable formula will afterwards be reached for shaping the party's central general secretariat. Its membership base will be expanded to include representatives of the various governorates. At the same time, the liaison secretaries will be reorganized to be one of the main links for all the governorates of Lower and Upper Egypt.

In the wake of the anticipated changes, it is expected that the party's main committees that parallel those of the Egyptian parliament will be reshaped. The sources said that certain experienced political figures will again return to prominence on the party stage. Foremost among these is Dr. Mustafa al-Sa'id, Egypt's former minister of economy and foreign trade, who returns to party ranks after his victory in recent parliamentary

elections. He has been nominated to fill the chairmanship of the economics committee, the same position that he occupied about four years ago.

AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned that four deputy party chairmen are expected to be chosen. Foremost among them are Speaker of Parliament Dr. Ahmad Fathi Surur and Shura Council Chairman Dr. Mustafa Kamal Hilmi. Also, Dr. Mustafa Khalil, the party's deputy chairman for foreign affairs, is to retain his position. Dr. 'Ali Lutfi will be chosen in his capacity as an economic figure to serve in light of the demands of the coming period for a freeing of the Egyptian economy and to lead the party in this area. It should be noted that he held the office of prime minister of Egypt in the first stage of economic reform that began in 1986.

A responsible party source stated that all these formations will be ready before the date of the next general party congress, which is scheduled to be held in July of this year.

Central Bank Intervenes To Reduce Exchange Rate

91AA0283A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
4 Apr 91 p 11

[Article: "Bankers Express Concern Over Constant Rise in Interest Rate; Central Bank of Egypt Intervenes To Reduce Dollar Exchange Rate; Savers Refrain From Selling Dollars in Anticipation of Higher Rates"]

[Text] Cairo—AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT Bureau—For the second time since implementation of the new exchange-rate system which relies on supply and demand, the Central Bank of Egypt was compelled this week to intervene in the market and to sell dollars so as to lower the dollar exchange rate which has experienced large-scale speculation, causing it to soar to nearly 350 piasters a dollar. Simultaneously, the interest rates, freed as part of the reform measures currently being implemented by Egypt, have been rising steadily, thus spurring a number of bankers to express their concern over the negative effects of this rise on inflation and on the cost of loans for investment projects.

An authoritative banking source has characterized the Central Bank's intervention to curb the rise in the dollar exchange rate as a "normal measure in the free market system when foreign currency exchange rates versus the local currency rise and when such a rise does not emanate from normal market transactions."

The Central Bank had intervened for the first time a few days after establishment of the free market in order to cover the pending import credits in order to curb the growing demand and, consequently, to stop the rise in the dollar exchange rate in the market. However, it has been noted that in the past two weeks the dollar exchange rate has been rising constantly, reaching 348 piasters per dollar in transactions through middlemen and to 337 piasters in ordinary remittance transactions.

In a related development, Economy Minister Dr. Yusri Mustafa has issued a decree creating a committee formed of representatives of the Ministry of Economy, the Central Bank of Egypt, and the banking sector to consider the 200 applications submitted to date to the Ministry of Economy to open money-changing shops. The new exchange-rate system permits the creation of money-changing companies to buy and sell foreign currencies.

Bankers note that the new system has been implemented under difficult circumstances, considering that tourism revenues and the remittances of expatriate Egyptian workers have decreased as a result of the Gulf war. However, the banking system has produced positive results to date, considering that the average daily foreign currency yield has amounted to \$8.42 million. The market's total revenues to date have amounted to \$254 million, of which \$232 millions have been used. The banks have a surplus of \$27 million.

A sum of \$108 million out of this total yield has been used to finance private sector needs, and \$67 million has been allocated to finance public sector needs. The total sum sold by banks to the public directly has amounted to nearly \$52 million, constituting nearly 20 percent of the banks' resources.

An economic source has asserted that there is a large number of savers who refrain from selling the foreign currency in their possession in anticipation of higher dollar exchange rates, especially since the banks have posted high dollar exchange rates throughout the recent period and since they have been raising these rates daily. The source added that as soon as the dollar exchange rates decrease, speculators will suffer losses and foreign currency sales by savers will increase for fear that the value of their savings will diminish. Such a development will help stabilize and lower foreign currency exchange rates.

On the other hand, the average interest rate for the treasury bonds issued weekly by the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Egypt to cover the deficit in the state's general budget has risen sharply. Banks have subscribed to the latest bond issue at an interest rate of 18 percent.

Bankers warn that interest rates have not stopped rising since these rates were freed and since the issuance of treasury bonds was started at the beginning of last January. They have noted that the interest rate for the first treasury bond issue was 14 percent and that an interest rate of 16 percent was charged for loans [at the time].

Economic experts fear the negative consequences of the rising interest rates, especially of the interest rates charged for investment-project loans. These rates raise the total cost of projects, thus reducing the attraction of investment in production and diminishing the capability

of projects to exploit the available production capacity or to increase this capacity because of the increased costs of financing.

Some people have several observations on the treasury permits. These observations are embodied in the fact that the main role of the world's central banks is to set discount rates compatible with the inflation rates and with the desired growth rates. Relinquishment of this role by the bank of Egypt and adoption of the rates at which the treasury bonds settle as a criterion for the banking market may continue for a time but it is not the rule. Moreover, the Ministry of Finance offers the same number of bonds for subscription every week. This volume does not represent the real volume and does not reflect an actual deficit. The Ministry of Finance is supposed to begin offering a bond volume representing the actual deficit. The rate will then become a real rate, not a rate based on unreal deficit figures.

These observations also note that the offered bonds mature in 91 days and that it will become clear whether the treasury will cash them when they become payable or whether it will increase the volume and value of [future] bonds offered for subscription. If so, the interest rate will be inclined to rise, thus creating inflationary pressures. The principle urged by bankers is to use these permits to avoid inflationary pressures. Moreover, more than 90 percent of the budget deficit is caused by investments intended to finance public sector units and economic organizations. With the tendency to free the public sector, it is necessary that this sector's units turn directly to the banking apparatus to request investment loans. State budget expenditures will be thus confined to wages, to section two, and to the investments made by government agencies solely. This will reduce the deficit greatly.

Through the Central Bank of Egypt, the Ministry of Finance issues every week nearly 200 million pounds' worth of treasury permits for bank subscription in the form of bids. The Central Bank then selects the best prices offered by bidding banks.

The number of bids submitted weekly is estimated at 20 bids. The Egyptian Government has resorted to financing the budget deficit by offering public treasury bonds instead of the past approach of financing this deficit by printing more money—an approach which aggravated the inflationary consequences because money was borrowed at a very low interest rate of 8-10 percent. This rate did not encourage the streamlining of spending or the development of any other resources. It also led to increased public consumption and, consequently, to increased national consumption. In its turn, this consumption affected the gap between saving and investment and, as a result, led to increased reliance on foreign financing.

Therefore, the essence of reform in the treasury permits is to offer bonds equal in value to the net budget deficit. In 1987-88, this deficit was evaluated at nearly 5.061

billion pounds in 1987-88, i.e., approximately 740 percent of the expected deficit, considering that that year's budget had estimated the net deficit at just 680 million pounds. That deficit was to be subscribed to according to interest rates set by the various banks. As a consequence, public spending was to be streamlined because higher interest rates would result in increased burdens to the state's general budget.

The Egyptian Government also has been compelled to adopt the method of issuing public treasury bonds as a measure aimed at correcting the imbalance between the budgetary revenues and expenditures. According to Central Bank reports, the total deficit in Egypt's 1989 budget amounted to 7.219 billion pounds. A part of this deficit has been financed by foreign resources embodied in credit facilities, foreign loans, and nonbanking domestic resources.

Islamic Economists Criticize IMF, Government Policies

91AA0254A Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 13 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by Mahmud Al-Khuli: "After the IMF Rejected Our Economic Plan: Fund Demands are Warning Signals"]

[Text] The International Monetary Fund (IMF) last week rejected Egypt's latest economic reform plan even though the country suffered tremendous Gulf war costs in excess of \$20 billion. IMF specialists objected to aspects of the government plan that call for delaying such reforms as reorganizing the public sector, floating the Egyptian pound, and stemming the widening deficits of the state budget and the balance of payments. Egypt is forced by Gulf war losses to defer the implementation of certain reforms and has asked the major powers to expedite disbursement of international aid allocated to countries distressed by the Gulf crisis. The powers, including the United States, nevertheless made such aid conditional on signing the new IMF pact which, in itself, will lead to depression and a severe economic slump in Egypt. Is this Egypt's reward for its Gulf stance? Why aren't the United States and other powers putting pressure on the IMF? AL-NUR sought answers from economists in the hope that they might pinpoint Egyptian economic imbalances and prescribe a course of action to solve this crisis and deliver the Egyptian economy from IMF domination as well as American and Western control.

IMF Not to be Faulted

Dr. Rabi' al-Ruby, professor of Islamic economy at Umm-al-Qurah University in Mecca, says that the IMF should not be blamed since the fault lies with us. Our economy, which the IMF assumes to be free, is socially oriented and therefore at odds with IMF demands. Egypt's economy, such as its public sector [emphasis], is

largely a product of socialist ideology. Certain situations have become public prerogatives that are not easily reversed at present.

Dr. al-Ruby emphasizes that the problem lies in the proliferation of so much political and administrative corruption that the people are rendered unproductive. It is imperative therefore to change the political and administrative climates. This, as Dr. al-Ruby puts it, means that the government must earn the trust of producers and investors and must put a lid on economic legislative amendments which are constantly changing.

Surplus Petrodollars

The problem also seems to have political dimensions. Dr. al-Ruby points out the risk of depending on the West in everything we do rather than relying on our own economic and productive capability. He adds that Islamic imperatives bid us to correct our economic course. The investment objectives of Islamic countries with petrodollar surpluses would have been totally different were they aware of their own power and of how committed the West is to destroying that power. Their surpluses would have flowed into Arab and Islamic countries to strengthen each other, and we would have avoided such problems as the Gulf crisis in which we were dependent on Western resolutions and armaments that wrecked our recent achievements for decades to come.

Dependence on the West

He adds [phrase is illegible] that all America wants is to turn us into a satellite. If the Egyptian government agreed to amend its [economic] plan in accordance with IMF demands, the result would be social imbalances that could threaten the regime and create a situation difficult to control.

In-Depth Studies

Dr. 'Amr Muhyi-al-Din, professor of International Economics at Cairo University, advocates in-depth studies of the direct and indirect consequences of policies advanced by the IMF. He says that such policies—and he deliberately avoids describing them as economics—must be subjected to academic investigations of their economic variables and political dimensions in order to study their impact on all other variables such as income, outlays, education, and investment. We must also identify the social groups whose grievances these policies aim to redress.

A Social Fund

Dr. 'Amr Muhyi-al-Din adds that the political leadership, if it become necessary to comply [with IMF demands], should identify such requisites and call for setting up a social fund to compensate those who would be aggrieved by complying with IMF wishes. We should not forget, however, that efficiency is the objective of proposed policies as a whole.

He adds: The obvious question is at what optimum point can efficiency be achieved without compromising distribution considerations—an optimum dose that society could tolerate economically and socially. This objective is difficult to accomplish at present and the answers lie not in economic decisions but political ones.

Economic Blocs

Dr. 'Amr warns of economic groupings in the 21st century which will be the century for giant economic blocs and will be dominated by three groupings representing advanced industrial centers and governed by competition based on production technologies and efficient economic structures. The three groupings will be the American bloc, comprised of the United States, Canada, and some Latin American countries; the European bloc which will include a restructured Soviet Union; and the Pacific bloc which will include Japan and small industrial giants, such as Singapore, Hong Kong, and Thailand, of which there are seven so far. The Arab and Islamic world must define its position vis-a-vis that new world. It must determine its relationships with those blocs and how to deal with them. But to do so, the Arab and Islamic world must first devise its own structure.

A Policy of Retrenchment

Dr. Khalil Bur'i of the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Cairo University emphasizes that the IMF seeks a policy of retrenchment in all fields which would not serve our interests as it claims. Strong economies may be able to endure such pressures but not economies that are semi-strong or semi-weak. Implementing such a policy may create economic pressures intolerable to the people, therefore creating social and political crises not easily resolved.

Dr. Bur'i says that the IMF deems that wages should be frozen for the time being but this would be a grave mistake in view of escalating prices. This IMF demand is a rigid policy implemented in all countries but it would do considerable harm to the Egyptian economy.

He points out that Egypt must receive economic aid in the aftermath of the Gulf war. The major powers should play a positive role in this regard and creditor nations must consider the economic impact of the Gulf war and must appreciate Egypt's leadership role in the region. They should be more flexible with Egypt until it emerges from the bottleneck.

Structural Imbalances

Dr. al-Gharib Nasir, an expert with the Center for Islamic Economy, believes that the Egyptian economy has structural imbalances in its imports and exports and in its ratio of national income to national consumption. Such imbalances, he says, can not be corrected with quick fixes in the short term. Long-term solutions are needed to reform the economic structure.

Commenting on the Egyptian government's stance and its economic reform plan, Dr. al-Gharib Nasir says he

supports the government's plan for gradual economic revival in view of the Gulf war's adverse impact reflected in lower petroleum and Suez Canal revenues, smaller remittances, a serious decline in tourism, and decreased exports. All are major sources of foreign exchange.

Inappropriate Time

The Islamic expert adds that IMF demands come at an inopportune time. The fund should not pressure the Egyptian government. On the contrary, the major powers and especially the United States should play a positive role in pressing the Fund to allow the Egyptian government and its plan to catch their breath following the Gulf war which exhausted all Arab sources of funds and swallowed up all accumulated petrodollar surpluses.

To Regain Arabism

Rashad 'Ali Hasan, general manager of Suez Canal Islamic Bank, brings up a most serious point. He believes that the world has recently experienced dangerous economic blocs aimed at confronting the Islamic countries. Those blocs, he says, will destroy the Arab Islamic market unless the Islamic countries wake up, regain their Arabism and Islamism, and harness their collective wisdom and strength to dedicate their resources and products to serving each other. The alternative will be grievous Islamic and Arab losses.

He points an accusing finger to flaws in Egyptian government economic policies. He says the government should refrain from price fixing which dampens investment by discouraging production and depressing economic conditions. The economy's fundamentals remain inactive and idle. How can any country in the world achieve economic success with such primitive passivity?

He asserts that only a fool would not recognize that the Western nations are inhibiting the Arabs and Muslims from investing their funds in order to keep them ever-dependent on the West.

Solidarity

Economists emphasize the need for self-reliance and for promoting local production and individual initiative even if it takes a change of administration. The Arab and Islamic world must therefore stand united in the long range and hasten to create Islamic and Arab economic groupings. In the short term, however, they [Arab and Islamic countries] should lament being hostages of the Americans and the West for their basic needs. But needs have to be satisfied at whatever cost it takes, as the saying goes.

Black Market Flour Smuggling Reportedly Rising

91AA0249B Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 4 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by Nasir Fayyad: "Flour Smuggling Serial Continues"]

[Text] Despite continuing campaigns by Supply Ministry investigators and inspectors to track flour smuggling operations, the rate of leakage into the black market is increasing. Large amounts have been seized in recent months, exceeding those taken in previous years. New routes for smuggling flour from Cairo to provincial governorates and villages have been discovered. The phenomenon is raising the concern of investigators and worrying supply inspectors. It had been hoped that the decrees separating production from distribution and unifying prices would eliminate the problem, but the situation has remained the same and the severity of the problem has increased.

Supply Ministry statistics show a frightening increase in the number of smuggling cases in the baking and milling sector. In 1988, 16,000 tons were seized. In 1989, this increased to 19,000 tons. In 1990, it reached 19,500 tons. These figures confirm how serious the situation is. They constitute a final warning for the authorities to work to remedy this increase, and they call for additional surveillance measures to prevent smugglers from infiltrating distribution areas. High rates of smuggling from Cairo to the provinces and especially the villages have been noticed.

In recent weeks, in the course of repeated campaigns led by Investigations Director Brigadier General Jalal al-Sa'id, Supply Ministry investigators in al-Jizah seized dozens of cars loaded with flour from Cairo bound for the governorates. On one occasion, 333 gunny sacks of flour, each containing 100 kg, were seized. Trucks loaded with dozens of smuggled sacks are seized every day. The governorate has prepared itself to throw a cordon around smuggling operations, apprehend the criminals, and bring them to trial.

Effect of Price Difference

Major General Ishaq 'Ashmawi, head of the general administration of the Supply Ministry's Investigation Bureau, states that the difference between flour prices at the depots and the price at tourist and pastry shops is the main reason encouraging some bakery operators to dispose of part of their flour allocations to black marketers. Pastry stores have been observed supplementing their allotment of luxury-grade flour priced at 1.10 Egyptian pounds a sack from the black market or some bakeries at less than the fixed price. In general, multiple prices create the black market. Also, the other governorates do not have the same interest in providing supply goods as front-line governorates like Cairo and Alexandria have because of their special circumstances. That is why smuggling into the provincial governorates takes place.

Regular-grade flour heads the list of items smuggled. Bakeries continue to receive sacks at the price of 22 pounds, with the government carrying the remainder as support. In the countryside, this grade is considered cheaper than wheat. Peasants therefore prefer to deliver wheat at the price of 75 pounds an ardab and to buy fresh

bread. The price of flour in governorate depots has risen so that a sack of regular-grade flour costs 55 pounds and luxury-grade flour costs 70 pounds. However, the same sack is supplied to bakeries of Syrian-style bread at a price of 32 pounds. Another kind of luxury-grade flour is delivered to tourist, pastry, and pancake shops at a price of 1.10 pounds. The price of flour for pasta is 70 pounds. This difference in prices is what leads to the high price.

Solutions

Detailing the measures required to stop smuggling, Maj. Gen. 'Ashmawi said that most of them are in fact being applied. For example, there is the experiment of separating production from distribution. Bakeries are under constant surveillance. Centers for distributing flour from the warehouses to the bakeries are being monitored. There are constant campaigns, and traps have been set up on the routes leading in and out of Cairo. Also, the department takes security measures for vehicles apprehended smuggling, including the withdrawal of licenses. Smugglers are imprisoned. Surveillance over routes leaving the governorate is being intensified.

Maj. Gen. 'Ashmawi asks the Ministry of Justice to cooperate in working to prevent corrupt persons from obtaining government-supported flour which constitutes public wealth. This should be done by strengthening the penalty. The accused should be brought to court as a prisoner, rather than being released on bail, since the bail is never appropriate to what these accused persons realize. These defendants should be brought before special courts or judicial circuits, rather than the current courts.

IRAQ

Voice of Free Iraq Manager on Operations, Future

91AE0290A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
27 Feb 91 pp 54-56

[Interview with Ibrahim al-Zubaydi, manager of the Voice of Free Iraq, by Muhammad Mukhtar al-Fal, AL-MAJALLAH's office in the Gulf: "Ibrahim al-Zubaydi, Manager of Voice of Free Iraq and Former Manager of Radio Baghdad Tells AL-MAJALLAH, 'An Iraqi Was Sentenced to Five Years in Prison for Having a Dream That Threatened National Security';" date and place not given]

[Text] Voice of Free Iraq Radio has been involved since the first of January in the battle which is being fought by the media to expose the lies and deceptions of the tyrant of Baghdad. In a short period of time its broadcasts were being heard in Iraq. Ibrahim al-Zubaydi, the former manager of Baghdad Radio, is associated with the Voice of Free Iraq. AL-MAJALLAH met with him and interviewed him. This is what he said at the outset: "Our broadcasts are aimed at the Iraqi people. All members of the opposition and all opposition parties had been thinking about these radio broadcasts, which affected

events and were affected by them. These radio broadcasts became possible after some Arab countries gave us short wave and medium wave transmitters in an effort on their part to help us overcome the difficulties of getting started."

Ibrahim al-Zubaydi started his broadcasting career in Radio Baghdad where he worked as a broadcaster when he was 17 years old. He became chief broadcaster in 1964, and he served as the chief of the Programming and Varieties Section after that. He was then appointed manager of Baghdad Radio, and he served in that position from 1969 to 1974. But al-Zubaydi emigrated from Iraq in 1974 when he realized there was a movement toward bloodshed in the country. He realized then that he had to make a choice: he could join the Ba'th Party or emigrate. He chose the latter.

Defining the identity of the Voice of Free Iraq and the role it is being asked to play, Ibrahim al-Zubaydi said, "Our broadcasts are driven by the sense which everyone has that the Iraqi people in Iraq have not been able to make themselves heard abroad because the media blackout in our country has been significant. This blackout strives to isolate Iraqis from life in the outside world and tries to separate them from events in their country to keep them unaware of what is happening around them.

"Examples which illustrate that information is being withheld from citizens in Iraq have become well-known, and there are many stories which illustrate that. One of them, for example, is a statement made by Taha al-Jazrawi, also known as Taha Yasin Ramadan, who stated that Iraqi citizens were now enjoying the best days of their lives. On the same day he made that statement, al-Jazrawi, who was then minister of industry, issued a decree firing a group of Iraqi women from their positions. The lack of adequate resources to cover wages was the reason given for firing these women from their positions.

"One story which confirms that a news blackout exists and that information is being held back and confined to members of the gang is being whispered by Iraqis. This is the story about the death of Fadil al-'Ubaydi, one of Saddam's relatives and a member of his clan. The story about al-'Ubaydi, who was general manager of the Land Transport Corporation, goes as follows: 'A bus driven by an Egyptian driver took off on its route from Baghdad to Tikrit. The driver's instructions were to stop the bus at three stations only: Balad, Samra', and Tikrit. While the bus was en route between Samra' and Tikrit, a passenger from 'Awjah, Saddam's village, asked the driver to stop the bus. When the driver, following his instructions, refused to comply, an argument between the passenger and the driver ensued. Nevertheless, the driver continued to drive the bus, but when the bus arrived in Tikrit, the passenger took out his pistol and fired all the bullets in that pistol into the head of the poor Egyptian driver. Fadil al-'Ubaydi was contacted, since he was the

general manager of the corporation which was responsible for the murdered driver. Mr. al-'Ubaydi, who was also a member of Saddam's clan and one of his close associates, was contacted to solve the problem because there was tension in Tikrit following the incident.

"When al-'Ubaydi came and looked into the circumstances of the crime, he said, 'This is an assault. I do not blame the people who talk about us (that is, Saddam's kinfolk)'. These few words were enough, and al-'Ubaydi disappeared for six months. After the six months his mangled body was sent to his family.

"Another one of al-'Ubaydi's relatives has a daughter. Charges of a suspect relationship were trumped up against this daughter and a group of young men, and all of them were arrested. Their bodies were cut up into pieces and thrown in a garbage dumpster. Their families were then contacted by telephone and told, 'Go get your children from such and such a dumpster.' If this is what happens to the regime's close associates, can you imagine what happens to our people who have been afflicted with this tyrant?"

Al-Zubaydi went on to say, "While all this was going on, the media were hiding the truth and glorifying the tyrant's achievements. Cities are somewhat separated from each other, and residents of Baghdad, [for example] do not know what goes on in al-Basrah. Hapless citizens are watched by scores of agencies which practice repression and deception: the intelligence agency, the Republican Guard, the security agency, the Bureau of Investigation, and the party's investigations agency. All these agencies keep an eye on the hapless citizens and on each other.

"The Iraqi people are living in a deep abyss: they can neither see nor hear anything going on around them. That is why what our radio broadcasts offer our powerless people is honest and without precedent. We will continue to pursue that goal. Our radio broadcasts will not have to stretch the truth as the radio broadcasts of Baghdad's ruler do. Stories about the bloodshed under his regime make fabricating stories or stretching the truth unnecessary. Our approach and our purpose are such that we reject making up stories. We will present the facts as they are perceived by Iraqis in the country and abroad."

[Al-Fal] Given the brutality of the Iraqi regime, is it possible to find people inside Iraq who can provide you with information?

[Al-Zubaydi] First of all, this is hazardous and risky duty. However, those who dedicated themselves to serving their country and its virtuous values do take risks to achieve that major objective. Such risk-taking, however, is not limited to ordinary Iraqis who hate the regime; there are others in the regime who are working with us and providing us with information. Many of Iraq's ambassadors abroad provide us with information, and some senior officials have their own methods for taking part in providing this service. Then there are

organizations, parties, and independent figures who have their own channels and means of communication for sharing information. We have normal relations with all these people and organizations, and we continue to receive news from Iraq about the country and about fellow Iraqis there. You may be wondering why everyone is working with us, and the answer is that everyone thinks the country is burning and the ship of state is sinking. Everyone thinks something has to be done: the truth has to be told, and the consequences of that have to be borne.

[Al-Fal] You said that the Iraqi people were living in a deep abyss, and you said that they neither hear nor see. Are the Iraqi people, whose country is rich in oil, agricultural, mineral, and human resources, living a life which is compatible with their country's revenues?

[Al-Zubaydi] It has been more than one month since the war to liberate Kuwait started. Over 3,000 sorties are launched every day against the military installations of the tyrant's regime. Their targets are the camps, the air bases, the missile platforms, and the factories where legal and illegal weapons are manufactured. And yet, what has been destroyed so far is not even half of this arsenal.

We can say that what this lunatic spent on weapons is more money than what Iraq does and does not have. This means that Iraq's considerable national revenues have been spent and squandered and that debts are mounting for the Iraqi people. We remember how this lunatic embarked on a war with neighboring Iran, and we remember how he got out of it. We do not have to repeat what was destroyed in that war since that has become well-known. All this happened without the people of Iraq knowing why he went to war, why he got out of the war, and what he gained by it. Eight years later this tyrant who squandered Iraq's resources announced that the war with Iran had been a matter of intrigue and civil strife sought by the "nation's enemies." Saddam used the war to funnel much of the resources of the Gulf region under the pretext of defending the eastern gateway of the Arab nation.

We know that a large part of Iraq's oil has been pledged to European countries, like Germany and France, for the next 10 years. We know this oil was pledged in return for the weapons of destruction which these countries built in Iraq. More weapons than we need and more weapons than we can comprehend and operate were built in Iraq. The military establishment grew as a result, and what we now have in Iraq, which is well-known for its limited human resources and its limited geographical area, are 1 million fighters. Salaries, housing, and transportation had to be provided for these fighters, and that was disastrous for the Iraqi economy. It is known that before the invasion of Kuwait our economy was close to collapsing. The tyrant's regime hurtled into the unknown to find a quick solution to the economic crisis.

In addition to the military problem, there is the story of corruption, funds, and nepotism. A committee of financial experts and economists in the Iraqi opposition carried out a financial study listing Iraq's revenues and expenditures from 1976 until the occupation of Kuwait. The revenues included revenues from oil, agriculture, and minerals as well as aid, loans, and credit which Iraq received during that period.

The committee compared revenues with expenditures, and it found that \$100 billion could not be accounted for. In adding up expenditures, the committee took everything that was spent on weapons into consideration. It counted the estimated commissions paid for these operations, and it counted thefts as well as what the tyrant spent on himself and on his people and his followers.

One can affirm, therefore, that Iraqi citizens did not benefit at all. Iraqi citizens did not benefit from their country's resources, nor did they benefit from their own land. And how can they when they are under oppression, repression, and injustice? Can a person who lives in fear enjoy money even if that money were his?

Honest Iraqis fear for their security and dread a decline in their material income, and they are being tortured every day with lies which attribute the blessing of life to the tyrant. Did you hear him say that every sweater worn in Iraq is thanks to him? Did you hear him say that every drop of milk in Iraq is attributable to his kindness?

We would ask him why he is making up such lies: Why are you throwing your weight around? Where were the Iraqi people before you came to power, and where are they now? What was their life like then, and what is it like now?

[Al-Fal] It is no longer a secret that the Iraqi regime exercises its authority over the people of Iraq. But what people are wondering about now is this: why is it that this regime dominates the proud people of Iraq who have been known throughout history for rejecting injustice and humiliation?

[Al-Zubaydi] First of all, part of the answer to that question would become clear to us if we were to review how Saddam Husayn became involved with the Ba'th Party. It is known that Saddam joined the party in 1959. He was unknown then, and he did not become known until he took part in the assassination attempt against 'Abd-al-Karim Qasim. He became known then as a killer and an adventurer who did not shy away from conflict. This was the kind of assistance that the party needed, so it took him in and advanced him. The story of his flight to Syria and Egypt is well known. When the Ba'th Party devised a plan to take over power to sidestep the obstacle presented by Ibrahim al-Dawud, president of the Republican Guard, and 'Abd-al-Razzaq al-Nayif, chief of military intelligence, it took an approach which was similar to what one can see in American movies. The story is well-known. Members of the Ba'th Party made an agreement with al-Dawud and al-Nayif according to which

al-Nayif would become prime minister and al-Dawud would take over the Ministry of Defense. Those members of the Ba'th Party brought along Dr. Nasir al-'Ani, a well-known balanced national figure, to witness this agreement so that al-Dawud and al-Nayif would feel confident and reassured. Less than two weeks later, al-Dawud and al-Nayif were eliminated.

This plan, the plan to get rid of one's opponents, was the start of an ugly series of actions prepared and carried out by the Ba'th Party throughout the years of its rule. It were as though Saddam had discovered that method and found it to his liking. Unbeknownst to the military men who held leadership positions in the Ba'th Party, Saddam followed that approach. Behind their backs, he acted in his own interest on behalf of Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and under his protection. He was, after all, al-Bakr's "man" as well as his guard and spokesman.

When he came to power, he set out methodically to develop a series of actions that would enable him to get rid of his opponents. For that purpose, he recruited professional organizations which used rigorous methods to determine who were the most important Iraqis of all religions, denominations, parties, ethnic groups, classes, and associations, and he prepared a schedule in accordance with a well-considered plan to get rid of them. He started with Dr. Nasir al-'Ani who was invited to the [presidential] palace where he disappeared. After two days of repeated telephone inquiries from his wife, the fact that he had been invited to the palace or was there was denied. His body was [subsequently] found in al-Jaysh Canal.

Saddam recruited Sa'dun Shakir to liquidate nationalists and Ba'thists in the opposition. Communists were also liquidated. Then he started settling accounts with opposition leaders in the party who were in competition with him. Hardan al-Tikriti, 'Abd-al-Khaliq al-Samira'i, Muhammad 'Ayish, and 'Adnan al-Hamadani were either killed or driven insane. Then Saddam devised a plan to drive all those who opposed him politically out of the scene in Iraq. In fact, he wanted all those who were capable of engaging in political activity out of the picture altogether.

[Al-Fal] This prompts us to ask a question about the situation of Iraq after Saddam. What do you think the political map in Iraq will look like after Saddam, and who can succeed him in ruling Iraq?

[Al-Zubaydi] After 20 years of darkness and oppression, this question actually represents one of the predicaments of political life in Iraq. Saddam drove away all of Iraq's prominent figures. If you were to look for one outstanding person whom Iraqis would admire and universally agree to respect and trust, you would have to wait for a long time before you could point out a single person. This may be one of the reasons why a strike from within against Saddam is being held up. I would not rule out, however, that a devoted nationalist in the Iraqi army might come forward. This would be a person who

kept his true mettle and retained his devotion to the country despite all the efforts made by Saddam to distort the army's role and to utilize it to serve his goals. We hope such a hero will come forward so that a new stage of life with dignity can be restored to the people of Iraq.

[Al-Fal] You said that the military establishment was reorganized over a 20-year period in accordance with party loyalties and clandestine operating methods. Does the military establishment still have this character?

[Al-Zubaydi] Saddam Husayn is a bloodthirsty man. It is not likely, therefore, that he would have kind, righteous people of good character carrying out his policy for him and overseeing the country's industry, agriculture, and politics as his agents. This is why I am convinced that all those whom Saddam chose for such tasks are in one way or another his accomplices in crime. We are certain, however, that genuine, honorable, dignified, and just Iraqis continue to be the foundation of the country. It is the regime which brought about this darkness and this dark cloud which lets evil overshadow virtue, falsehood overshadow truth, and hypocrisy overshadow honesty. Loyal and sincere Iraqis are still alive and well, and when this corrupt layer is removed, their true mettle will show. Saddam tried to hide the true mettle of the Iraqi people. He tried to promote a falsehood about his reliance on 5 million Iraqis who are members of the Ba'th Party. If this were true, who then is responsible for the repeated assassination attempts against Saddam? The most recent such attempt was carried out on Army Day by the late Sattam al-Jaburi, who died that day with 11 Iraqi army officers. And yet, we do confirm that there is a plan which has been carefully executed to implicate all the leaders of the Iraqi army. When Saddam wants to kill an officer, he involves army leaders in the crime and that induces them to protect their common destiny.

Let me repeat, however, that loyal, devoted individuals who can make sacrifices are alive and well among the populace and in the army despite the extraordinary laws which are enacted by the tyrant to destroy every ambition and every sense of pride they have. Those who commit crimes are punished by all international rules and regulations, but not by the Iraqi regime which punishes wives, mothers, sisters, children, brothers, and all members of a clan when one of its members is accused of a crime. These infernal laws helped slow down the effort that was being made to get rid of this tyrannical and despotic regime. In addition, the regime spread a sense of suspicion and apprehension among the people so that no one confides in anyone, not even the closest person to him.

One story which is being told by Iraqis with a sense of sorrow and bitterness is about the citizen who dreamt that a coup d'etat had taken place in Iraq. He told two of his closest friends about his dream. Fearing that their friend may have deliberately confided in them to test them, they wrote a report to inform the authorities about their friend's dream. They wanted to have the upper hand and to prove that, when it comes to the security of

the state, they do their duty. The poor fellow was taken to court, and his trial was a farce: nightmares and dreams were on trial.

When the bewildered defendant sat down in front of the judge, this was what the judge told him, "Listen, you know that dreams are an expression of the unconscious mind. Why would you have such a dream if you were not hoping for a coup d'etat in Iraq? You are hereby sentenced to five years in prison."

That is how people go to prison in Iraq: they go to prison because of their dreams. Can this happen anywhere else but in Saddam Husayn's Iraq?

[Al-Fal] A law calling up all 17-year-old males for the draft was issued a few days ago. Students who are still in school were among those who were to be drafted. What do you think will be the effect of this law on life in Iraq?

[Al-Zubaydi] Life in Iraq was put on hold a long time before this decree. The people's army that you hear about is made up of civil servants, workers, peasants, and students. Peasants were taken away from their land, and students were taken out of school. In practice, even those who were 17 years old were drafted. And yet many students did manage to avoid the draft. The matter then is not new; what is new, however, is that the law enabled those who are responsible for the people's army to bring charges against any person who was accused of avoiding the military draft and to try him in court.

This matter actually reveals that Saddam's claims about having one million fighters are lies. Half of those fighters are peasants, civil servants, and school students. With this law Saddam demonstrates the magnitude of the crime he is committing against our people in Iraq. The people and the peasants of Iraq are being subjected to destruction in a war for which they have not been trained. They have not even been trained to carry weapons.

[Al-Fal] Do you believe that this will increase the possibility of tighter controls on the regime from within?

[Al-Zubaydi] This is a question that has to do with the army. No one in the army now can take any action without permission from the leadership. It is known that the army is totally cut off from all Iraqi opposition groups because Saddam stripped the army of all those who had any connections with political parties. This does not mean, however, that everyone in the army is a member of the Ba'th Party. There are independent young men who joined the party because they wanted to earn a living. They joined the party because they know that those who do not are not hired. Those who do not join the party are pursued by the authorities; they become suspect; and they are placed under observation.

We realize that these young people who are our brothers, our relatives, and our friends may feel bitter, but their circumstances are harsh. If current conditions were to cause the tight and unjust hold which was placed on

them to be relaxed, we would then start hoping that these devoted people might take positive action. There is much hope because telltale signs of hidden turmoil have started surfacing recently: handwritten leaflets were distributed in the army; slogans have appeared on walls in areas where there are no civilians; and attempts have been made in more than one location to assassinate symbols of the regime. Some of these people were actually assassinated. What one notices these days is that the tyrant's movements and the movements of his aides are extremely limited and enveloped in the utmost secrecy. All the ministers have sent their families to shelters outside Baghdad. All members of the gang understand the fury in people's hearts, and they know that a simple incident could set off an explosion.

[Al-Fal] You said that no one in the army takes any action unless he has an order. Do you have information about the method used by military leaders in their dealings with Saddam?

[Al-Zubaydi] All the leaders can be found these days in the tyrant's shelter, and three of Saddam's relatives convey the tyrant's military orders to those leaders. Every corps in the army receives its orders directly from Saddam, and there is no coordination and no communication between the various sectors of the army. Each corps is isolated from the rest of the army. An announcement was made a few days ago that Sa'di al-Jaburi had toured the front lines in Kuwait. That was a lie because al-Jaburi cannot leave the shelter where the tyrant can be found.

[Al-Fal] Speaking of the Iraqi regime's iniquities and media lies, what do you think about the lie that Saddam used in his series of false justifications for the invasion of Kuwait? As an Iraqi citizen and a media person, do you think the Iraqi people believe Saddam when he tells them that the invasion of Kuwait would return part of a whole body to its source?

[Al-Zubaydi] First of all, we in Iraq view our relationship with the Kuwaitis as a fraternal one. Our fellow Kuwaitis share this view with us. The borders between our countries are open: Iraqis travel to and from Kuwait whenever they wish, and Kuwaitis enter Iraq without a visa. Before the oil, Kuwaitis used to travel to al-Basrah to buy vegetables and then return to their people in Kuwait. After oil, Iraqis used to travel to Kuwait to buy the goods they could not find in Iraq's markets. There are many Kuwaitis who are originally from Iraq, and if we had stuck to this question about the part and the source, we would have had to redraw the map of the world more than three times. We reject such reasoning for several reasons. In addition, we ask ourselves this question: what is the population of Kuwait compared to Iraq's territory and population? What is the value of Kuwait's resources when compared with the value of Iraq's oil, agricultural, mineral, and human resources? It is a fact, on the one hand, that Iraq does not need Kuwait from a material

standpoint. On the other hand, the tyrant's repeated claim that the Kuwaitis were conspiring to destroy Iraq's economy makes no sense.

Does it make sense that the economy of a large, strong country like Iraq would be destroyed by a small country like Kuwait? What kind of economy would become paralyzed by an imaginary price war? No economy can be paralyzed by a price war unless it had really collapsed [already] before such a claim was ever made.

The invasion of Kuwait then is a proposition rejected by the Iraqi people for fraternal and religious reasons. The Iraqi people reject this invasion for reasons which have to do with proximity and international law. Ordinary Iraqis are wondering why Saddam changed his mind about staying in Arabistan if he were really the hero he claims to be. Why did he give up Shatt-al-'Arab? People are bitter as they wonder why he did not turn against the common enemy. Had he done that, Saddam would have found all the Arabs on his side. Even those of us who are subject to his fire, his torture, and his tyranny would have sided with him.

For Saddam then, this is not a question of a part being returned to its source, nor is it a question of taking one step toward unity, as he falsely claims the invasion of Kuwait was. The invasion of Kuwait was not a precursor to Palestine. The cat is now out of the bag. The invasion of Kuwait was a question of greed and megalomania. Saddam dreams of building an empire at the expense of our downtrodden people. Saddam aspires to carry the title of "the great Sultan of the Arabs." He did actually put that in writing one time, and he told his Revolutionary Command Council, "Someone you know will come to you one day carrying a handwritten letter from me proclaiming the caliphate and announcing that Iran has joined forces with us. We will then withdraw from the United Nations and establish the Islamic United Nations." Insane dreams know no limits. How can Saddam, whose career started by murder and bloodshed, expect that he will be accepted when he comes forward and declares himself the Muslims' caliph?

[Al-Fal] Actually, any reasonable person who keeps up with what is going on will not become overly concerned about Saddam's Islamic professions because no one buys them. But since you have revealed Saddam's dreams of a caliphate, can you shed some light on his relationship with scholars of Islamic jurisprudence in Iraq?

[Al-Zubaydi] Saddam used his own pistol and the pistols of his aides and lackeys to kill the best of Iraq's religious scholars. The story of the three hapless religious scholars who were sent by Saddam to Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani is well-known. Saddam booby-trapped their garments and sent them to negotiate with al-Barzani. What he did to these three religious scholars provides affirmative evidence of his desire and plan to do away with the scholars of Islamic jurisprudence in Iraq.

This man does not have one iota of religion, morality, or decency. That is why we, the Iraqis, are offended when

you call him, "the Iraqi President Saddam Husayn." Saddam does not represent the decent, genuine, Muslim Arab people of Iraq.

[Al-Fal] Is it possible that an effective Iraqi opposition might rise in Iraq and take part in getting the down-trodden people of Iraq to take some action?

[Al-Zubaydi] Talking about the Iraqi opposition now presents several problems as a result of the nature of the composition of Iraq. I think, however, that for Iraq to have a strong opposition whose influence in the country would be substantial, all opposition parties must merge together to form one grouping and one entity that will have one goal and the same method of action. All these opposition parties must communicate with the same united bases in the country. But if the opposition movement continues to consist of numerous parties, building it up will continue to present difficulties. That is why I will say this again: for the Iraqi opposition to move beyond the stage of fragmentation, opposition groups must unite and form one entity. They must think about Iraq of the future because the beginning of Saddam's end has just started. The opposition has to gain something from past mistakes which had widened the rift between the various groups which make up the population of Iraq.

[Al-Fal] Since one thing reminds us of another, what role did intellectuals play in exposing the crimes of the regime? How did some Iraqi intellectuals contribute to the deception of the people?

[Al-Zubaydi] Intellectuals have the same problem which the people have. There are intellectuals who endured, who did not sell out, and who fought, starved, and became homeless. But there are intellectuals who preferred to live in peace and tranquillity. Those intellectuals acquiesced with the regime and were drawn into the cycle of injustice. The situation is such that it sorts people out: there are those who go back to their true nature, and those who turn their back on it.

[Boxed Item]

- Several Iraqis who are specialists in radio broadcasting are involved in the preparation, production, and presentation of these radio programs.
- There is one volunteer female Kuwaiti broadcaster.
- Enthusiasm for the work to be done and high productivity make up for the limited number of personnel.
- There are no official work hours. Everyone works for 12 hours.

Religious Opposition Leader Discusses Foreign Policy

91AE0290B London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
27 Feb 91 p 43

[Article by Dr. Nijm 'Abd-al-Karim: "'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Hakim Tells AL-MAJALLAH, 'If Israel Had Been

Saddam's Target, a Strike Against Israel Would Have Preceded His Occupation of Kuwait'"]

[Text] 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Hakim, a member of the Central Advisory [Board] of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, is considered one of the leaders of Iraq's religious opposition. Mr. al-Hakim, who runs the Documentation Center for Human Rights in Iraq, was interviewed by AL-MAJALLAH and asked about several matters which have to do with the situation in Iraq. He was asked about the opposition's attitude and about the war to liberate Kuwait. Al-Hakim had this to say about the attitude of the Islamic opposition in Iraq and its relationship with Iran: "The opposition in Iraq predates the victory of the Iranian Revolution, but it evolved after that. This opposition does not deny the existence of a secular opposition. Realistically speaking, however, the Islamic opposition has no equal in Iraq, and the Kurdish opposition trails the Islamic opposition."

In his answer to a question about the reasons why military actions by the Islamic opposition were tempered, al-Hakim said, "We still believe in the armed struggle as a principal method of opposing the Iraqi regime, and we have every justification to hold on to this belief. Things changed, however, after the Iraq-Iran war was brought to an end. Although military operations cannot be carried out at the present time, the course of struggle will continue."

Al-Hakim then went on to talk about relations between Iran and Iraq. He talked about Tehran receiving Tariq 'Aziz, Iraq's minister of foreign affairs, and Barzan al-Tikriti, Saddam Husayn's brother. He said, "Iran approved the Security Council Resolution and is working for its implementation. Iran has the right to act in accordance with the policy it decides on, and we have nothing to do with this matter. Tariq 'Aziz and Barzan are among the regime's key figures, and they committed crimes against many Iraqis. Their visit to Tehran, however, is something that has to do with Iranian officials primarily."

One million lives were lost before Saddam Husayn approved the Algiers Agreement. Did that agreement stipulate that the Iraqi opposition, which is coming out of Iran, was to stop its activities? This is what al-Hakim said in that regard: "Our existence is not prohibited by the Algiers Agreement, and it is on that basis that we decided to stay in Iran until a decree asking us to leave was issued. I do not believe such a decree will be issued."

Al-Hakim had this to say about the poor living conditions which Iraqi expatriates are experiencing in Iran: "Iran has 750,000 Iraqi expatriates and 1.5 million Afghan expatriates. It is difficult to manage such a large number of refugees, given the negative posture of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency." Al-Hakim added, "The Iranian authorities have no objections to the departure of Iraqi refugees. Realistically speaking, however, these people have no passports, and that fact does present them with quite a problem, but that

problem may be solved in the coming months since I have been told that the Iranian government has started preparing passports for them."

Media Activity

Al-Hakim talked about the weakness of the opposition's activity in the media, and he affirmed that this activity fell short of standing up to a colonialist regime. He considered the Iraqi opposition to be very strong though because despite Saddam Husayn's dictatorial authority and intelligence machinery in Iraq, his control over Iraqi cities before his invasion of Kuwait could not be achieved without using the army. This was what happened in north Iraq, in al-Ahwar, and in central Iraq. Al-Hakim had this to say about differences within the religious opposition and the displacement of its ranks: "Iraqi Muslims have no problems with each other, and the source of the rumors which are being heard is suspect. It is inevitable that many points of view would be expressed on the Islamic Council because the council represents more than one person and more than one organization." Al-Hakim talked about joint plans which are being carried out by the Iraqi opposition working with other Iraqi movements.

Al-Hakim is one opposition figure who was recently involved in an extended meeting with officials of Britain's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Regarding his position on the war to liberate Kuwait, al-Hakim thought that Saddam Husayn's regime has always victimized the Iraqi people with its decisions and with its rashness and insanity. Al-Hakim affirmed that he condemned Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and he considered it an act of aggression. He also considered the regime's allegations to be false, and he said that if Israel had been that regime's target, Iraq would have used its missiles against Israel before occupying Kuwait. He also affirmed that although he refused to accept Saddam Husayn in power, he was standing with the Iraqi people.

The Construction of a Solution

Al-Hakim thinks that a solution to the present crisis must focus on allowing the opposition to play its part and on empowering it to make central and strategic decisions pertaining to the Iraqi people. He also thinks that the countries and the peoples of the region must become involved in finding a solution.

Al-Hakim had this to say about the method of action used by the Iraqi opposition under present circumstances in Iraq. "This opposition is not manifesting itself in Iraq, but it does have its own method of expression at this stage." He then went on to add, "Most of the new generation does not believe in the ideas of the Ba'th Party. Whatever harmony may appear to exist between this new generation and the regime is the product of fear and the cruelty of the intelligence machinery."

When al-Hakim was asked if he thought the Supreme Council might become the alternative to Saddam Husayn's regime, he replied, "The Supreme Council is

the de facto command body for the Iraqi opposition. We are striving to make the opposition the alternative to Saddam's regime." Al-Hakim affirmed that he believes in free elections.

ISRAEL

Arens Interviewed on Air Power, Rear Echelon Defense

91AE0322A Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE in Hebrew 6 Mar pp 4-7, 52

[Interview of Defense Minister Moshe Arens; date and place not given]

[Text]

[BAMAHAANE] Defense Minister Moshe Arens, how do you evaluate the security situation of the state of Israel following the end of the Gulf war?

[Arens] Our situation has no doubt improved most significantly due to the defeat of the Iraqi Army. Iraq had the largest military machine in the region and has always been perceived as a leading component in the eastern front that was liable to position itself against Israel. The weight of this threat has declined greatly in importance.

[BAMAHAANE] What is the chance that we will see Iraq returning to its military power in the coming years?

[Arens] It depends primarily on the willingness of arms producers in the world to supply weapons to the Iraqis. If the Soviet Union or the Western European countries return to a policy of selling arms to Iraq, and if elements are found who are willing to finance these purchases, we are likely to find the Iraqi Army returning to its previous strength within a relatively short time.

[BAMAHAANE] The war has ended, but Israel's response did not materialize. Has the deterrent ability or the credibility of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] been damaged?

[Arens] I do not think so. Our deterrent ability is based primarily on our military capability, whose strength is known throughout the world, especially in the Arab world. Nonetheless, I think that everyone understands that the war ended in an almost sudden manner, precisely when conditions had developed that made it possible to consider a contribution on our part to the elimination of the missile threat, which was eliminated with the conclusion of the war.

[BAMAHAANE] Should we change the security concept of the state of Israel?

[Arens] It is still too early to derive lessons, take a moral stocktaking, and examine whether a change in direction is needed. In previous years, we considered the problem of ground-to-ground missiles and the danger they pose to the rear. Several years ago, we began to develop the

Arrow [Hetz] system, which is the only system in the world that can contend, more or less soundly, with the threat of ground-to-ground missiles. We are energetically pushing the development of the system and will accelerate the process to the extent possible. Long before the Gulf war—actually, as soon as we identified the danger posed by ground-to-ground missiles to the Israeli rear—we recognized that the Arrow is the answer.

Beyond that, we saw the problems experienced by the American Air Force in locating and eliminating ground-to-ground missile launchers. That mission was not completed, although they attempted to execute it very energetically for six weeks. We estimated that if we were to act, we would have probably achieved greater gains. In any case, we must study this matter well, so that, along with the Arrow, we will have the ability to locate and eliminate launchers.

[BAMAHANE] Given the success of the American combat doctrine, is there a need to change the IDF's doctrine, which provides for the arraying of a rapid offensive by ground forces into enemy territory?

[Arens] In general, it can be said that this is the first war in human history that was decided by air power. Debates about air power have been going on in the world for many years. An American general, Billy Maidle [?], was dismissed from the Army because he believed that a war could be decided by air power alone. Perhaps he is now sitting above, happy to see what happened in Iraq. Our army personnel, like other army personnel in the world, have never seen such a thing: A modern army equipped with precision bombs operating over land forces for six weeks, day and night, twenty-four hours a day. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the Iraqi Air Force did not go up against the Americans, and Iraqi ground-to-air missiles revealed themselves as a total failure in all phases of the war.

We have an excellent air force. We also have American technology and most of the types of weapons that were used in the Gulf. We knew in advance that if air power operates for such a long time above land forces, the latter would ultimately be completely attrited. The question is whether Israel would have such an option in a time of war. Would we be able to use air power for six weeks. In the past, we never encountered such an option, and I do not estimate that it is necessary to build on such an option in the future.

[BAMAHANE] As one who is familiar with the subject, which types of weapons decided the battle in your opinion?

[Arens] In my estimation, modern aircraft, the F-15, F-16, F-18, the Tornado, and the F-117, with precision weapons, were decisively effective. That in itself did not surprise us, inasmuch as we have most of these weapons. In recent years, there has been much discussion about the era of the manned aircraft coming to an end. Opponents of the Lavi' project included those who argued that a manned combat aircraft would not be useful in the

battlefield of the future. The Gulf war did not strengthen this argument, inasmuch as the war was decided by manned aircraft with advanced technologies and smart bombs.

[BAMAHANE] Before the war, it was felt that nothing could be concealed from diversified, sophisticated intelligence means. Was there disappointment with the capability that was demonstrated in reality?

[Arens] We are not living in the era of omnipotent intelligence. First of all, regarding intentions, there were many surprises regarding Saddam Husayn's intentions. No satellite can read intentions. Regarding capability, I would say that on the macro [level], the estimations were good. The Americans knew exactly how many divisions were deployed in the area of Kuwait. Perhaps they did not know exactly whether these divisions had chemical combat means and whether they intended to use them during the fighting.

[BAMAHANE] Given that this is the first war to be decided by air power, is Israel likely to change its goals in the area of equipping itself?

[Arens] It is too early to say. It is no surprise that I am sorry that the Lavi' project was canceled. This war only reinforced the importance of such an aircraft. I do not know if it is possible now to return to the Lavi', or to move toward developing an even more advanced generation of combat aircraft. I have the impression that the damage that was caused [by the cancellation of the Lavi'] is irreparable. The aeronautics industry require many years to develop a modern combat aircraft. The teams have disbanded. To my regret, some of the people have left the country. In addition, it is hard to believe that we could manage to again mobilize financing for such a project in the American Congress. Beyond that, we will carry out a precise examination and derive lessons. I am unwilling to say that the matter will not result in any changes in our directions of thought, but I certainly do not think that it should be said that all of our thinking has been erroneous.

[BAMAHANE] What is the main thing that you noted for yourself on 'the small slip of paper' during the war, which you intend to take care of immediately at the end of the war?

[Arens] Actually, before the crisis erupted in the Gulf, the matter which we noted, and which became doubly valid in the war, is that we must organize the management of the rear in a more concentrated, centralized manner. We began to deal with this when the crisis erupted on 2 August. However, we decided not to change the organization of the rear's defense during the crisis. At present, the handling of the rear is dispersed among the commands, Civil Defense, and other bodies. We are moving toward changing the deployment in a way that concentrates everything related to the defense of the rear. Within several weeks, we will publicize the new framework that we will have formed.

[BAMAHANE] What exactly was your claim against the intelligence services?

[Arens] I had no claims against intelligence. I do not think that we were surprised. Among all intelligence elements in the world, our intelligence has no doubt been the best in appraising the Iraqi capability and the dangers inherent in it. That charge, which I made as it were, originated in an interesting leak from the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee [of the Knesset], which is supposed to conduct its discussions in secret. A storm has arisen over nothing. I did not criticize intelligence, neither in the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, nor anywhere else.

[BAMAHANE] Is the demand to know how many launchers are in the Iraqis' possession, or whether they have chemical warheads, an excessive demand?

[Arens] That demand is not excessive. However, I think that if we were to determine that our intelligence had to supply us with such precise data, it would simply drown. Such a demand is probably not within the realm of the possible, and we must not demand the impossible. This is the reality with which one must know how to exist. The state of Israel also has weapons whose location we do not want others to know about, and I believe that we have the ability to ensure that no one knows. Therefore, we do not need to be surprised if Iraq, which has a much larger territory, manages to conceal small weapons. This is a matter of vehicles, not large objects. Therefore, one should not make a claim against intelligence, because it did not know exactly how many launchers are at their disposal and where they are located at a specific moment.

[BAMAHANE] Despite the defeat of Saddam Husayn, he still controls Iraq. In our estimation, all of the missile launchers were not eliminated. Is this situation acceptable to us?

[Arens] There are many matters in the world that are not satisfactory to us. However, we do not see ourselves as being able to regulate matters throughout the world as we please.

[BAMAHANE] What arrangement will we demand to see in Iraq after the war?

[Arens] We cannot demand. We can only offer our suggestions. I hope that these suggestions will not differ from U.S. desires. If Iraq is allowed to re-arm, it will pose a danger not only to the state of Israel but to the entire world. We do not want this to happen. We want to see Iraq completely disarmed, not only regarding its nonconventional weapons. The missile threat against countries in the region should also be eliminated. It seems to me that these objectives are acceptable not only to us. Therefore it is likely that they will be obtained.

[BAMAHANE] How will the war affect the strength of Israeli society?

[Arens] I cannot measure this. I can say that the behavior of Israeli society was exemplary. If we ask ourselves whether we could have predicted how the Israeli rear would have behaved if close to forty missiles fell upon it, I do not know whether we could have predicted the actual behavior of the Israeli rear, which was truly extraordinary.

In this war, unprecedented things happened that people would have found it difficult to predict six months ago. If I were to say six months ago that the United States would concentrate a half million soldiers and the largest air force in history to eliminate the Iraqi Army, no one would have believed me.

[BAMAHANE] Should the rear now be a top priority for the state of Israel?

[Arens] The state of Israel must first of all defend the state's security interests, which also include the defense of the rear. This thinking stands behind the Arrow program, which is intended to contend with the threat posed by missiles to the rear.

[BAMAHANE] In this war, have we become transformed from a strategic asset into a burden for the Americans?

[Arens] I sensed no sign of us constituting any burden. On the contrary, our relation with the Americans during the war was very close and included a lot of information exchange. The information exchanges were two-way, and they contributed more than a little to the Americans. I do not think that it is correct to say that the work was done for us by others. Bush has acted in the Gulf to serve U.S. interests, not Israeli interests. This, by the way, should not surprise us, inasmuch as the United States and Israel have common values and ideals. Therefore, they also have common strategic interests.

[BAMAHANE] Is Jordan about to turn into another FATAH-land [base of operations of FATAH—the Palestine Liberation Movement], a focus of frustration and anger?

[Arens] This could happen, but it has not happened yet. FATAH-land was an area in which the sovereign government actually ceased being in control, and terror militias and organizations operated freely from it. This is not yet the situation in Jordan. The Jordanian security forces are still in control in the field. I do not know if they will continue to control the field or whether we are destined to see a Black September in 1991. For the present, there are still no signs of a loss of control. Yes, we know that the number of infiltrations from Jordan into Israel has increased in the past year. The Jordanian Government is attempting to prevent such infiltrations and has stopped not a few attempts by terrorists before they crossed the Jordan. However, it seems that the desire to penetrate into Israel and carry out terror operations is becoming stronger among a larger number of Jordanians and is resulting in more penetrations.

[BAMAHANE] Does the IDF need to change its deployment along the eastern border?

[Arens] As a result of incidents in which a number of soldiers and officers fell in meeting engagements with terrorists who infiltrated, we have strengthened our presence in the area and our deployment along the Jordanian border.

[BAMAHANE] How will the war affect the intifadah and relations between us and the Palestinians?

[Arens] The Middle Eastern reality is a very cruel reality. When a democratic society such as ours is located in such a region, it is natural that there will be people who will tend to believe in false hopes, who will refuse to recognize the reality, and who will idealize the conditions prevailing in the region to the point of concluding that Israel is the obstacle to peace. This is of course completely absurd. It suffices to visit our military cemeteries to understand where the obstacle to peace is. One of the things that Saddam Husayn did was to sober many people, including Israelis. Saddam brought us back to the difficult reality in which we live, to the deep hatred of Israel that is the lot of many Arabs, not only of the Iraqis, but also of the Palestinians. We have come to know that the Palestinians do not want peace with Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state next to us. Rather, they want to liquidate the state of Israel. We saw how much it was hoped that Saddam would realize his threats to burn half of Israel using his chemical weapons. Thus, I imagine that the Israeli public is more sober, perhaps sadder, today. I hope that a similar process of sobering has also occurred among the Arab population in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza region. I hope that at least a portion of this population will reach the inevitable conclusion that violence will gain nothing, neither the violence of Saddam Husayn nor Palestinian violence. If they want to reach an agreement, an understanding, and peace, it must be done through political processes, not terror.

[BAMAHANE] Can we exploit the situation to bring an end to the intifadah?

[Arens] There has been a significant decline in the number of violent incidents in recent weeks. I do not want to risk saying that this has already become a natural phenomenon and that there is no danger of a return to the dimensions of violence that existed before the Gulf crisis. We are investing considerable thought in ascertaining whether it is possible to bring about a turn. We must first examine whether such a turn has taken place in the Arab population. It is still too early to judge.

[BAMAHANE] With the end of the Gulf war, has an opening to a new peace settlement in the Middle East been created, for example with the Syrians, who firmly sided with Western forces?

[Arens] Every crack and possibility must be examined to the extent that it exists. At the same time, it is necessary to be realistic. The Syrians participated in the coalition,

not out of love for Israel, but out of hatred for Saddam, hatred which is not clear to us. It is difficult to understand the source of the rivalry between the head of the Syrian Ba'th Party and the head of the Iraqi Ba'th Party. I am not sure that there are ideological differences between these two persons. They have both taken positions that are very hostile toward Israel. Nonetheless, the Syrians' participation in the coalition could lead them to change their thinking and ascend to the road of peace. I hope that this is so, but we have yet to see signs of it.

[BAMAHANE] Will we be prepared to make concessions to reach a peace settlement with the Syrians.

[Arens] Some of us have locked onto this approach. Why does peace need to be based on Israeli concessions, and not on concessions by a state that attacked us five times and is always threatening war?

Negotiations can ultimately produce one or another concession on the part of one of the parties. However, this must be a bilateral process. The problem to date has not been one of Israeli concessions. Would Israeli concessions have brought Saddam to peace with Israel?

[BAMAHANE] How do you see Israel being integrated in the new world order that the Americans will attempt to arrange in the Middle East?

[Arens] It is no secret that Israel wants to achieve quiet in the Middle East even more than the Americans. In sum, the Americans can exist in a Middle East that lacks complete quiet.

[BAMAHANE] We were all impressed with the boldness demonstrated by the American leadership throughout the crisis. Are you jealous of them? Is it that we no longer sense the same boldness on our part?

[Arens] The President of the United States executed well the mission that fell to him as the leader of the Western world. It should be remembered that the United States has a different system of government, which is very centralized and grants the President very great power. It should also be remembered that the American boldness that was demonstrated in recent weeks was demonstrated against an enemy. The state of Israel is an ally of the United States. This is a different situation, especially inasmuch as we also know how to be bold when our interests are involved.

[BAMAHANE] Do you accept the approach according to which the importance of territory has declined in the era of long-range missiles?

[Arens] Whoever thinks that any change occurred here that invalidates the importance of territory has not considered the matter completely, or does not understand it. We would not want to see the Iraqi Army on the border of Petah-Tiqva, which could have happened had we conceded the territories. Throughout the war, we lived with the logical fear that the Iraqi Army would enter Jordan. Fortunately, we did not have to fear that the Iraqi Army would enter Judea and Samaria.

[BAMAHANE] Is the coming period likely to witness a contradiction between our security interests and the possibilities latent in a political development?

[Arens] I do not think so, because our political objective is primarily to ensure the security interests of the state of Israel. As one who has been both foreign minister and defense minister, I see no contradiction between our political objectives and our security objectives.

[BAMAHANE] Who are your heroes in this war?

[Arens] The main hero is President Bush, who headed the operation, followed by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Secretary of State James Baker, Chief of Staff General Powell, the Commander of American forces in the Gulf, Schwarzkopf, and the pilots and ground soldiers who did the job in an excellent fashion and invalidated all of the fears that arose regarding a second Vietnam and body bags flooding the United States.

[BAMAHANE] If you were to stand today, at the end of the state of emergency, before IDF soldiers and personnel of the security system, what would you say to them?

[Arens] Israel still faces security problems that are by no means insignificant. Around us are states with large armies that are in a state of war with Israel, and we must continue to be on guard.

Defense Ministry Ready To Establish Bank in Gaza

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9 Apr 91 p 1

[Text] Eytan Rabin reports that Defense Minister Moshe Arens met yesterday in his office with representatives of the Gaza Strip Chambers of Commerce and informed them that the defense establishment would be ready to establish a commercial bank in the Strip which would, among other things, grant start-up loans for factories. The new bank would be autonomous, run by industrialists and not under the Bank of Israel's supervision. Arens also said that he would consider cancelling the debts of failing industries so that they may renew their operations.

Until about a month ago, the defense establishment refrained from permitting the establishment of a comprehensive manufacturers association in Gaza, patterned after the Israel Manufacturers Association. Then, the policy was changed and the establishment of the association was permitted. Yesterday, following Arens' announcement of the new organization's enhanced spheres of operation, the delegation's members expressed their desire to meet with the Israel Manufacturers Association chairman, Dov Laupmann and obtain advice from him about setting up a similar organization in Gaza.

Palestinian sources yesterday reported that the delegation included Mahmud al-Yazji, Tawfiq Abu-Ghazalah,

and the Gaza manufacturers' legal adviser. According to them, the delegation sought to establish a bank, to be financed by such esteemed persons from Gaza as Mansur al-Shawwa, which will grant loans to new new industries and to failing ones.

Defense establishment sources yesterday affirmed that the meeting took place [unclear passage]. According to them, there is an intention to create jobs in the Gaza Strip by setting up economic industries.

Sharon Interviewed on Immigration, Implications of War

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in Hebrew 1 Mar 91 pp 12-15

[Interview with Housing and Construction Minister Ari'el Sharon by Sima Qadmon; date and place not given]

[Text] On Sunday, several hours after the land offensive began in the Gulf, Major General (reserves) Yanush Ben-Gal was hosted at the studio of IDF [Israel Defense Forces] Radio. "I was willing to pay a lot of money to be there," he stated excitedly. "You must understand that I am a military person. This is my profession. What greater challenge is there for a military person than to be a partner in the most advanced battlefield in the world?"

[Qadmon] Ariq Sharon, you are also a military person. Have you also felt that way?

[Sharon] No. I have no desire to participate in a battle as a professional person. I would not go to fight in foreign battlefields solely because I am a military professional. It is not like being a surgeon who is interested in participating in an interesting operation in a hospital in Boston. All of my military service and security activities were carried out with a direct, close connection to a Jewish-Zionist outlook, not a professional outlook. Therefore, I have no desire to be where others are conducting a war.

[Background] In August, several days after the Iraqis' invasion of Kuwait, the housing and construction minister [Sharon] sent personal letters to the prime minister and to the defense minister. "In view of the latent dangers posed for Israel and the possibility of war," he wrote, "it is my desire to return to the reserves to receive a command position." He mentioned his previous position as an Armored Corps commander, which was taken from him, pursuant to the law, when he was appointed minister. "In the event of a legal difficulty," he added, "I would be willing, in the event of war, to leave the government."

At 1230 exactly, the white Volvo stopped amid thick clouds of dust. On the hill, on the eastern border of Beersheva, next to a large sign announcing a joint project of the Jewish National Fund and the Construction and Housing Ministry, is a cloth awning under which are crowded lines and lines of plastic chairs. This is the site

of "Hatzerim." Soon, 8,000 housing units for new immigrants will be built here. Maps of the planned area are attached with pins to hard cardboard and placed in an arc at a comfortable viewing angle. There is a sense of the pioneer spirit and action pulsating through the loudspeakers, which are playing "sing sing Mamtera ["Suvi Suvi Mamtera—"spin, spin sprinkler"—an Israeli pioneer song]" and "Oh, the Red Rock [a song from the pioneering period about a fatal expedition to Petra]." Either nothing has changed in the last 30 years, or history is simply repeating itself. You can swear you have been here before.

Three days before the land offensive, Sharon hosted a delegation of 80 "bonds" leaders. They got off the dusty buses and went under the awning, where the coolness of air conditioning and the scent of American cigarettes and aftershave could be detected. Enthusiastic clapping accompanies Ariq Sharon, when he stands before the microphone. Eyes widen as he speaks in Hebrew-accented English about the number of immigrants whom we expect in the coming ten years, and his eyes become moistened when he thanks them, the "bonds" leaders, for the large sum they have collected for the enormous immigration from Russia. Shudders of emotion seize them when he reprimands: "But this is not enough. We need more. We need to do more." The excitement is at its peak, when he insolently says: "The state of Israel is not an Israeli project. It is a Jewish project." The applause is endless.

Something about Sharon is different. It is difficult to put a finger on it precisely. He begins to talk about how we must rely only on ourselves. His voice becomes more strident as he warns that the Israeli Government's refrainment from intervention in the war will help us only for one day after the war. It is only when he recalls excitedly that the Israeli Government did not defend its residents from the missile attacks, does one sense what had so far been lacking in him: enthusiasm. Suddenly you understand that, until Sharon began to speak about the security of the state of Israel, he simply seemed bored.

[Qadmon] If it were possible, would you exchange four years in the Construction and Housing Ministry for one week in the Defense Ministry?

[Sharon] (Sharon does not speak hastily. He speaks slowly and cautiously as if a large mine were hidden in the question posed to him.) No, No, I am satisfied with my current position. Except for defending the lives of Jews, the absorption of immigration is the most important matter at hand. I know what I could do in the Defense Ministry, but I do not have an uncomfortable feeling because I am not there.

[Background] In recent weeks, so it seems, Sharon has been passing from buildup sites to destroyed sites. Currently, there is an abundance of both. On buildup sites, he attempts to mobilize [financial] capital. On destroyed sites, it is said, he attempts to mobilize political capital.

There is talk of weeks of silence that have ended, as it were, last week with his appearance on "Moqed [television news program]." Until then, he had refused to express his opinion regarding the Gulf war. On "Moqed," Sharon spoke somewhat convolutedly, which is the only way to explain that everyone understood him to be calling for our intervention in the Gulf war, although he strongly denies this.

[Sharon] I did not call for intervention. I reiterated what I said on the second day of the war, when the missiles began to fall. I seek neither revenge nor retaliation, nor am I calling for the discharge of stormy impulses. I spoke only about one thing: preventing missiles from being fired against Israel.

And from the beginning, I stated most clearly that if the Americans think that our involvement would be a disruption, let them take all the measures. They have all the forces needed for that. They have an excellent air force. They have special units, airborne divisions, and para-troop divisions. This place [where the missile launchers are located] is 200 km from the Saudi border [and thus closer to allied forces]. If they do not want us to act, let them act. If they cannot prevent this fire, there is a possibility that they will allow us to join. Let the day be divided, so that they work during part of the day and we work during the other part.

If they are unwilling to or cannot do this, let them give us a chance to handle this alone. What is happening now is a wager. To date, missiles have fallen in open areas, between houses, and next to them. Fortunately, a major disaster has been averted. However, it is still a wager.

[Qadmon] Do you not think that intervention in the war under the existing conditions would be no less of a wager?

[Sharon] There are matters of principle. Israel's security concept in the days of Ben-Gurion, Eshkol, Golda, Yitzhaq Rabin, and certainly in the days of Menahem Begin, brooked no compromise. It was clear that Israel must do the maximum to protect its citizens. This was the concept then as it is now. I do not say so as one who rejoices at going to war. All of us have children who are serving in the army.

The question is, can Israel permit itself to knowingly not provide the full protection that it is capable of giving to its citizens. I am not talking about a debate between a passive mask and an active hood.

[Qadmon] What would happen if something were to go wrong? If, because of our intervention, the coalition were to break up, and we would have brought upon ourselves a terrible disaster.

[Sharon] And what would happen if a missile were to strike, causing a terrible disaster? Aside from that, when we decided not to intervene, did we know for certain that nothing would happen, that falling missiles would not cause disasters? Something has happened here which did

not begin today. It began during the intifadah, when this people [the Israelis] were taught that one must live with gasoline bombs, rocks, and knives. Why did Israel not take measures then? Because of fear over how the Americans would respond.

Now, the second stage has arrived. They have accustomed the people to [believe that] missiles are not such a bad thing. So you flee from Tel Aviv to Area F, and suddenly there are missiles in Area F as well, and you flee northward again. People have begun to rush around in Israel from place to place in search of a place that affords some security. In my opinion this has long-term destructive effects. People here have been imbued with a feeling of "what can Israel do," and then, what can we do but are not doing because the Americans do not want us to do it. In other words, we have done an indescribable damage to the people's sense of security.

In England, did the people not go to work during the difficult days of attacks? Yes, they did. Everyone did their very best. Only then is there moral force to make demands on the citizens. The people can be told that they must go to work only when everyone is making a maximum effort. This is not the situation here. When some are asked to give their maximum effort and told "but there is a problem with the Americans, they are not permitting us [to do so]," this has very dangerous implications.

[Qadmon] It is a fact that polls have shown that most of the public supports this approach.

[Sharon] I do not recommend that we let ourselves be impressed by polls.

[Qadmon] But the war is almost over. Let us assume that the current damage figures will remain the same more or less. Do you not think that, in retrospect, restraint—sitting quietly and not being pushed into the war—has nonetheless been the most correct course?

[Sharon] I think that this has been an unprecedented mistake, a mistake for which we will pay. It is good to gain time in the short term. However, Israel's failure to insist on there being no missile firings in the strongest possible terms, and its failure to declare unequivocally "it is either you or us," is a major mistake in terms of the [Israeli] people's sense [of security] and in terms of any future political arrangement.

These matters cannot be excused. They have accustomed this people to knives and stones in the heart of the settlement. Now, they have accustomed us to missiles as well.

[Background] Ariq Sharon is careful not to attack anyone directly. Sometimes, when he mentions inexcusable mistakes that have been made using the third person impersonal, i.e., "them," you can think, mistakenly, for a moment that you are talking with some member of a small, forgotten party rather than with a senior minister in the Israeli Government who shares in all crucial

decisions, has access to all of the information, and, whether he likes it or not, is like "them" insofar as he also bears all of the responsibility.

On "Moqed," he argued that we possessed all of the necessary intelligence about what was going on in Iraq but did not know how to use it.

[Sharon] True, over the years, the government obtained information on the Iraqi Army's strength. Some put their trust in the protracted war between Iraq and Iran. I argued against that war being in our favor, because these years of combat provided the Iraqi Army with great experience. There are no surprises regarding the number of tanks, divisions, and chemical and nuclear weapons. For many years, we have maintained a policy by which we knew that there were things that the Arabs could not be permitted to possess.

At the end of the fifties, this was [seen] in the activity against Egypt, which had begun to produce chemical weapons. In the eighties, when it became known that the Iraqis were about to produce a nuclear weapon, a basic decision was made. I had the privilege of working with Menahem Begin and to be among those who pushed for the destruction of Iraq's nuclear reactor.

Throughout all of these years, Israel has maintained a very clear policy of preemption. In the last seven or eight years, we knew, but we viewed the matter differently. We should have done something. We should have found ways to deal with the problem. I cannot say how. However, it is a fact that we have been thrown into this difficult situation.

[Qadmon] Is the person who said that former Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin is preparing his alibi for the inquiring commission correct?

[Sharon] I do not want to comment on this directly. I am only relating what existed until the end of Menahem Begin's tenure. That was the line of the state of Israel. To now say that we did not know! The government knew about Iraq's conventional and nonconventional buildup. The question is, what did the government do with this information.

[Qadmon] However, excuse me, you are a member of this government, and you are a member of the cabinet. Why did you not speak out?

[Sharon] I not only spoke, I also fought. In times when I could have an influence on these matters, in times when the security doctrine was that of Ben-Gurion, Eshkol, Golda, and Begin, when all of them had the same concept regarding defense, things were different then. Throughout the years, I have expressed my opinions on this matter and political matters. I expressed them strongly. So why do you not ask me now why I did not resign?

[Qadmon] Why did you not resign?

[Sharon] It cannot be claimed that I did not resign over matters of principle. I spoke of the security failure, the absorption of immigration, and the error in the political approach. I was not afraid to resign. I returned to the government to handle a matter, which, except for the protection of lives, is the most important matter at present, and to which I believe that I can contribute. In another 30 years, when the protocols of government meetings are opened, everyone will know the truth.

[Background] The war caught Sharon at his farm in Area F, north of Beersheva. Therefore, it is not relevant, in his opinion, how he spent the first night in which the air raid alert was sounded, when all of us, with shaking hands, put on gas masks for the first time. However, the feeling, he states, was hard. Very hard. As one who has participated in all of the wars of the state of Israel, he knows how, during the most difficult times, there was always a feeling of pride that hundreds of thousands of citizens were living normally and quietly in the rear.

[Sharon] What it is difficult is the feeling that I have during each alert thinking that it is really in Israel's power to prevent this situation, this running back and forth between the sealed room and the shelter. Each time there is an alert, I think about this. This was the terrible situation in the north before the Lebanon war [when Katyusha rockets were fired at northern Israel]. Public opinion shapes lives in Tel Aviv. What they now feel in Tel Aviv was felt in the north for years.

[Qadmon] Do you know the latest joke about you? (He does not. I tell him.) What does Ariq Sharon do in his sealed room? Answer: He counts how many times a distance of 40 km comes in between Israel and Baghdad [a reference to the 40-km limit established initially as the maximum distance Israeli forces would move into Lebanon in 1982].

"Good," he says, and laughs a bit. If there is something about Sharon on which all agree completely, it is his sense of humor.

[Sharon] I said, and I am willing to reiterate, that an apology has already been made to Menahem Begin regarding the blowing up of the [Iraqi] reactor. Soon, yes soon, they will apologize to him regarding the Lebanon war. I had the privilege of being among the initiators of the attack against the reactor in Baghdad, and the privilege of being Menahem Begin's defense minister before and during the Lebanon war. What we did in these two operations was precisely preventive warfare.

[Qadmon] Perhaps that could be said about the atomic reactor. It is somewhat more difficult to say it about the Lebanon war.

[Sharon] What is currently happening on the northern border is that people can continue to live there, which is a result of the Lebanon war.

[Qadmon] Yes, but for that purpose, there was no need to go further than 40 km.

[Sharon] There is no reason to talk about this. It was not possible to stop. There was a detailed decision by the government. All of the protocols will confirm this.

[Background] Three days before the start of the land offensive, I joined Sharon and his aids on a tour of construction sites in the Negev. The convoy of cars leaves, headed by Sharon in his white Volvo, followed by Subarus containing a battalion of aides, guards, spokesmen, and members of his ministry. The convoy moves from site to site, following a fixed schedule in which we move rapidly across desert sands, grind to a halt at a site, jump from the cars, and quickly take out colored maps from the glove compartment of one of the Subarus. The maps are spread out on a car. The group crowds around. Arye Bar, the director of the Negev District in the Housing Ministry, an energetic, active person, illustrates the progress using a thin metal pointer. Everyone views the expanses, which are sprouting with small concrete cubes, electricity poles, and miniature wooden houses. Minister Sharon asks, Minister Sharon states, Minister Sharon dictates to the small notebook of one of his aides.

Ariq Sharon knows that it is impossible to argue with facts. During those long hours, I was drowned in a sea of facts: amazing numbers of apartments, houses, trailers, wooden houses, build-your-own-house sites [homes built under a plan that grants incentives to persons building their homes themselves], [housing for] young couples, impressive plans, walking tours among houses in the initial and advanced stages of construction, sightseeing tours in empty areas that have only been marked, infinite reports on construction progress and delays, recommendations, questions, and orders.

During that unending march among the sites, it seems that I was being punished for all of those media people who claimed that nothing was being done in the field.

If the desert did not deceive me, and we did not go around in a circle that entire day, the Negev is undoubtedly beginning to be built up.

[Qadmon] Minister Sharon, you are speaking of 2.5 million immigrants who are expected in the next ten years and billions of dollars [that will be needed]. How is it that you—who perhaps know better than anybody how much we will need the money of the Americans—suggest that we become entangled in the Gulf and jeopardize our relations with the Americans?

[Sharon] True, Israel receives aid from the United States. However, this is not a charity gift. Israel has paid for every dollar that it has received. Much of what the allied forces are doing in the Gulf at present—the knowledge, experience, and short cuts [from which they are benefiting]—stems from the contribution of Israeli intelligence in past years. And this is not our only contribution, but there is also the fact that we are a stable democracy.

Israel will certainly need to receive American aid. One of the things that saddens me is that Israel does not demand

this aid in a loud voice. True, the Americans respond: 'We are endangering our boys and you are talking about money.' I thank the forces in the Gulf. However, we stood for a thousand days on the [Suez] Canal against the Egyptians and the Russians, and we preserved the interests of the entire world. That was difficult. It was difficult to decide to attack missile bases manned by Russian officers. It was difficult to decide to shoot down aircraft piloted by Russians.

Ultimately, it was this small Israel that arrested the Soviet expansion. Thus, one can demand all of these things with an upright posture, without a feeling of inferiority.

[Qadmon] Sharon is angered by the fact that we have yet to put forth demands.

[Sharon] Instead of announcing now that Israel does not have preconditions, instead of saying that we will hold talks with these [Palestinians] who are dancing with joy on roofs when missiles are striking Tel Aviv, instead of dealing with all of these vain statements, we must come forward with preconditions, and demand that Iraq no longer be permitted to develop, possess, or acquire chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and that it be prohibited from having missiles. I have not heard an Israeli demand, even amid talk of a cease-fire, that weapons never be positioned in Western Iraq.

Israeli statements now say: 'Israel does not have preconditions.' We will talk with those dancing on the roofs. This does not have to be said, certainly not as a government position. The government should clarify that this is a private statement.

[Qadmon] More than ever, Sharon thinks that his old plan to topple King Husayn and transform Jordan into a Palestinian state is the correct course. In his opinion, this is the key to solving the Palestinian problem.

[Sharon] Trends in the world support this plan. I am not saying how this is to be done. I do not want to enter into what could happen and how it could be done.

[Background] No, states Sharon, it is now impossible, after all that has happened, to remove from mothballs the peace plan of 14 May 1989. Too many things have happened then. It is now impossible to return to the foolishness of democratic elections for those who dance on the roofs of houses.

[Sharon] These matters should be viewed much more broadly. One does not create "a new order" with old faces. There must be a process of democratization in the Arab states. It is necessary to decide on the cessation of the arms race, and to see to it that Israel will have a quantity of weapons like that of all of the Arab states together. It is necessary to eliminate terror organizations and to treat regional problems such as water and refugees. To this must be added direct negotiations and the creation of a situation of nonbelligerency. Then, Israel would have to determine what it can and cannot do.

It is said that everything is open to negotiations without preconditions. Is Jerusalem open to negotiations? The Golan? There are Knesset resolutions [on the annexation of the Golan Heights and Jerusalem]. The key to solving the Palestinian problem remains in the establishment of a Palestinian state in Jordan.

[Qadmon] Can it be understood from your support of Rehav'am Ze'evi's entry into the government that you accept his transfer plan?

[Sharon] I do not want to deal with this now. I am speaking of a plan that I believe can be implemented.

[Qadmon] It is no secret that you want to contend for the national leadership. It is said that you are too late. Shamir will remain in the throne for another few years, after which he will vacate it for Moshe Arens or one of the [Likud] princes. Why do you not see it as a national mission to descend from the theatre of history as the person who absorbed two million Jews and declare in advance that you have no ambitions for the position [of prime minister]? That way, you would receive greater help and confidence, both from your party and from the opposition, regarding the complicated position that you are currently filling.

[Sharon] (Ariq Sharon smiles) I have always said that my secret weapon is that I have had many fewer ambitions than people think. I do not intend to change my opinion regarding contending. Anyone who chooses this life, must contribute as much as possible. I believe that I can contribute in this area.

Number of Bedouins in IDF Increasing

91AE0293D Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew
26 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by Emmanuel Rosen]

[Text] The number of Bedouins drafted into the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] this year has nearly tripled as part of the new policy stated by Defense Minister Moshe Arens a few months ago. Eighty-seven Bedouins were drafted a few weeks ago as opposed to the 30 drafted last year.

A few months ago the defense minister instructed the manpower branch of the general staff to work on increasing the number of Bedouins—whose service is not compulsory—drafted. Arens was concerned about the increasingly extremist tendencies among the Bedouin community in Israel and thought it could be stopped by increasing the number of draftees and decreasing the alienation between the IDF and the Bedouins. It was decided to draft 32 Youth Corps counselors to operate shooting clubs in Bedouin settlements and work on drafting them into the army.

The manpower branch prepared a special program in which IDF officers worked among the Bedouins. It was also decided to open additional units and jobs to them

and not restrict them to traditional tracking jobs. The IDF is satisfied with the sharp increase in the number of Bedouin draftees and hopes for further improvements in the coming months.

IDF Reportedly Lost War

91AE0302A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew
5 Mar 91 p 10

[Article by Israel Rosenblatt: "Crushing the IDF"]

[Text] In his book "Topaz," the Jewish-American author Leon Uris compares the United States with a long-legged, silent cowboy, controlling himself with super-human restraint against the disparagement of his arrogant enemies. When he finally reacts, however, the earth shakes. "Topaz," for those who have forgotten, is a tale of espionage on the background of the crisis of the Soviet missiles discovered by the United States in Cuba in 1962.

Obviously, Uris' cowboy was not named Norman Schwarzkopf, but that is entirely immaterial, because he was and remains nameless. [He is] the eternal American hero, who burst forth from the horizon, disappearing beyond the rainbow after crushing the bad guys.

Since he is mythical and eternal as in all of the legends, the cowboy remains in his saddle, though swerving, even after his absence from the Vietnam war brought with it a traumatic earthquake in American society. Even the failed incursion to rescue the American hostages in Iran did not shatter his image.

In preparation for Operation Desert Storm, he exchanged his pair of guns for two intelligent bombs, equipped himself with a high intelligence quotient, and, while the Soviet Union struggled with a severe shortage of potatoes, the eternal cowboy established "Pax Americana" in the Gulf.

Incidentally, the "bad guys" with whom our cowboy has to deal are no longer necessarily Communists, but Caribbean or Middle-Eastern dictators. It was not in vain that the author of spy thrillers, Gavin Lyle, established a unique society for the fall of the Gorbachev regime. "Glasnost has destroyed the livelihood of writers like me. None of the readers still believes in the existence of Soviet spies," explained Lyle.

Ever since the four-star (merely a temporary number) cowboy on duty crushed the current wicked one, the media, both in the United States and Israel, are engaged in deriding the pounding of its operations. At the same time, in Israel [there are those who are] also engaging energetically in crushing the image of the IDF [Israel Defense Force]. It is somewhat difficult to believe what living for a month and a half (gross) in a sealed room does to people.

There are those for whom this tendency of self-denial falls within the framework of the national swing, rising

and falling between euphoria and depression. For others, the trend to minimize the weight of the IDF and dwarf the image of its generals serves a political goal. A state with a disorganized army that is incapable of defending its civilian rear, along with loudmouthed generals, must seek shelter from missiles behind the back of the American cowboy.

It is somewhat amusing that those who, in recent years, have demanded cuts in defense budgets, claiming that the danger to Israel has decreased, are now playing innocent and wondering out loud why the IDF does not have answers to the accelerated armament of Iraq or Syria.

The Gulf war was the first war in which the IDF was defeated without even firing a single shot.

Finance Committee Politics Discussed

91AE0306A Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew
1 Mar 91 p 14

[Article by Avi Temkin: "The New 'Sheriff' Shoots From the Hip"]

[Text] The Minister of Finance, Yitzhak Moda'i, is eager to negotiate with the Rekanati family on the sale of the shares of the Discount Bank. This week, he explained to the members of the Knesset Finance Committee that he, together with the Ministerial Committee for Economic Affairs, had decided to continue with the negotiations, despite the opposition of Bank of Israel Governor Micha'el Bruno. Budgetary considerations, he told the committee, were what had brought him to recommend the continuation of the process to the ministerial committee. There were also legal considerations, as there is a written agreement with the Rekanati family.

Bruno, as is known, does not want to negotiate with Rafa'el Rekanati, against whom there is a series of serious accusations concerning the affair of the bank shares manipulation. Moda'i has also prepared an alibi in the event that someone makes a simple move and appeals to the High Court of Justice. According to the proposal of Minister of Industry Moshe Nissim, it was decided to approach the legal advisor to the government and to request his opinion. It was the legal advisor's bad fortune that he was dragged once more into the banks' affair. Once burnt, twice cautious. Harif has already experienced the criticism of the justices of the High Court of Justice, when he attempted to avoid the submission of indictments against the banks. This time, Moda'i has left another time bomb at the entrance to his office.

Logically, it could have been expected of Moda'i that he would request Harish's opinion on the continuation of the negotiations before his approach to the ministerial committee. What actually happened raises questions regarding the minister's decisionmaking process. These questions should have arisen in any public discussion of the subject, all the more so in the Finance Committee.

But that is not what the men of the coalition thought, and at their head the new chairman of the committee, Moshe Ze'ev Feldman, a member of the Gur Hassids in Agudat Yisra'el, whose knowledge of economics is based on what he learned from his grandfather (according to him, at least).

Why exactly did the members of the Likud on the committee decide to rally as a whole to the defense of the negotiations between Rekanati and Moda'i—that is a riddle, the answer to which will not be given here. It should be remembered that on no less sensitive subjects, such as reform in the capital market, the imposition of Value Added Tax on fruits and vegetables, or the sale of Kayil [cables], the members of the Likud demonstrated independence against the minister's decisions. But this time, there apparently were good reasons that convinced them to defend the actions of the minister of finance.

The members of the Likud assigned to Feldman the task of successfully getting Moda'i's decision through the committee, and that was exactly the problem. It is not every day that a Minister of Finance decides to ignore flagrantly a recommendation of the governor of the central bank, who is responsible also for the banking system, regarding so basic a subject as the future of the control over the third-largest bank in the country. All would agree that this is a highly significant and serious subject, which would require a comprehensive discussion. Instead, the members of the Finance Committee were privileged this week to witness twice the breakdown of the session that dealt with the subject, not in small part due to Feldman's behavior.

It may be that Feldman does not know exactly what it is all about regarding the Discount Bank, and why exactly Bruno was disturbed by the fact that there is an extreme and severe indictment against Rafa'el Rekanati. He did not say anything about the affair itself during the meeting this week, and he did not allow others to do so. The meeting began with Moda'i's explanations, which were frequently interrupted by the chairman and by "strange" outbursts. Feldman called MK [Knesset member] Ron Cohen of the RATZ [Citizens' Rights Movement] faction a "golem" [idiot]. When Moda'i tried to answer a question from MK Shimon Shitrit, Feldman demanded that he not do that.

But the high point of the meeting came when the general debate opened. MK Hayyim Ramon, one of those who opposed Moda'i's move, was the first to be recognized. Feldman told him that he would not allow him to speak more than three minutes. And, indeed, at the end of 180 seconds the chairman tried to stop Ramon, and even to remove him from the room, when the MK asked to continue to explain his arguments. The breakdown was immediate.

The next day, the secretary of the committee put up a small sign with the agenda for the session at the entrance to the conference room. The first item—voting on the concluding motions following the announcement of the

Minister of Finance the day before. The MK's read it and did what they were supposed to do on such occasions—that is, they prepared motions. Ramon, together with Hayyim Oron, Ron Cohen, and Shimon Shitrit, moved that the committee demand that Moda'i not negotiate with the Rekanati family until legal advisor to the government Yosef Harish decides whether it is permissible or forbidden to continue with the negotiations. Two other MK's, Avraham Shohat and Avraham Burg, actually supported the continuation of the negotiations, but they proposed asking Harish to hurry up and submit his opinion.

But this time Feldman had his own ideas about what the MK's should think about the whole affair. At the beginning of the session, he announced that he had arrived at the conclusion that the subject was not ready for a vote, and he tried to go on to the next item in the agenda. To put it simply, Feldman tried to establish that Moda'i could act as he wished, without fear of criticism or supervision on the part of the committee. This time, too, the breakdown was unavoidable. The MK's do not like to be treated like government clerks who receive orders from the minister's bureau. Oron explained to Feldman the facts of life, but it took the chairman twenty minutes of adjournment to understand that he had gone too far this time. The explanations of the members of the coalition, which has, in fact, a safe majority, also helped convince the chairman. Thus, when the "smoke of the battle" in the committee had cleared, it became obvious that the 15 members of the Likud supported Feldman's motion not to conclude the subject at all. The opposition was divided between those who demanded the cessation of the negotiations and those who thought that they could be continued, but wanted at the same time to demand an opinion from Harish. What is etched in the MK's memories is the strong impression of a chairman who does not understand the subjects that he is supposed to handle, whose behavior is difficult for them to understand or to predict, who is proud of a "sense of humor" that they do not understand.

Should anyone have forgotten, in another four weeks the same chairman should have the state budget and pertinent laws reviewed by the committee for the second and third revision. It should be an interesting session. The question is, what will be the budget that will come out of the conference room.

New National Kibbutz Movement Secretary on National Politics

91AE0293B Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 1 Mar 91
p 11B

[Background on and interview with Giora' Furman by Neta' Shadmi; date and place not given]

[Text] He has always been known as a chronic oppositionist. Even when he almost reached the top, Brigadier General (reserves) Giora' Furman, did not align himself

with the establishment line, neither as deputy commander of the Air Force, nor as assistant to the chief of the Operations Branch. Most important, he has never been afraid to express his independent views. Caustic and biting, he narrows his eyes and fires off exactly what he thinks to his opponents.

And now for the surprise: Furman is suddenly revealing himself as a kind of submissive lamb. He is saying "yes" to the establishment. In the heated debate over the government's policy of restraint, Furman has been in favor of the decisionmakers. Furman and Shamir, thunder and lightning, are behind the same passive gas mask.

Last week, Furman was elected secretary of the National Kibbutz Movement, at the side of Elisha' Shapira, the veteran. In addition, he serves as the chairman of the board of directors of 'AL HAMISHMAR and the coordinator of the committee for peace and security in MAPAM [United Workers Party], and he is studying for his doctorate in economics at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. However, like many Air Force veterans, the corps flows through his veins. His emergency appointment in the reserves enabled him to participate in Air Force discussions and presentations of the situation to the general staff. He witnessed the frustration of the decisionmaking military echelon in general and his Air Force colleagues in particular due to the restraint policy. This week, he detailed the reasons for this frustration:

[Furman] Since the attack against the reactor in Iraq, and since the Lebanon war, there have been two Air Force commanders. These commanders have been involved mainly in marginal operations—construction sites, the introduction of changes to the training system, and the absorption of new aircraft. Such a situation is a source of frustration for the commander and the team with which he works.

In addition, the Dotan affair arose, which was a great source of frustration for Avihu Ben-Nun and Libi Ito. This affair represents a failure of the entire system for which he is responsible. Suddenly an operational situation arose, giving the Air Force a wonderful opportunity to express all of its good features and abilities after all of the reckonings and criticism. However, this opportunity slipped through his hands. Nevertheless, everyone filling positions [in the Air Force] at present is excellent and I have no doubt that they will prevail.

[Shadmi] Would the involvement of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] in the war have improved the defense of the rear?

[Furman] All of this talk about "we will do this better than the Americans" is prattle and groundless; even if we assume that all of our pilots, commanders, and paratroops are better than the Americans. What two of us could do can be done by six Americans. Do they lack forces or money?

[Shadmi] That is not exactly what troubled those who sat powerless in the rear waiting for a missile to land in their living rooms.

[Furman] It was a mistake to focus only on calming [the public] regarding the damage caused by the destruction, which was truly marginal. The military echelon should have also dealt with the psychological impact on the public, which is much more destructive. The paralysis of the economy is tremendous, and no volunteer commentator [masbiran] in the media will help. There is a need for national leadership, which we do not have. Instead, they created the national ritual of the sealed room.

[Background] In the first weeks of the war, the dubious honor of being one of "our commentators" on television and in articles fell to Furman. However, his attempts at therapy on television about a week before the war—"what can happen with 8-12 missiles"—crashed a short time later. As these lines are being written, the balance stands at 39 missiles and a deep psychological crisis. People who placed their trust in the IDF throughout their entire lives have broken down. They have found themselves refugees. People who were convinced that the defense of Israel's air space is the mission of the Israeli Air Force felt abandoned and powerless.

Economic thinking determines Furman's azimuth regarding defense matters:

[Furman] As in economics, it is necessary to ask how much you would pay for another way. Each course of action has a price: in money, losses, territory, or the loss of something in international relations. I have no doubt that all of the alternatives were much more expensive. Our involvement would have damaged the coalition and thrust us into combat with Jordan and a crisis with the United States, on which we are dependent. The result? It is not certain that it would be better [than that obtained through restraint]. Moreover, the direct damage caused by the missiles is truly marginal.

[Shadmi] Where is the army that has been trained to defend you?

[Furman] It is defending our total security. We do not have the absolute ability to defend citizens hermetically from missiles. For a certain period, it was necessary to take risks. The security system viewed the threat in its correct proportions. The problem is that the war lasted longer than we expected.

[Shadmi] How will the current policy affect Israel's deterrent ability in the future?

[Furman] Whoever transforms the concept of a deterrence policy into total concept that stands on its own does not understand anything about the matter. Deterrence is a part of the considerations of each military echelon on both sides. It was clear to the IDF that there is a hermetic defense against aircraft but not against missiles. We were well aware that the missile quantities would not determine any battle. It is also clear that the

Syrians do understand our considerations. They know that this is not a kindergarten here. They understand that their case is different from that of Iraq.

[Shadmi] And the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

[Furman] Shamir's position, and perhaps his obstinacy, has been strengthened. However, Bush will be stronger. The question is: How will Bush relate to Israel after the end of the cold war transforms us from being a strategic asset to being a strategic burden. It is likely that "they might do us a favor" and pressure us to reach a settlement. I do not want to reach a settlement because of external pressure, but I want to reach a settlement.

[Shadmi] At the start of the war, Furman did not foresee the shock that decisionmakers would absorb. Nor did he foresee the paralysis of the economy. This week, he said:

[Furman] It was necessary to continue living as normal. All governmental services should have been functioning. The government must lead and not be satisfied with Nahman Shay [the IDF spokesman] telling us when to drink.

[Background] The leadership motif is a frequently recurring theme in Furman's remarks. It is a very sensitive matter for him, perhaps because he himself is a leader at heart. His face bears an expression of high self-esteem, which could be interpreted as haughtiness and aloofness. Sometimes his expression changes into a "foxy" cunning expression. His authoritative tone, so it seems, conveys expectations that he will be obeyed. Last month, he related, there were kibbutzim that stirred him up. Although they are located outside of the missile game and have a low probability of being struck, they raised a din and were seized with fear. Furman stated his disgust with such phenomena. As is his custom, he was not afraid of unleashing his disgust openly, which not everyone liked. "I know that people have been injured," he acknowledged, "but this behavior resulted in the defective functioning of the kibbutzim. Fearful women cried 'what will happen to my child' and refused to go to work in places where the risk was almost nil. All refugees of area 'A' screamed at them." What a disgrace.

Furman, 56, was born and has lived his entire life at Kibbutz Ma'avarot. He is married to Ruti and has three children and a granddaughter. Their eldest daughter is studying in the United States, their second daughter is studying at the Technion, and their son is serving in the Army—"not a pilot" he clarifies, an apologetic tone creeping into his voice.

One has only to look at Furman once to know beyond a doubt that he is a kibbutznik. Furman has never had to appease anyone, nor has he ever been beholden to anything. His life has swung between the kibbutz and the Air Force. Between sorties he customarily returns home and wraps himself up in projects. He developed the avocados branch, for example. For the position of assistant chief of the Operations Branch, he was pulled from

an eight-month stint of pushing carts laden with soup bowls in the kibbutz dining room.

He has always felt he has had support. When he was in the Air Force, he knew he had somewhere to go whenever he wanted. At home in Ma'avarot, they waited for him with open arms. In the early sixties, 'Ezer Weitzman, then Air Force commander, had to take the trouble of going to the kibbutz twice to convince the members' assembly to release Furman for the Air Force's benefit.

The entries in his log book perpetuate thousands of hours of flight on a rich and varied course. He began with Spitfires and Mustangs and ended with F-16s. "My style of command comes through flying, not operational organizations. My authority stems from my ability to act as a commander in flight."

He experienced a difficult period at the beginning of the seventies: Due to severe vision problems, he was forced to stop flying combat aircraft, although this did not prevent him later from piloting transport aircraft. Four months ago, he was grounded permanently.

As assistant chief of the Operations Branch under Moshe Levy, who went on to become chief of general staff, Furman came to understand that the difference between the greens [Army] and the blues [Air Force] is not just a myth. The new position required him to adapt to a different operating method and way of thinking compared to what he was accustomed to. However, the position served as a springboard for him to realize his longstanding goal of returning to the Air Force—and this time, as its commander.

That was in January 1982. Furman fell directly into the Lebanon war. A year later, when "Amos Lapidot won the contest for the position, Giora" returned to the pasture, as we say for literary effect. For the sake of accuracy, he assumed responsibility for managing Kibbutz Ma'avarot's products produced at its infant and livestock food factory.

In the four years he managed the factory, Ma'avarot's products climbed into the national league. The financial balance of the kibbutz places it well in the forefront of profitable kibbutz industries. At the same time, Furman continued to launch missiles of criticism against the Lebanon war. His arguments, he has explained in the past, were not against those who put Israel into Lebanon, but those who left it there for three years.

The group of kibbutznik generals, with which Furman associates, has a number of special characteristics, the primary one being a distaste for politics. They do not assume responsibility for political-social areas. However, they have supplied a command infrastructure in the IDF, and those who have returned to their kibbutzim have created an economic revolution there.

Over the years, his distaste for politics has dissipated. With trenchant words, he lays out the situation, forcefully and with determination.

A bombshell: "There are kibbutzim which could not attain self-sufficiency, even if they were to solve the problems encountered as the result of the economic policy. This situation has difficult social implications, and I doubt that there is any reason to invest in the recovery and rehabilitation of these kibbutzim. Some of them could be closed."

In the running against 'Amiram Efrati, a member of Kibbutz Dan, Furman won by a slim margin, by 11 votes only. This election campaign included, unbelievably, headquarters for activists, campaigns, and everything of that sort. Who knows, in another two years perhaps we might merit a troop of energetic cheerleaders. To be sure, however, Furman will not be in this segment. This competitive culture makes him overreact. The gulf war took the sting out of the festival, but left behind several lovely anecdotes, with the naive flavor of Chelm [a legendary city of fools], and perhaps of Katrialivka.

The two candidates heaped praise on each other. Furman raised three reasons why it was not worthwhile to elect him: He had more questions than answers, his expectations of the kibbutz secretaries were almost impossible, and the tools for filling the position were in great trouble.

At the time of voting, Efrati voted for Furman. When the results were announced, Efrati offered Furman his humble assistance and then, with a big smile on his face, returned to his purl on Kibbutz Dan. "I do not know if I will be able to provide solutions to the problems that are facing us at present," declared Furman, "however, at least I will be faithful to myself for trying." A noble intention. Nonetheless, lest we forget, after the activity within the framework of MAPAM [United Workers Party], the secretary of the National Kibbutz Movement is exposed to the general political establishment. This position could serve as an excellent political springboard. Furman is not ashamed to say he has pretensions.

[Shadmi] The Knesset?

[Furman] The Knesset? No. The government, yes. An executive position is much more suitable for me.

Free Trade Port Proposed for Gaza

91AE0322C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARANOT (Financial Supplement) in Hebrew 8 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by Sever Plutzqer]

[Text] The war in the Gulf is over, and the war in Gaza continues. The uprising in Southern Iraq was suppressed, and the uprising in Nabulus continues. Israel and the Palestinians remain in the imbroglia of their problems, separately and together, hating but unable to exist without the other. The state of emergency in Israel and the curfew in the territories have shown how dependent the Israeli economy is on workers from the territories and how workers from the territories have no real alternative to work in Israel to earn a livelihood.

As early as 1967, the finance minister at the time, Pinhas Sapir, recommended basing future relations between Israel and the territories on two economic-political principles: 1) The encouragement of local development to create jobs in Nabulus, Jenin, and Gaza; and 2) the reduction, as much as possible, of the flow of workers from the territories into Israel to prevent friction, exploitation, and the blossoming of branches in the Israeli economy that would be based on cheap labor. Even if Palestinians and Israelis could benefit in the short term from Palestinians working for the Israelis, Sapir warned, in the long term, such a situation would pervert and damage the two peoples.

Sapir's opinion was not accepted. For 23 years, Israeli economic policy regarding the territories has been marked by the clear suppression of any local business initiative, the maintenance of obstacles of all types in the way of Palestinian investors, and the subjection of the territories' economy to the hungry needs of the Israeli economy.

The Gulf war highlighted the damage caused by this policy. Palestinians came to realize the extent to which only Israeli construction sites, hotels, and orchards provide them with stable employment. At the same time, Israelis realized that, without construction workers and orange pickers from the territories, central branches of the economy are damaged and even paralyzed.

Have policy makers in Israel understood how and to what extent they have erred over an entire generation, when they deliberately neglected the development of industry, transportation, communications, and tourism in the territories' economy?

Professor Ze'ev Hirsch of the School of Administration at Tel Aviv University would not testify that Israelis have understood their error and are willing to seek a real alternative to this sick mutual dependence. Therefore, he formulates in a sterile, highly cautious political language suited to every position, his proposal for the establishment of a free trade zone and a free port in Gaza. This project, he states, can exist in every political reality, including autonomy, a Palestinian state, a Jordanian-Palestinian state, and the status quo. Therein lies its advantage.

About three years ago, Professor Hirsch, together with two other researchers (Sha'uli Katznelson and David Sasson) began to examine the economic viability of transforming the Port of Gaza into a deep water port and declaring it a free trade zone. The study was completed several days ago, and its main findings are published here for the first time.

The following question is examined in the study: Is there economic logic to the establishment of a free port in the city of Gaza, or is the project not feasible from a business standpoint and therefore doomed to subsidization and the arbitrariness of the governors. Professor Hirsch's response: It is worthwhile. The investment of about a \$0.5 billion in the establishment of the Port of Gaza,

including a system of broad expressways and a port with an annual capacity of about 7 million tons of cargo, would yield direct economic earnings of about \$250 million over 30 years. This, in the language of economists, is the "current net value" of the Port of Gaza project, which is calculated on the basis of real interest of 6 percent annually. Even a small port, which would serve only the territories, would be worthwhile from an economic standpoint, albeit much less so.

In all of these calculations, which were performed with great care, Professor Hirsch disregarded the additional positive effects on the economy of Gaza due to its transformation into a free trade zone, and the establishment of a large, active international port on its shores. Professor Hirsch explains to me that he did not want to insert into the pure, strict economic test, all manner of estimations that cannot be measured, although he is certain that the establishment of a port would serve as a great lever for developing the strip in a manner similar to the port in Singapore, which produced in its environment the economic miracle of the entire state of Singapore.

How do you transform the strip into a free trade zone? By an Israeli, unilateral declaration. That is all. What characterizes the idea of a "free trade zone," Professor Hirsch emphasizes, is its unilateral nature, which suits the reality of the complicated Middle East. The Israeli Government would simply declare that it is conceding the collection of taxes and duties on goods that arrive at the Port of Gaza and that depart from it for all destinations in the world, except Israel. The government would also declare that it is giving a free hand and an exemption from taxes and currency restrictions to anyone interested in investing and developing the zone. In that way, the door would be opened for investors who are interested in building the port, which would serve, according to the study, the territories, and perhaps Jordan as well.

The proposed port would not serve Israel and Egypt for reasons of political economy: Both of these states would not permit shipping companies to abandon existing shipping routes, and thereby cause unemployment in the Port of Ashdod and the Port of Sa'id, which would be probably be damaged by the direct competition posed by a duty-free Port of Gaza. This is not the case regarding the territories and Jordan. The territories and Jordan do not have ports on the Mediterranean. A serious port in Gaza is likely to reduce the cost of transporting cargo in containers to Amman by more than \$11 per ton compared to the cost of transporting cargo from al-'Aqabah. That is inarguably a respectable savings.

However, the main beneficiaries of the port would of course be the residents of Gaza themselves. Eight hundred workers would find direct employment in the port, and many thousands more would find indirect employment. Gaza, which is crowded and asphyxiated, would be able to begin to breathe and to even dream of an independent economic future according to Professor

Ze'ev Hirsch. Do the Gazans see a blessing in such a port? In past conversations which he held with Gazan notables, Professor Hirsch was impressed by their desire for an economic solution of this type, even if they were wary of sounding too cooperative with Israel. He found a particularly positive response among the political leadership identified with the Palestinian organizations; as far as they are concerned, a free port in Gaza could symbolize the beginning of a process of economic separation from Israel and the laying of the cornerstone for an independent economic entity in the territories.

Because of that, Professor Hirsch is convinced that it would not be difficult to find foreign investors and international financing for the project. Professor Hirsch states that the engineering operation needed to build the port would be simple, not lasting more than four years. From an economic standpoint, the business numbers speak for themselves.

However, in Gaza, the numbers do not speak. In the alleys of Gaza, rocks, burning tires, and gasoline bombs speak, and they do so loudly. Therefore, although Professor Hirsch's data and estimates are very well-founded and his political-economic arguments very convincing, I find it difficult to imagine a free, flourishing port precisely there, on the coast of Gaza, in the hard kernel of the intifadah. In order for the dream of the port to succeed, Gaza first needs peace.

Professor Hirsch intends, in the near future, to submit his plan to the heads of the civil administration and the Palestinian public in Gaza.

Are you not afraid, I ask him, that we have already missed the phase in which economic development by itself can bring peace to the two peoples?

And how can we know whether we did, responds Professor Hirsch, if we have never attempted a phase of economic development in the territories?

Peres' Plan on Jordanian Confederation Reexamined

*91AE0322D Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew
6 Mar 91 p 10*

[Commentary by Josef Harif]

[Text] The shower of peace plans that poured down this week in the Labor Alignment cannot be considered beneficial rains that are likely to produce political processes more fertile than those we have known in the past. The only new development is in the young generation's plan, which speaks of the Palestinians' right to an independent state. The majority, as it emerges from discussions in the Labor Alignment bureau, support the "Peres plan," which has two foundations: To facilitate negotiations, he recommends the start of a political process by convening a "Geneva conference," on the order of the one held in 1973. After the ceremonial opening of the conference, negotiations between the

delegations would begin. Those who reject the idea of an international conference argue that direct negotiations are needed, which are the test of the Arabs' willingness to discuss peace with Israel.

However, it is not the procedural side that is important, but the content that is distilled in the second foundation of the "Peres plan," which is: recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and a territorial compromise, on condition that the unity of Jerusalem as Israel's capital is preserved. Has it occurred to anyone that the other side is willing to accept a territorial compromise? Will King Husayn, who last year issued countless declarations regarding the right to an independent Palestinian state, suddenly conduct negotiations with Israel regarding a territorial compromise?

Husayn is afraid of annexing to his kingdom 1.5 million Palestinians, who would transform Jordan into a true state of Palestine. Moreover, Husayn disassociated himself from the West Bank because he believed that, in doing so, he could put an end to the idea that Jordan is Palestine. Now Peres is again raising the idea of a "confederation." How strange. Does Peres not know that the confederation idea failed in 1985, because 'Arafat was not willing to concede a flag, currency, and an army. "A confederation?" said 'Arafat, "I am willing [to accept it], but an independent Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem must first be established, and later, I will form a confederation with Jordan."

Peres' old idea regarding the joint administration of the territories (designated "a functional compromise") is currently occupying several policymakers in Washington. Not long ago, this idea was examined in the security council at the White House, and there was even discussion of the possibility of financing regional, economic, and cultural enterprises that bear the possibility of encouraging confidence-building and a more moderate Palestinian leadership.

In any case, it is doubtful whether the shares of the Peres plan will have buyers on the world political exchange.

Situation of New Immigrants Probed

91AE0307A Tel Aviv DAVAR (Weekend Supplement)
in Hebrew 1 Mar 91 pp 6-7

[Interview with Soviet immigrant family by 'Ofer 'Amirav in Netanya; date not given]

[Text] Clara Gotlover is 70. Her son, David, (Dima) is 32 and married to Raya (Raisa), 29, the daughter of Me'ira and Yisra'el Goldstein (55 and 57). David and Raya have twin daughters, Rita (Margarita) and Vita (Victoria), age nine. It is important to remember these speakers' age to understand certain limitations under which our conversation was held. In the small living room in Area E, a sort of self-censorship was imposed. The interpreter assisting me repeatedly emphasized in Russian and Yiddish our enthusiastic confidence that

one can speak freely in Israel without fear. I nodded bravely, but it failed to impress them, especially the adults in the family.

Aside from the absorption basket [which consists of grants and services for new immigrants], which has been cut [by 3,000 shekels from 17,500 per family for the first year in Israel], and the celebrated 5,000 shekels promised, but not given, to them [to purchase appliances] on the day of absorption, there is no reason to assume that the members of this family represent or typify the immigrants who arrived in December. An atmosphere of detachment and distraction prevails in the room. The trip from Ben-Gurion Airport to an out-of-the-way city is all the "Israel" known by the people in the room, who even view the war in the Gulf as a kind of rumor that has yet to be verified. Bombs have not been heard in this city, and the small, broken television they brought with them from Russia does not add much information. I assume that others who immigrated in December and found themselves in Area A in January [hard hit by Scuds], are not nicknaming the Saddam-Against Man [a rhyming expression in Hebrew] war with the diminutive which they chose for it here, "vinuchka" (little war). The Gotlovers and the Goldsteins arrived in Netanya on 21 December from Vinnitsa, which is in Podolia, Ukraine.

['Amirav] Did you have a choice [regarding your destination]?

[David] How can I say it properly. We would have preferred the United States. Yisra'el and Me'ira wished only to come to Israel, because they have relatives here. We knew nothing about Israel except what we read in the Soviet press, if you can call that information.

[Raya] We had no notion about the outside world until we traveled. We have acquaintances in the United States who wrote us about life there. We wanted very much to be near them.

[Yisra'el] If something is displeasing, can we mention it?

['Amirav] Yes, certainly.

[Yisra'el] When we arrived, we received a document stating that we would receive a grant of 5,000 shekels for electrical appliances. It is a fact that those who arrived in January have already received it, but we have not heard anything yet.

[Clara] Enough with this nonsense. Everyone will receive it.

[Raya] Are we speaking of problems? Let us begin at the bottom: We do not have a solar water heater, although this was included in the contract. The apartment is filled with moisture, and there is an outstanding telephone bill left by the previous occupant. We have yet to get a telephone line. The landlord promises and promises, [saying] tomorrow, next week, we cannot, there has been a war. These are problems of the landlord, not the government. We have three small rooms, a total of 58 [square] meters, which costs \$450 per month. Three

families must combine their allowances for rent. Together, we receive \$520, which is just enough to cover rent, electricity, and water. We are concerned about what will happen in a year. It should be remembered that we have no other financing, and the mortgage we can obtain is not enough to buy an apartment.

[Amirav] How do you live?

[Raya] We live frugally. When the girls ask for something, they do not receive it. Nonetheless, we must acknowledge that the money given to us is certainly enough to live on if one does not behave crazily.

[David] Raya is merciful with money. She is always saying pity the money [pity there is no money].

[Amirav] What surprised you when you arrived?

[Yisra'el] We arrived all together, 2,500 persons. It is amazing how they received us and processed us without hitches. We arrived, and they opened a bank account for us. Have you ever heard of such a thing. I went to buy milk and I asked for milk in Yiddish [which sounds like the Hebrew word for salt]. The saleswoman gave me a bag of salt. I asked if it was powdered milk, and she understood that I wanted something ground more finely. Ultimately, I went home with two bags of salt.

[Raya] I cannot tell such a funny story. True, they received us very well. At the hotel, we were told, among other things, not to be concerned, because we would be put up for the first five days at the hotel's expense. Subsequently, the hotel owner promised that he would find us an apartment without charging a commission. In the end, we paid 1,000 shekels for a seven-day stay in the hotel, and we found an apartment through another broker, whom we had to pay a full commission of course.

[Clara] I saw how immigrants from Baku were absorbed in Moscow. There is no comparison. I cannot say one bad word about Israel. I stop people in the street to ask for directions and they always help. There was even a strange man, who has been in Israel for 28 years, who offered to let us all live with him.

[Me'ira] I am a food technician. The goods here are so nice, the machines are very sophisticated, and the ingredients that go into the products are of great interest to me. In the Soviet Union, products reach the market broken and crushed.

(Clara hurries to the kitchen to bring a counter example).

[Raya] This piece of candy is called "Arabic of Kiev" when we left, Me'ira received it as a gift. However, the truth is that it cannot be obtained here. Is this not bad packaging? However, it is not in the stores.

[Clara] What do you mean by bad packaging?

[Raya] But it cannot be obtained in the stores. When we looked for it, we could not find it.

[Clara] Others found it.

[Amirav] Have you discovered any similarity between what is happening here and what is happening in the Soviet Union?

[Clara] There are negative people here and there.

[Raya] This will not sound so simple. Residents of the Soviet Union are good people in general. However, how can I explain myself.... I will give you an example—"Lassie Come Home." In the American film, Lassie is sweet and good. In the Soviet film, the dog becomes mad. In the Soviet Union, they made her mad. There is no doubt that the empty shelves are to blame.

[Clara] One must be objective.

[Raya] However, I am telling you the facts! I was in the supermarket on the day of a shortage, and one man was beaten so murderously that he had to be hospitalized.

[Clara] Such things should not be said or printed. People who know us are still there.

[David] What is similar? I should point out the difference. Russia is a rich country with very poor people, and Israel is a poor country with very rich people.

[Amirav] Less than a month after you arrived in Israel, the war began. How did you feel about that?

[Raya] The truth is that we knew nothing. Our neighbor who warned us when the first alert was sounded deserves credit. We were very frightened, even shaking. However, there are all kinds of fear. When the Narodn'i Front [People's Front] telephoned us at 0200 and threatened to kill us at daybreak, we were much more afraid. The missiles are on a different scale. We sealed two rooms. The masks posed no problem, because we were familiar with them from Russia.

[Amirav] Have you ever used the masks?

[Raya] We have not used them. We were required to undergo civil defense training in the Soviet Union. Even if there had been a need for masks, they would not have informed us in time. Five days after we absorbed the radiation from Chernobyl, we were informed that we had been exposed to radiation. The two girls became sick, and their breathing passages were damaged. Here, they at least inform you in time. Overall, we have become accustomed. I am not afraid at all.

[Yisra'el] We are far from the [missile] fire. There were difficult days in the [Second] World War. Nothing compares with that. We starved.

[Clara] We suffered much in the Great War for the Homeland.

[Amirav] Did you think about the danger of war when you decided to immigrate?

[Clara] We had neighbors who said to us, [why] are you going now, no one is expelling you.

[Amirav] Except the Narodn'i Front, which called you in the middle of the night.

[Raya] These were not our only neighbors. We also had true friends, although in some places, we were always labeled as Jews.

[Clara] Why are you saying this?

[Raya] Because it is a fact. It is reflected in the actualization of all kinds of rights.

[Clara] That should not be said.

[Raya] Why are you getting me angry? Did it not take Dima eight years to be accepted into the institute?

[Amirav] Let us come back to Israel. We were speaking about the situation.

[David] My cousin is arriving today or tomorrow. If I had an opportunity, I would tell him to wait. However, he is in Warsaw and I cannot do so.

[Amirav] Are any of you Zionists?

[Yisra'el] What is a Zionist? I think that I am a good person. I think of myself as a Jew and I feel at home here. There, they told us that the Jews are a negative element, "but not you Yisra'el."

[David] No, I am not a Zionist. I am actually an internationalist. I still see myself as a Russian.

[Raya] I am not a Zionist.

[Clara] I am not a Zionist. I never was a Zionist. However, I have always been concerned about the welfare of Israel.

[Me'ira] Neither am I a Zionist. However, I have always felt a closeness to Jews. We came from Vinnitsa in the Ukraine, 250 km from Kiev.

[Clara] Vinnitsa is the nicest city in Podolia.

[Yisra'el] Hitler chose Vinnitsa, because of the pure air there. The Germans conquered Vinnitsa and established their headquarters there. On the first day, they shot 30,000 Jews and transferred the rest to Treblinka. Three of my brothers are buried there.

[Raya] There is not even a monument for the victims.

[Clara] That is simply incorrect.

[David] Two years ago they set up a granite slab there.

[Amirav] After two months, do you feel at home here?

[David] Yes, this is home, even though we were Jews in the Ukraine and Russians here. I have a great hope that Raya and I will learn Hebrew. The girls will doubtlessly learn it. This will greatly strengthen the feeling of home.

[Clara] Without hesitation, yes, this is home.

[Raya] We are not yet accustomed, but this is certainly home.

[Clara] We did not feel bad there either.

[Raya] That is not correct. There was discrimination during all of those years.

[Me'ira] When they used to detail the percentages of participation in the 'Great War of the Homeland,' they would mention Russians and Ukrainians, and even Tartars, Bashkirs, and Moldavians. Never did they mention Jews, although Jews rank second regarding the receipt of the Medal for Heroism of the Soviet Union.

[Amirav] It is said that more than a million immigrants are expected to arrive. Do you feel that this great number will give you power?

[Me'ira] There is a great potential regarding the power of the mass immigration to help itself. We seek to be useful. I do not know if this is the war. But I do not understand. Does not the state need our knowledge?

[Raya] Today, I met two doctors of chemistry who are working as fruit pickers. I do not understand what is going on here.

[Yisra'el] Raya is a building engineer, I am a sewage water engineer, David is a computer engineer, and Me'ira is a food technician. As you see, there are many among us in the construction professions. Would it not be better if they permitted us to establish a cooperative group? We could build apartments for ourselves with the mortgage money.

[Raya] There are talented people [among the immigrants]. For example, there is the possibility of putting the girls back in music lessons with a teacher whom I met in the ulpan [intensive Hebrew language course].

[Yisra'el] There are people here who arrived 30 or more years ago who are telling us that we are parasites, that we became accustomed to receiving everything from the government under the regime from which we came. That is false. The potential for power no doubt exists.

[Clara] Not now, but after the war.

[Me'ira] After the war.

[David] He who helps himself will succeed. I do not want to talk about political matters. I do not read the newspapers, nor do I understand the language.

[Amirav] Do you have some kind of leadership.

[Yisra'el] We have only just heard about Natan Sharan-ski, of whom we knew nothing. I do not know of any leaders.

[Me'ira] I think that the government knows. Why does the government not initiate such a thing?

[Amirav] Can I get your expert appraisal on what is happening in the Baltic states?

[Yisra'el] They want independence. However, they are not ready for independence. They are using our oil and gas. They have nothing themselves. Personally, I do not know what will happen. It is clear that this is hypocrisy on Gorbachev's part. How can it be said that he did not know that the army fired on civilians?

[Clara] You are forgetting the Russians who live in Pribaltika [Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia].

[Raya] It should be said clearly and sharply. Gorbachev created the situation that made us flee like frightened sheep.

[David] Now, they are attacking us with the weapons that were developed with our money and labor.

[Yisra'el] We will tell him thank you for letting us leave.

[Me'ira] He is a great hater of Israel.

Adjustment Problems Discussed

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[Article by David Avidan]

[Text] The Russians are adapting to Israel quicker than expected, even quicker than the rate of assistance of the absorption authorities. With or without a job, with or without an ulpan [intensive Hebrew language course], with or without strings to pull, they are managing. Whoever speaks Russian to them is defined automatically as a former immigrant. They perceive a native-born Israeli who speaks Russian as a mockery. If communication in Russian or Hebrew is not possible, body language helps. The main thing: They are less concerned about "Scuds" than native-born Israelis, inasmuch as they know where and how the missiles were produced.

On this report's publication date, it is very likely, and only likely, that we will be less focused on the war in the Gulf and will have somehow begun to return to normal. A central issue, in addition to the rehabilitation of the economy from the more than partial paralysis [that it has suffered due to the Scud attacks] and the gradual normalization of the security situation in the region and in Israel, will be a review of Israel's top project, i.e., an update on the acclimatization of the Russian immigrants in Israel and the increase in the immigration rate. This is after the order issued to the Iraqi Army to withdraw from Kuwait, regardless of its significance: If the Iraqi Army does withdraw, the Russians will then have several large debts to Israel and the United States, one of which will undoubtedly be to step up cooperation to increase the rate and volume of immigration.

And the opposite as well: If Saddam has not accepted, or will not accept, Bush's brazen, thoroughly humiliating conditions, we will have an interest, and perhaps a certain pause, to examine how the new immigrants are

enduring the state of emergency, something we have not managed to do in particular over the past six or seven weeks.

Let us begin from the end: The Soviet immigrants are managing just as well as, perhaps better than, native-born Israelis. They are less concerned about the Scuds than veteran Israelis. After all, they know better than us where and how these primitive missiles were developed. If these missiles have any value, which no Russian, Jewish or not, has respected since the end of World War II, especially after the Cuban missile crisis, they represent the Soviet Union's military strength, arms industry, and status as a world superpower in general. Moreover, if there is anything that no Russian likes, regardless of his origin, it is Soviet involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nor is any Russian particularly enamored of Arabs, who are called "black-bottoms" in current Russian slang.

Any Russian immigrant, when asked about the situation, responds with a confused to negligible smile. "Everything will be all right" is the message. "This is not such a great problem" is another widespread message. Young Russians like to use that German expression prized [sofani] by all generations: "Nu, da, Saddam kaput" (yes, Saddam is finished) and move on to other matters, such as how to behave in a photo processing store when one delivers film to be developed and printed. I met two new immigrants in a photo store in Haifa who asked me with concern: "Does one pay in advance or later?" I assured them that one pays later and only if there are good results, and they rejoiced like children. "As in America," one of them said to me, and I confirmed it, despite the painful comparison that he offered, that this is truly the case.

No Russian is impressed or surprised if addressed in Russian. The Russian immigrants assume axiomatically that whoever speaks to them in Russian [is either because he] a) identifies them as Russian and understands Russian or b) is a veteran immigrant. They are not at all sensitive to the difference between Russian spoken as a first language and Russian acquired as a second language. They identify any chattering in Russian, even faulty Russian, as Russian Russian. If you toss out two words in their language, they immediately ask: [a Russian phrase transliterated into Hebrew appears at this point in the original. Each subsequent such phrase is indicated by "Russian phrase"] (Where are you from? How many years have you been in Israel?) They perceive Israeli Russian speakers as a mockery or a joke, believing that no one other than a Russian would trouble himself to learn Russian. They are distant from the self-confidence of the Americans and British regarding the absolute reign of the English language throughout the world. The Russians have no global, linguistic pretensions.

They are also not particularly choosy about the fluency of verbal communication, and they do not recognize, in practice or theory, the notion of "a language barrier." If there is a Russian speaker nearby, all the better. As

stated, the immigrants perceive any such speaker as an emigre from Russia. If no Russian speaker is nearby, they use the little Hebrew they have learned in the ulpan. If the ulpan does not help, there is body language and a bit of English.

There are more than a few Russian children at the Na'amat Day Care Center in Haifa, where my son, Tar, three, also stars. They are not pushed to speak Hebrew, but neither are they encouraged to speak Russian. When I visited there about two weeks ago, two young Russian women were there, one tall, good looking and aristocratic, and the other yellowish, a peasant (Ukrainian), with their two daughters. I was asked by the day care director to interpret, after she had struggled with them in basic English. Question: How old is the big one? Response: Three and a half. Question: And the second? Response: Two and a half. Question: Are you friends? Response: Yes. The day care news did not excite them especially: The two girls could not be together in the same day care center. Instead, they had to be separated, one would go to this center and the other to the one next door. The mothers were asked if that was allright. Yes, it is allright. "Is it a good place?" asked the tall one in a whisper. The best, I told her. As I helped the head day care provider put Tar down to sleep, the discussion continued, entering into details in English mixed with hand gestures.

An encouraging detail: There is no need to pull strings. A bit of luck is preferable. The day care director is pleased to inform the two mothers that, just an hour ago, she was informed of two cancellations and there was therefore room. The two Russian women, who had arrived with their children spontaneously, unplanned, and even without any intention, were shocked by the new situation: There was no line, nor was there any "no vacancy" or other such nonsense to which they had become accustomed in Russia. They simply passed by the place, observed it, and were successful. When I left, they waved to me enthusiastically, as if to an old acquaintance. They were also surprised to hear that I am a native-born Israeli, even though my Russian is not very fluent and my accent, imitation to a great extent, would give me away to any Russian grammarian whose profession is the language.

You can identify the new immigrant from Russia not only by his appearance or accent, but also by his special look of amazement. You immediately sense that he is a stranger and wants directions—how to get to such and such a street. He typically is satisfied with the most partial information, asking for help every ten or twenty meters. Incidentally, he behaves very much as an Israeli, asking the same question over and over to different people. A Russian immigrant looking for a street in Tel Aviv asks directions neither in English, nor Russian, nor even in the Hebrew he has acquired from the ulpan. He prefers to be identified by stammers and gestures. After receiving directions, which include a suggestion to take a taxi, the prevalent question is: "Is it far? Can one walk

there?" Most of them prefer to save on private transportation costs, and even public transportation services are still not completely clear to them. "Take a taxi please" is advice that is customarily rejected. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why there are almost no taxi drivers who have managed to learn basic Russian words or Russian taxi drivers in the large cities. By contrast, the Russians are being thrown into the labor market, with or without completing an ulpan, and they are not at all choosy. They are highly motivated to work, like kibbutzniks who come to the city. Even if they are offered a position which they deem inferior to their training and education, they accept what is given. However they are at pains to preserve their dignity at any suitable opportunity. On the Haifa-Tel Aviv Highway, I encountered at least two gas stations manned strictly by Russians, whose service station uniforms had an identification tag bearing the words "new immigrant." One can manage by communicating with them through gestures, and perhaps several Hebrew words. However, whoever wants to quickly gas up, pay with a credit card, and receive a receipt should know the basic Russian gas station lexicon.

Let us assume that you come into such a gas station and want preferred service—96 octane fuel for example plus payment with "Visa" or "Diners." This is what you must say:

[Russian phrase] (96 octane, full). If they ask you where the gas cap is, point to it and simply say [Russian phrase] (there), as you hand over the key if required by the vehicle type. When the fueling is completed, for greater security, ask: [Russian phrase] (Closed?) They then respond: [Russian phrase] (Yes, closed). If you want to be more intimate, ask the station worker: [Russian phrase] (Did you close it?) He then responds: [Russian phrase] (Yes I closed it). If you need oil, just remember the Russian word "maslo" which means both engine oil and butter.

Finally, you ask: [Russian phrase] (How much?) Then you offer: [Russian phrase] (Visa or Diners?). The response at most stations is [Russian phrase] (both Visa and Diners), or simply [Russian phrase] (however you wish). You conclude the transaction of course with a [Russian phrase] (thank you), if the attendant does not preempt you, which of course he does. If you want a bit of friendly conversation, you ask him: [Russian phrase] (Where are you from?) He responds to you immediately and asks: [Russian phrase] (Where are you from?) To spare doubts and arguments, just tell him that you are from Moscow, Leningrad, or Odessa. If you claim that you are from Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, or Haifa, he will question you about how long you have been in Israel and how you have managed. It is preferable to ask him such questions as the following:

- [Russian phrase] (How is the work?)
- [Russian phrase] (Is that so, not bad).
- [Russian phrase] (What is your original profession?)

The response in 90 to 100 percent of the cases will be [Russian phrase] (mechanical engineer), and sometimes, even at gas stations or at other odd jobs, [Russian phrase] (physician). All of them are mechanical engineers and all of them are physicians, philologists, artists, or anything that sounds professional and entails advanced education. [Russian phrase] (Why not?). [Russian phrase] (If he wants?). Do not muzzle the ox when it treads out the corn, nor the new immigrant regarding his degrees, if you want good service the next time around.

They do not find any means of livelihood distasteful. On Friday at noon a week ago, I met an immigrant from Russia at the Tzafti Coffee House on Jerusalem Street ("the in place"). He sat singing Russian folk songs with a guitar to himself and somewhat less so to the surrounding area, of which he was less mindful. By chance, I had an extra copy of NASHA STRANA [OUR LAND] with the literary-artistic supplement BEG VREMENI [THE FLOW OF TIME], edited by Erica Grovman and Neli Gottien, and which has boosted the circulation of the Russian daily (which sells for only one shekel!) on the weekends to 40,000 (from 25,000) within four months. By chance, this issue of BEG VREMENI included a Russian translation of "The Last Gulf," a long poem of mine, from the "Neo-Cantos" series, which was published in MA'ARIV on 18 January 1991, the first day of the "Scuds," a first-rate translation by the Russian translator Saveyli Greenberg of Jerusalem.

I asked the guitarist how he made a living, and he responded simply: "From this." I noted that he was wearing a wedding band, and I asked him in Russian, "Are you married?" He responded, "Yes, but without children." I asked: "Can you make a living from this?" "See for yourself," he said, pointing to the cup of coffee and two rolls that he had received from the owner of the establishment. He is blond, bespeckled, a typical folk singer, a kind of Russian "qauntris". "Do you like poetry?" I asked him. "Very much," he responded, as expected, and I gave him the issue of BEG VREMENI containing my poem. He read the 64 lines carefully and seemed enthusiastic. "Do you have today's issue of NASHA STRANA?" I asked. He responded negatively. I gave him an issue with my autograph signed under the poem (in Russian—The Last Gulf).

During the brief conversation that followed, he mixed his Russian with a few Hebrew words, but was content to speak in Russian. He acknowledged that heavy rock had not yet reached him. He prefers the "Beatles." When I had arrived, he was singing a song by Wissotzki. Yes, he had heard of Arqadi Dokhin, a young Israeli singer-composer, who released an entire album of the songs of Wissotzki (a Russian protest poet) in Hebrew. However, he had not heard of the "Mashina [Vremeni—Time Machine]" group, which is of Russian origin. He is not current regarding contemporary rock. He prefers ballads. He has not heard of Leonard Cohen. [He has heard] something about Jacques Berl. He is Russian through and through, satisfied with little and satisfied with himself.

Ultimately, whoever wants to help absorb the immigrants—and help himself as well—in daily communication in Israel, should accept the idea that a Hebrew-Russian/Russian-Hebrew pocket dictionary, or at least a phrase book, is not a requirement for new immigrants alone. It is strongly recommended, and perhaps particularly so, to the Israelis as well.

Professor on Future Role of Military, Political Left

91AE0293C Tel Aviv Tel Aviv MA'ARIV (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 1 Mar 91 pp 30-31

[Interview with Dan Meron by Hayim Nagid; date and place not given]

[Text] All thirty-odd scuds of Saddam Husayn did not amaze or shock the radical Israeli left more than the salvo of words against the policy of restraint and in favor of the use of military force which was launched by Dan Meron, a professor of Hebrew literature, in the third week of the war in a well-aimed article published in HA'ARETZ. Meron, 57, is no longer a literature researcher. He is a master wordsmith and an opinionated intellectual. A year does not go by that he does not cause some provocation with his acrid literary criticisms, and he has already been the target of a venomous "revenge novel" by Aharon Megged. For years he has also been known for his devotion to the advancement of a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue, and for being a tireless preacher against annexation and a senior member of RATZ [Citizens' Rights Movement].

Here you have a man, who is deeply implanted in the entrenched Israeli left, excitedly coming out in favor of using the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] against the "scarecrows of the chief of general staff"; a leftist who denounces the policy of restraint, which [he maintains] sends a message of "humiliation and low stature."

Restraint, he explains, damages our image abroad and in our own eyes. "If there is an IDF, let it appear immediately," he demands in a Bialik-like manner at the end of his article.

The responses from the left, from his branch, came immediately. Professor Ze'ev Sternhal, an expert in the history of fascism, warned of the dangers of "the phenomenon named Dan Meron." In his opinion, this phenomenon bears "the first signs of a frightening cult of violence, a diminishing of reason." In other words, a fascist has been created.

The truth is that this phenomenon is much broader. What people of the extreme left call the "great drift to the right" has characterized the arena for a long time. However, just as the end of every war always signals the start of a "new order," it was precisely the beginning of this war that disrupted the recognized order of the Israeli left. Meron was selected as a symbol of the phenomenon. Perhaps this is what explains the strong reaction.

Meron, needless to say, did not remain guilty. He was surprised, he acknowledges, by the atmosphere that was created around the article. However, on the other hand, he knows his friends:

"They have the mentality of sentries. They respond, according to a watchword, to two or three recognized combinations. The moment they do not recognize these combinations, they immediately impose a ban. They have the characteristic of petty accountancy and an inability to read a text, even though their main preoccupation is reading texts.

"Their thought is screwed into the fascist model, as if significant historical developments did not happen, other than those that occurred in Europe in the twenties and thirties."

He hastens to clarify that he does not view himself as a rightist.

[Meron] I am sorry to disappoint not only the people on the right, who perhaps were happy to receive reinforcement, but also those on the left, who apparently are truly happy in their persecution of defectors. Although I have criticism of RATZ, perhaps strong criticism, I do not intend to send them a letter canceling my membership in the party.

To put it in a primitive, elementary way, I continue to believe that the solution to the Jewish-Arab conflict is the division of the land of Israel into two states, one Jewish, which already exists, and the other Palestinian. However, I must say that, at this moment, the distress of the Jews is closer to my heart than the rights of the Palestinians.

[Nagid] The difference is that this division might perhaps not be carried out based on our will, as the left has always hoped.

[Meron] I am not sure that the establishment of a division is an inevitable process. A deterioration leading to additional struggles and new wars is also likely. However, if a division is adopted as a solution, and major international forces will attempt to bring that about, the Israeli public must arrive at that solution based on their internal recognition that this solution is, in sum, in our favor, and that Israel is sufficiently strong to assume the risks that it entails.

Without these two elements, [internal] recognition and a feeling of strength, such a solution will cause a serious national crisis. I fear that a situation may develop in which this solution is imposed on us because of [our] weakness and the lack of an understanding of the benefit that it offers. Therefore, it is very important to use force. The existence of weakness is the greatest obstacle to peace.

Members of the left, above all, must understand this. Their historical role has been to let the Israeli public be aware of the need for such a solution and the feeling that

Israel is strong enough to accept this willingly. At present, I see no one who can prepare the public for the impending crisis.

[Nagid] Neither on the left nor on the right?

[Meron] The right could give the public a sense of the positive nature of the division solution, if it acknowledged the need for this solution, which it is not doing. The Israeli left, on the other hand, is an absolute political failure and is unimportant as far as the general public is concerned.

The public is prepared to accept the facts of life from Shamir, Sharon, Dan Meridor, and perhaps Beni Begin, but by no means from members of the left.

[Background] To explain why the left is a political failure, Dan Meron makes use of his American experience. He knows America well. He has known it for almost 20 years. In recent years he has been spending several months each year there, dividing his time between the fall semester at New York Columbia University as the head of the Hebrew literature department and the spring semester at the Hebrew University.

Last month, he arrived in Israel ten days after the war began, at the end of his American term. A short time later, his father died. Last week, when articles attacking him were published, he was sitting shiva [the traditional mourning period for Jews]. We met at his home, in a new building covered with marble and inhabited by few residents on a street in northern Tel Aviv. An airy bright apartment with surprisingly few books in his receiving room. In the kitchen, his mother fusses with workmanlike energy untypical of elderly women her age. The house is noisy—relatives, a ringing telephone. A photographer aims a lamp to photograph a profile for the newspaper. He maintains a calm expression. He offers a cup of tea. He is a polite man.

[Meron] I have had some American experience. I have attempted to help the members of the Israeli left, mainly members of RATZ, reach the radical segment of enlightened, liberal American Jews who are sympathetic to Israel. I was present at these meetings. Standing before you are people who are obviously intelligent. They hold discussions with these American Jews, but they do not establish any true communication with them.

The ability of the Israeli left to speak in other than a purely rational language is tragically limited. They can speak only in sociological-political jargon that suppresses emotion. They are unable to understand that these Jews' connection to Israel is based on emotion. They are alienated from emotions, especially "Jewish" emotions. Their feelings, aside from a feeling of brotherhood and a shared destiny, include much fear, which has completely sound historical reasons.

[Nagid] Does this explain, in your opinion, why the left has also failed in Israel?

[Meron] In order to be convincing, first of all one must identify. You cannot exert an influence if you do not convey closeness. Our leftist intellectuals are foreigners to anything related to feelings regarding Jews. This does not at all damage their ability to be concerned about the rights of other peoples, and I greatly admire this concern and arousal in contrast to the process of brutalization which Jews are undergoing in relation to other peoples, but it is not enough.

Without identification with the feelings of Jews, one cannot reach the depths of Israelis. This is tragic. I also belong to this left, and I also find all of its defects in myself. These are not defects in political thinking, but in the ability to communicate and to hold a real dialogue with a public that does not belong to the secular-academic Israeli elite.

[Background] He has an explanation—also based on his American experience—as to why Israeli passivity in this war has such dangerous psychological implications:

[Meron] I know how to read texts and subtexts. In the first phase of the war, all of the American commentators were certain that an Israeli response would come quickly. They even had absurd, "hasmaba'i," Entebbe fantasies. However, as time passed, and it became clear that Israel was not responding, they indeed complimented Israel and praised its restraint, but a clear note of disappointment and scorn could be heard in the subtext.

Impatience with Israel, which was reflected in the unprecedented reprimanding of Ambassador Zalman Shoval, was an expression of the attitude toward Israel in general. Such treatment is given to a vassal, to an ally who has forgotten his place.

[Nagid] Your remarks strongly bring to mind those of Ariq Sharon.

[Meron] I must say that I heard Ariq Sharon last week, and I identified with a substantial portion of his remarks. I also agreed with Ezer Weitzman's remarks. One is a hawk and the other a dove. I must also add that I cannot say that a response to the threat of missiles exists at all. I am not an expert in this regard.

However, what is important to me is that elements of insecurity do not become stronger in the Israeli consciousness, because, in any political development toward peace, Israel must act from a position of strength. The left does not know how to appreciate this. Although many on the left understand this matter theoretically, they fail to convey this understanding to the public at large.

[Nagid] When I read your article, I was reminded of the reversal made in the twenties by Uri Tzvi Greenberg. Greenberg, who was a poet of the pioneers and a leftist, became a rightist and a leader of the revisionist party. In the period of the "incidents," in the mid-thirties, there was a policy of restraint in Israel, and Uri Tzvi Greenberg denounced it in his poetry.

He, like you, felt that the demand to use force is linked with correcting some feeling of diaspora humiliation, which is also cultural humiliation. In your article, you spoke not only of the humiliation of the chief of general staff, but also that of the houses of Tel Aviv and of empty streets. He too speaks of the humbling of Tel Aviv homeowners, and from there the restraint and the weakening of members of Mishmar Ha'emeq [the Valley Guard].

[Meron] The prominent humiliation of the destroyed houses in Tel Aviv, about which I wrote in my article, was only a metaphor. I felt that this humiliation takes us back to some pre-Israeli reality. The Israeli reality suddenly appears to me as the streets of the city appear at dusk, the time of nervous flight into the refuge of buildings.

However, with all of my love for the poems of Uri Tzvi Greenberg, I do not recommend, as he did, the establishment of the kingdom of Israel from the Euphrates to the Nile by the force of the sword. Rather, I recommend dividing the country between us and the Palestinians.

Nonetheless, I have no doubt that, after such a division, Israel would have to remain strong and maintain its military power, perhaps to a greater degree than before.

[Nagid] What is your opinion on the "defection" [the flight of residents] from Tel Aviv during the first days of the war? S. Yizhar stated on television that it violated the rule of "there is no other place," which is the very foundation of Zionism.

[Meron] One must be precise about the meaning of that Brennerist [expression] "there is no other place." Obviously, there are many other places in Israel and abroad. Israel is that last place for which there is no substitute only to the extent, and provided, that the Jews living in it accept that which can be deduced from the decision to break away from a marginal position, become rid of the passivity of many generations, bear the yoke of responsibility for their existential fate, take the initiative, and fight.

An Israel that is suddenly seen distancing itself from this decision will still be a Jewish place, but one that can be exchanged for other places. Many will certainly do that.

[Nagid] Regarding the defectors?

[Meron] I do not blame anyone. Whoever goes, goes and whoever remains, remains. There is of course a great difference between remaining in an embattled city that continues to maintain its normal life under almost any condition, and remaining in a city that is absorbing blows and is closed up inside its homes in darkness, abandoned. The latter act of remaining is less significant than the first.

[Nagid] Perhaps this restraint has been good for us. Perhaps it has clarified for us what the true dimensions

are. Perhaps it is desirable for Israel to adapt to new, limited dimensions that teach it to exist with its limitations and weaknesses.

[Meron] Yes, very desirable. Conceding grandioseness and an inflated self-image in favor of recognizing reality and the correct dimensions are frequently the goals of psychiatric therapy. However, for therapy to succeed, the patient must be prepared gradually by strengthening all of the solid foundations in his personality.

Conceding that a self-image can, in certain conditions, produce a psychological breakdown or something even worse. I want to see the intellectuals and the sages in Israel working to the best of their ability to strengthen the national personality in preparation for the tests that it is expected to undergo.

KUWAIT

Editorial on Position of Palestinians, 'Arafat

91AE0291A London SAWT AL-KUWAYT
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 7 Mar 91 pp 1, 5

[Editorial: "Good Morning My Country. What Does Yasir 'Arafat Want From Us?"]

[Text] "The PLO leadership, after careful examination and inquiries, is horrified by the magnitude of tragedies suffered by the Palestinian community in Kuwait at the hands of Kuwaiti officials. Frantic, suspicious, and malicious campaigns are being waged by the mass media against the Palestinians."

These are quotes from a communique released by the PLO on Monday, 17 September of last year, during the black days we had to go through and one and a half months after the Iraqi invasion; one and a half months after the Iraqi campaigns of murder, plunder, and pillage in our land; one and a half months after most of our people were uprooted from their land and their homes and made to wander in the capitals of the world; and after an order of coercion, repression, and rape was imposed on those who stayed behind in their homes and dwelling places.

The PLO leadership, which supported the aggression, colluded with the occupier, and thought up all sorts of justifications for the invasion, the devastation, and the uprooting of people from their homeland, and for depriving them of the right to self-determination, accused "Kuwaiti officials" and the Kuwaiti people, who had to live under occupation and under the rule of Saddam Husayn's policemen and were even denied the freedom to move around, of assaulting the Palestinians. So is it any wonder that only two days ago, and after the liberation of Kuwait, Yasir 'Arafat once again raised outrageous charges against our people and our legitimacy and appealed to the countries of the world to protect the Palestinians in Kuwait?

We would have preferred not to answer Yasir 'Arafat, leaving it to the Palestinian people to bring him to account, as the Iraqi people are now doing with Saddam. But, when he states in the communique, which called for the protection of Palestinians, that the number of Palestinians in Kuwait prior to the Iraqi invasion was 440,000 and that this number dropped to 170,000 after the invasion, we have the right, we the people of Kuwait and of legitimacy in Kuwait, to hit him between the eyes with the truth and tell him that half a million Palestinians were living with us in Kuwait in peace and security: working, living, and bearing children, donating money to the PLO, sending money to their families, and saving for the future, and that 270,000 of these people were the victims of invasion, devastation, and displacement. 'Arafat supported and backed the invasion through his organization, and he championed the call for its acceptance and recognition as the shortest road to the liberation of Palestine.

Today, Yasir 'Arafat is asking the world to protect the Palestinians from the Kuwaitis, begrudging the Kuwaiti people and the leaders of legitimacy in Kuwait the right "to pursue relentlessly the criminal elements whatever community they might belong to," as the deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, said in his communique. Kuwaiti officials have said: "We are after collaborators and criminals and not after people of any particular national origin because we are above that." 'Arafat's suspicious appeal is not strange at all, for, as usual, its aims go beyond the words used in his communique. And, as the legitimate government responded to 'Arafat's communique in those black days of September through Shaykh Ahmad al-Sabah, it responds today, now that the truth has come out, by declaring its inherent right to "preserve law and order inside Kuwait after the criminal Iraqi occupiers destroyed all the country's vital elements and found a band of conspirators and collaborators to help them achieve their ends." What we said in our response to their repugnant communique in September we repeat today: "To be sure, the PLO leadership feels that it is isolated from its people and that the best way to get out of its isolation is to incite its people not against their enemies but rather against the Kuwaitis who have championed the cause of the Palestinian people and have embraced all the honorable brothers regardless of their national origin and still do. By so doing, the PLO sought to sow the seeds of discord three times: once when it supported the butcher of Iraq in the occupation of Arab land and the displacement of an Arab people; another time when it sought to incite the Palestinian Arabs against Kuwaiti Arabs; and a third time when it made the mistake of wrongfully assuming that the liberation of Jerusalem begins with the invasion and destruction of Kuwait."

We are Arabs. Kuwaitis Arab; so are its people and its legitimate government. We share the Arab people's feelings and feel their pain and, and no matter what words might come out of Yasir 'Arafat's mouth, he will not be

able to strip us of our Arabism. We have the right, however, to protect our country, a right we will never relinquish. As freedom and legitimacy are restored to Kuwait, the Palestinians and other honorable residents will have nothing to fear. Now that Saddam has been defeated, defeat will not be limited to him alone. There is only one step between isolation and "alienation" and the Palestinian people have embarked upon it.

LEBANON

Beirut Mayor Discusses Security in City

91AE0304I Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English
11-17 Feb 91 pp 14-15

[Interview with Shafiq Sardug by 'Abdallah Abu-Ghannam: "Woes of the Beirut Municipality"; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] Lebanon's constitutional structure is, in principle, that of a highly centralized state, and the eclipse of that central government since the civil war erupted in April, 1975 has meant the effacement, equally, of bodies of local government, which have seen their authority usurped by the paramilitary militia organizations pulling in this country since the war began.

The Beirut municipal government is no exception to this rule. There too, nearly 16 years of turmoil have left their mark on the efficiency and morale of city employees according to the city's mayor, Shafiq Sardug. [passage omitted]

Here is a translation of the interview:

[Abu-Ghannam] Where, amid the wave of burglaries we've been having in Beirut, are the "municipal guards," the constables who are supposed to be patrolling the streets of the capital by night?

[Sardug] I'm afraid I have to tell you frankly that the condition of our "municipal guards" is lamentable. I don't want to say this is due [to] flagrant dereliction of duty. It's rather the cumulative result of almost 16 years of turmoil, disorder, uncertainty, insecurity, violence. This, together with lack of supervision—which arises from the general "laxity" prevailing in the ranks of civil service employees—has resulted in a breakdown of morale and discipline among the guards. Mind you, there only are about 250 of them, divided between East and West Beirut, a woefully inadequate number for a law-enforcement force in a city whose people are not necessarily the world's most law-abiding. And there are not only too few of them; even the ones we have are getting very close to retirement age. Our most youthful guard is over the age of 50. Age is a relevant factor when we're talking about the municipal guards, as is physical fitness. The great majority of the Lebanese population, I think I'm right in saying, are under 25 years of age, and this probably applies to the majority of malefactors that Lebanese lawmen have to deal with. I'm quite sure that,

physically speaking, very few of our municipal guards are anything like a match for the tough, agile young thieves and hoodlums they're likely to meet.

But whether they're physically fit or not is academic, since very few of them perform any of the functions which are theoretically theirs, except of course the very important one of receiving their salaries. A case in point is that of the pair of guards who are assigned to keep watch around my own house in Ras Beirut. Were it not for the fact that either I or members of my staff or family keep a sharp eye on them, you wouldn't find either of them on duty after 10 p.m.

I'm afraid the present force of municipal guards is beyond redemption. What I think should be done is to allow the whole lot to retire in a body, then to recruit a brand new force which would be under the command of an Army officer, so that they'd be under military discipline. In the meantime, people will have to depend on the Internal Security Forces, and so their own vigilance, to protect themselves from thievery.

[Abu-Ghannam] One reason, surely, the guards perform so inadequately is that they're not properly equipped.

[Sardug] It's useless to think in terms of the present guard force. We really can't suddenly ask a group of middle-aged men to stay up all night long, especially in this cold, rainy weather we've been having, when for years they've been used to spending their nights in warm beds. Besides, any first-rate weapons they were given would probably be stolen by the car thieves who haunt our streets by night.

[Abu-Ghannam] The question of security in the capital is one that should be taken up at the highest level in the Interior Ministry. Has the municipality had the cooperation of that ministry in resolving its troubles?

[Sardug] We've discussed the matter at length with Interior Ministry officials, but security conditions prevented implementation of the measures we agreed on. Our latest meeting with Interior Minister Sami Khatib was very positive. He expressed his readiness to do all he could to help proceeding to the Fire Department, the rescue services and the office staff.

I believe Minister Khatib is genuinely anxious to help us. The City Council, including myself, have already met with him twice since the new cabinet was sworn in a month ago, whereas under previous administrations meetings between us and the interior minister were rare. We hope to be meeting with Minister Khatib every two weeks in future.

It is hard to exaggerate the sorry state of morale and competence among municipal employees, on all levels. The only function they are careful to perform regularly and scrupulously is the collection of their salaries. In such a situation it's very difficult to carry on municipal services adequately. It may be that the only way forward is to sack the employees—the whole lot—a step for

which we'd need the permission of the cabinet. We will certainly have to replace a large number of them.

[Abu-Ghannam] Surely you're being too pessimistic. Wouldn't the application of a measure of discipline bring the staff into line?

[Sardug] You see, my problem is that I'm not really in a position to make key decisions. The key decisions are in the hands of the governor of Beirut Province—which includes not only the city itself but part of its banlieue—and the Interior Ministry. What we need is a program of reform drawn up and implemented jointly by the Municipality, the provincial authorities and the Ministry. Without the active cooperation of the top people, there's really very little the mayor of Beirut and his councillors alone can do to put things right.

Amal Vice President on Army Deployment

91AE0304C Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English
11-17 Feb 91 pp 20-23

[Interview with 'Akif Haydar on 5 February by Amal Fadlallah: "Army Deployment and Lebanon's Sovereignty"; place not given]

[Excerpts] [Boxed item] A leading member of the maily-Shiite Amal Movement has spoken of the importance of deploying the Lebanese Army in the South as the means of consolidating the authority of the Lebanese government throughout the country.

In an interview with this magazine on February 5, Amal Movement Vice-President 'Akif Haydar noted that this process of consolidation had to start with the capital and its region. But, he said, Beirut was not the key to the Lebanese riddle; the South was the key. [passage omitted]

Here is a translation of the interview: [end boxed item]

[Fadlallah] The position in Lebanon seems to be frozen, to some extent. Do you see a link between the situation here and the war in the Gulf?

[Haydar] I don't think the situation in Lebanon is frozen because of the Gulf war, not at all. Before the war there was a certain hesitation in application of the al-Ta'if Agreement on the level of the cabinet. The aims of the government were, are, first of all national reconciliation, then the disbanding of militias, the appointment of new members of Parliament to replace those now deceased, and relations with Syria. Of course these are not the only items on the government's agenda, but they take priority.

The first obstacles were laid down, as you know, by (Lebanese Forces militia commander) Dr. Samir Ja'ja', (Phalangist Party leader) Dr. Georges Sa'adah, and Minister Michel Sassine. This was soon followed by the resignation of (Progressive Socialist Party leader) Walid Junblatt. It is the absence of these personalities—Ja'ja' and Sa'adah on the Maronite side, and Junblatt on the Druze side—from the cabinet which is holding up the

principal government business, i.e., the four items I've mentioned, nor with the important issue of how to protect the public against the spiralling cost of living. Ministers now spend their time merely handling routine matters, while the really vital questions hang fire.

Dr. Ja'ja' tried to justify his absence from cabinet meetings by alleging an excess of Syrian influence on the new government, influence coming from the large number of pro-Syrian ministers, he said. But this was only a pretext. What he was trying to do was to restore matters to a confessional basis, something which was demonstrated by the fact that when he consulted with other ministers and personalities about his grievance, he confined his discussions to Christian figures, not consulting Muslim personalities.

Most other members of the cabinet have, I believe, abandoned the sectarian hang-up. (Ba'th Party Organization leader and) Minister 'Abdallah al-Amin, whom I deeply respect, represents a party which includes both Muslims and Christians. Minister Muhsin Dallul, though a Shiite, has no Shiite constituency or power base, no more than al-Amin, who is also a Shiite. These two ministers are, I suggest, two of the most capable members of the government. Other top ministers in the cabinet also base their positions on principles rather than on confessional affiliation.

One could have wished that a similar desire to move away from sectarian prejudices had animated recent acts of the cabinet as a body. I'm referring to the appointments made to senior civil service posts, which were made not on the basis of qualification but of religious sect. Many of these persons are really not qualified to hold but not for the posts they've been named to.

In the Chamber of Deputies, too, sectarianism is still the order of the day, as it is in most walks of Lebanese life.

No, our battle really has nothing to do with the Gulf at all.

[Fadlallah] Syrian officials have emphasized the importance of the Lebanese Army's deployment in the South as a necessary accompaniment to the consolidation of the Beirut security plan. Is this deployment likely to take place on the date set for it—February 7—or at any time in the near future?

[Haydar] What the Syrian media have said is true enough, but the Army's deployment in the South should be seen as an end in itself, as a part of the necessary pacification of the South, not as merely an appendage to what happens somewhere else.

The position in South Lebanon first became critical with the advent of armed Palestinians to the area. It deteriorated as Israel mounted and intensified its reprisal raids, raids which culminated in the ferocious Israeli invasion of 1982-85. The situation reached rock bottom in the last two years with the fighting between the two Shiite militias Amal and Hizballah in the Iqlim-al-Tuffah.

Of course the process of consolidating security in the country had to start with the capital and its environs. But Beirut is not the key to the problem; the South is the key. The Lebanese conflict began in the South in the late 1960s, before it started in Beirut in 1975, and it will end in the South, and nowhere else. Failing to liberate the South, leaving it unprotected, the prey of Israel, will lead inevitably to the disintegration of Lebanon as a whole.

The fighting between Amal and Hizballah has led to no gain for either, and it has resulted in devastation in the Shiite community and in the South generally. That is why both sides have agreed to support the Army's deployment in the South, which will be a shield for both. The Army has been absent from the South since 1975, if not before, and its return is something greatly desired by Southerners, who see in it an assurance of stability and normality.

Of course Syria supports the sending of the Army to the South, since it is something the Southerners want, as do the Lebanese generally. But the decision to do so is a Lebanese, not a Syrian, decision.

It is the government's intention to deploy the troops along all major roads in the South, and wherever the Army is stationed, no militia gunman will be allowed to venture. All militia arms will be turned over to the Army. Not a single weapon will be allowed to appear in the South except those of the Army.

[Fadlallah] What about Palestinian armed presence in the region?

[Haydar] Of course we will take the interests of the Palestinians into consideration. The Lebanese government will be discussing with Palestinian representatives the manner and details of a pullback of armed Palestinian elements, but we will not be discussing with them the decision to send the Army, a decision which has been taken by the Lebanese alone, which only the Lebanese can take. But we will confer with them on measures to ensure the security of the Palestinian community.

[Fadlallah] Some Palestine Liberation Organization officials have stated, or at least implied that in return for acquiescing in the Army's deployment in the South, they want the Lebanese government to conclude with the PLO a new agreement regulating Palestinian presence in this country, to replace the 1969 agreement abrogated in 1987. Is such an accord on the cards?

[Haydar] The whole of the international community rejects the occupation of one country by another, as the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has shown. The Palestinians have the right to ask for discussions and to maintain representatives, but it is impossible to let them interfere in the taking of Lebanese decisions in regard to Lebanese territory. The Lebanese want to help the Palestinians, who are very dear to us, and I don't think that Palestinians anywhere else in the world have enjoyed more indulgent treatment than they have had at

the hands of the Lebanese. But we cannot allow ourselves to be placed in a position where we would be submitting to blackmail.

[Fadlallah] Don't you think Israel [will] try to stop the Army from going to the South, as it did in 1977 and 1983? Israeli government spokesmen have often said they regard the Lebanese Army as incapable of maintaining security in the Lebanese region adjoining Israel's northern frontier.

[Haydar] The Lebanese Army is not responsible for protecting Israel from the operations of the Lebanese Resistance. If the Army tried to stop Resistance fighters, they would turn on the Army itself. The government stands on the side of the Resistance because the Lebanese people are with it. It is not however the role of the Army to either assist or hinder Resistance operations.

As for an Israeli attack on the Lebanese Army, I would say that Country A may be stronger than Country B, but that does not give A the right to attack B. If the Israelis hit the Lebanese Army, we will hit back.

But we can lay aside any exaggerated fears as to what Tel Aviv might do as a consequence of the Gulf conflict. Israel will not take over the South, nor will Lebanon lose a handspan of its territory. We insist on maintaining full sovereignty over all our land, and I'm confident we will have the support of the world at large. The international community has shown that it is backing Lebanon's legitimate authorities, and the world's reaction to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait shows that it is not prepared to countenance aggression by one country against another.

Fadlallah Discusses Poetic Side to His Character

91AE0320A Paris AL-DUWALIYAH in Arabic
23 Feb 91 pp 34-35

[Interview With Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Hizballah Spiritual Leader, by 'Imad Judiyah; place, date not given: "On Occasion of Publication of His Third Collection of Verse, Other Side of Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah's Personality; Verse Must Retain Its Music Because It Is Fundamental to Poetry; Modern Verse Currently Written by Poets Lacks Clarity"]

[Text] Beirut—"On the Shoreline of Passion" has recently joined two collections of verse written by the scholarly Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah. The other two collections are: "In The Shadows of Islam" and "Verses for Islam and Life."

On the occasion of the publication of this new collection, AL-DUWALIYAH has interviewed the scholarly Shaykh Fadlallah and discussed with him the other side of his personality, especially since he has written 16 intellectual books on Islamic affairs.

[Judiyah] How would Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah present his other side as a poet, man of letters, and intellectual to the readers?

[Fadlallah] I have proceeded in life from an intellectual position and scientific position based on my studies of jurisprudence, philosophy, and Islam. It is normal for anybody who actively studies Islam to proceed from the Islamic intellectual, emotional, and motivational idiom and to consider all issues of life from the angle of this comprehensive understanding of Islam which is involved in all of life's issues. Therefore, I have been trying to stir the intellect, to philosophize the issues, and to plunge deeply into all the issues created by cultural development in order to turn these issues into intellectual material through which I try to highlight the Islamic idea so that it can become the idea that motivates others to respect it vis-a-vis the other ideas and, subsequently, to be persuaded by it.

As for the literary aspect, I have lived in an environment that breathes poetry, namely the environment of the venerable al-Najaf in Iraq which, in addition to being a scientific, jurisprudential, and philosophical environment, is the literary environment that has given rise to numerous prominent poets, such as Muhammad Sa'id al-Hububi, Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri, 'Ali al-Sharqi, and other prominent modern Arab poets. I breathed the air of this environment when poetry was recited at weddings, at funerals, and on social and political occasions. This is why I started writing poetry even before I was aware of it.

I started writing verses at the age of 10. It was a good experience at that time. This tendency was reinforced by the fact that I am from a poetically inclined family. The Fadlallah family, which lives in 'Aynata in the Bint Jubayl District at the border area of South Lebanon, is a family of poets, in addition to being a scientifically inclined family. I participated in numerous poetic experiences there. Perhaps many of my poetic experiences in my three published collections were experiences encountered in the venerable al-Najaf. Perhaps whoever reads my third collection of poems, namely "On the Shoreline of Passion," realizes that al-Najaf poems are separate from Lebanese poems.

I lived the poetic experience with all its openness. I have read old poetry and modern poetry. I have read Ahmad Shawqi, Hafiz Ibrahim, 'Ali Mahmud Taha, Mahmud Hasan Isma'il, Khalil Mutran, Ilyas Abu-Shabakah, Bisharah al-Khuri, Salah Labaki, and other Lebanese poets. As already noted, I have also read Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri and 'Ali al-Sharqi. When poetic experimentation led to the development of so-called free verse in the 1950's and when Nazik al-Mala'ikah, Badr Shakir al-Sayyab, Salah 'Abd-al-Sabur, 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Sabur, and all this generation of poets contributed to it—and they are still moving in this direction—I kept experimenting. I have had several experiments with free verse. I have written in free verse a number of poems that are published in "Poems for Islam and Life"

because I do not believe that poetry should be frozen in the measures of verse used by ancient poets because their meter emanated from a certain poetic balance in which their poetic experience lived. Other poets may innovate new measures. But I believe that poetry must retain its music. This is why I do not understand prosaic poetry. It is just prose that can convey creative artistic images. But it is difficult to call such images poetry because music is fundamental to verse. I find that the latest experiments in verse in the new style may convey very creative images and expressions. But they are so vague that a reader with a middle-level education cannot understand their poetic content. The new poetry experience through which poets are going has put distance between itself and clarity.

When speaking of clarity, I am not speaking of clarity of the poetic image or of simplicity. I believe that the image, style, and word of art must be structured artistically. But the artist must experience all this artistic process within a clear framework. This is what is called in literary idiom "that which looks easy but which is difficult to accomplish." One may find what one is reading easy to understand but then one realizes that this idea which one can envision clearly is not an easy idea because of the fundamental artistic elements it incorporates. This is why I believe that some modern poets, who have accomplished in some of their experiments a standard that we cannot ignore, have been able to make their poetry the poetry of the elite. I do not want to say that poetry reflects a popular condition. But poetry is a serious means of expression which surveys the real situation of people who possess a certain degree of awareness and of understanding and which enables these people to find in poetic experiences a reflection of the sound and horizons of their life. When we read such ancient poets as al-Mutanabbi, Abu-Tammam, and al-Bahtari, we find that they rose to high levels of artistic creativity in their poetic experiences. However, one finds that all people, even semi-illiterate people, recite their verses and understand them in their own way and that intellectuals also understand these verses, each according to his own level. This is why the call for clarity does not mean that a single artistic condition must prevail in all poetry. However, the true poet is the one who can combine clarity with creativity.

[Judiyah] With this review, it seems that you have answered several questions, not just one question. But have your Islamic roots had a direct influence on your poetic experience? Through this experience, have you tried to convey a new image of divine spirituality within a poetic context?

[Fadlallah] I believe that when we open up to the broad and vast horizons of Islam, we open up to poetry because poetry moves in the vast realm of the beautiful—the beauty of women and the beauty of the universe as seen scattered in all parts of the universe, including seas, rivers, mountains, stars, the sun, the moon, rose gardens, and all places that display a beauty so deep that one cannot but feel unconsciously happy. When one speaks

of God, one is speaking of the creator of beauty. When one speaks of God's qualities, one is speaking of the absolute and boundless universe. I think that nothing attracts poetry more strongly than the absolute. A poet tries to create from the rose, with its particular petals and fragrances, a vast universe of beauty, of feelings, and of emotions in which man experiences the beauty of the rose more in the poet's concept than in the physical beauty of the rose itself. The poet tries to spiritualize his concept of beauty in order to turn beauty into a lasting spiritual condition, thus imbuing the image in the literary or poetic experience with a sense of immortality that lasts after the [physical] image dies. This is what the lesser al-Akhtal expressed when he said:

"If not for poetry, beauty is naught but a flower with which the eye toys for a couple seconds;

But touched by the sensitivity of a poet or by a shed tear, the blood of immortality will course in its veins, and fate will sleep at its feet."

We have noticed that the Sufist experience which developed on the basis of the love of God, immersion in God, openness to God, and singing the praises of God emanated from an emotional and spiritual poetic condition which—through the divine beauty it had accumulated in its conscience and its intellect, through the Koranic climate and through contemplation—came to believe that God represents beauty and that existence in its entirety is a reflection of this beauty which God represents, considering that the universe leads to the presence of God. If we live the experience of beauty in all its manifestations in the universe, then we discover God through beauty.

As for the idea which many have of Islam as something that represents a rigid conventional condition, I believe that these people base their idea on one of two things. They have had experiences either with people who have a stiff personality and who have thus stiffened Islam to suit their personality or with those who talk about Islam based on banner lines they have read in the context of the West's experience with religion. These people have not read Islam properly. Therefore, I urge them to read Islam so that they may discover thought, art, creativity, and life's movement.

[Judiyah] Your new collection, "On the Shoreline of Passion," does not include all these ideas about which you have talked.

[Fadlallah] Some of the experiences included in the collection convey such ideas, as in the following poem:

God, why am I crying and why am I singing
When my life prevents me from conversing with You?
I love You, and in the shadows of love the soul shivers;
My song quivers under the blue sky from which the light-giving torch imbibes reverently and gracefully;
Love ignites the flame of longing in the heart; and in the heart love sings.

I then go on to add:

I know that the shadows of death will pursue me if my natural impulse becomes my jail;
And that I will tumble to hell if I plunge into my pleasures and fill my jug with sins;
But in the shadow of Your forgiveness, I hope for my salvation.

In another poem, I say:

Love, and pass love in dreams
To every mouth that has hummed a song;
I bless here a memory in which I was but a word and my love but a notion.

Here, love takes the form of an idea in which the beloved is no longer just a physical state in which man is immersed. Thus, I find that there are numerous experiences in this collection which represented my early youth when I had not yet profoundly and comprehensively completed my missionary experience. There are numerous signs and those who read these signs can realize that my life contained signals and suggestions which gave an idea of the life I am living now.

[Judiyah] Do you feel some sort of a split between what you experience in your Islamic activity and what you experience as a poet?

[Fadlallah] I feel that I am a living human being who is experiencing life with all its depth and openness, its struggles, and its beauty. This is why I find no split between what I feel as a poet in my artistic and emotional experience, what I experience as a message through my Islamic activity, and what I experience in my intellect through my scientific activity.

I believe that science is a message and that art can accomplish for life more than just richness of experience, more than just power of position, and more than just openness to God. This is why I feel that all my experiences complement each other and that none of these experiences tries to cancel or disavow the others.

Fadlallah's Writings

In verse:

1. "In the Shadows of Islam," a collection of poems.
2. "Poems for Islam and Life," a collection.
3. "On the Shoreline of Passion," a collection of poems.

Books on Islamic thinking:

1. "The Missionary Method in the Koran."
2. "Issues in the Light of Islam."
3. "Islam and Logic of Force."
4. "Dialogue in the Koran."
5. "Steps on the Path of Islam."
6. "Islamic Horizons."
7. "General Islamic Concepts."

8. "The Message of Fraternization."
9. "Talks on Islamic Unity."
10. "With the Wisdom of the Islamic Line."
11. "Women's Missionary Role."
12. "For the Sake of Islam."
13. "With the Inspiration of the Koran," 25 volumes.
14. "Islamic Movement: Concerns and Issues."
15. "The Islamic Cultural Plan."
16. "On the Path to Karbala'."

MOROCCO

Banque Commerciale du Maroc Profits 168 Million Dirhams

91P40203B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
26 Mar 91 p 11

[Text] Rabat, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT bureau—The Banque Commerciale du Maroc (the largest private bank in Morocco) has announced that its profits over the last year rose to 168 million dirhams. The bank's share of total deposits rose to 12.5 percent.

In addition, the Credit du Maroc bank increased its capital to 521.13 million dirhams.

Hard Currency Reserves Quadruple in 1990

91P40203A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
26 Mar 91 p 11

[Text] Rabat, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT bureau—The Moroccan central bank has announced that its reserves of hard currency jumped to about 16.6 billion dirhams at the end of December, which is four times the level of its reserves at the end of 1989. The reserves suffice to cover the country's imports for three and a half months.

In addition, Morocco's monetary stock rose 18.5 percent last year as compared to 11.8 percent in 1989.

AL-ANBA' Surveys Energy Sector

91AA0236A Rabat AL-ANBA' in Arabic 1 Feb 91
pp 3, 6

[Text] The changes witnessed by the energy and minerals sector require the continual adaptation of the administrative, legislative, and regulatory environment. Thus, 1989 recorded the promulgation of the implementing decree for the Mining Investments Law and the amended stipulation regarding the financial provision for the restructuring of mines, the requirements of which were incorporated within the Mining Investments Law by the Finance Law of 1989.

Regarding energy, efforts continued to regulate and organize all energy activities, especially regarding oil and electricity prices and safety and security. In addition, a draft law on fuels is about to be approved.

Structural measures concerning public contracts continue to be established pursuant to the royal monarchy's directives, particularly by means of:

- The drafting of contract programs between the state, the National Electricity Bureau, the Refining Industry Company (SAMIR), the National Oil Materials Company, the National Bureau of Oil Explorations and Investments, and the al-Sharifah Oil Company.
- The reorganization of Morocco Coal Mines, the Bureau of Mining Explorations and Shares [Bureau de Recherches et de Participations Minieres], and the National Bureau of Oil Explorations and Investments.
- The formulation of rigorous legislation regarding the distribution of liquefied petroleum gases and fuels, and regarding industrial safety in these fields.

Regarding other developments: In recognition of the importance of cooperation in strengthening and promoting the activity of the energy and minerals sector, the public authorities have continued to strengthen crucial areas of cooperation. Important activities worth mentioning in this regard include:

- the Arab Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline;
- the commencement of the operation of the two Moroccan and Spanish electricity grids; and
- Moroccan-Guinean cooperation regarding mineral exploration.

Regarding Maghrebi cooperation in particular, 1989 saw continued bilateral and multilateral meetings and contacts concerning different aspects of energy and mineral activity, which aimed to achieve a fruitful exchange of expertise and information, especially regarding energy, and to create the firm foundations and structures that are essential to continued progress in building the Arab Maghreb.

Regarding economic results, 1989 was marked by a crisis due to India's failure to respect a phosphate purchase contract that it had concluded with the al-Sharif Phosphate Bureau group. The crisis was solved honorably in the framework of the law and relations of friendship and cooperation.

1. The Energy Sector

It is impossible to imagine the growth and development of any economic activity without the securement of an energy supply. Therefore, extreme importance is attached to the national energy sector, especially given that we have to resort to imports to cover the greater part of our needs. This situation presents obvious obstacles, requiring the public authorities to make ongoing efforts regarding planning and investment.

The policy pursued in this area aims to:

- secure the country's supply under the most favorable technical and economic circumstances;
- reduce its dependence on imported energy as much as possible by mobilizing all available national energy resources; and
- control energy consumption by combating waste and using energy maximally in the context of different types of uses.

During 1989, a number of operations were carried out and a number of achievements were accomplished, accompanied by a series of measures and reforms aimed at continually improving the sector's operation.

National energy consumption during 1989 recorded a moderate increase, from the equivalent of 5.7 million tons of oil in 1988 to the equivalent of about 6 million tons of oil in 1989, an increase of nearly 3 percent.

Our imports of crude oil and liquefied petroleum gases increased to 5.8 million tons, an increase of 9 percent compared to 1988. Our imports of bituminous coal increased by 12 percent to total 1.3 million tons.

Oil

The Refinement, Transport, Storage, and Distribution of Oil Products:

Investments made in 1989 were intended primarily to 1) improve the productivity of units that refine and rate crude oil imported for the production of other products needed by the national economy; and 2) improve the distribution of oil and gas to all areas of the kingdom.

Regarding refinement, the SAMIR Company made important investments in maintenance and the improvement of the output of production units. The al-Sharifah Oil Company carried out a number of operations to increase liquefied petroleum gas production and to treat used water. The Africa Company and the SOMIBI Company strengthened their facilities for the production of lubrication oils and plastic containers to package them.

Regarding oil storage, the al-Sharifah Oil Company continued to implement an oil storage project at Mohammadia, which will be able to supply the company's refinery at Sidi Kacem via a new pipeline between Mohammadia and Sidi Kacem; this is being done economically through the use of a first-rate technique. The National Oil Materials Company continued its efforts to complete a large oil storage tank at Sidi Kacem. Private companies continued to upgrade their storage capacities in a number of regions of the kingdom. The most important development in this regard is the Africa Company's new storage tank at Agadir.

Regarding gas storage, loading, and distribution, the al-Sharifah Oil Company made important investments to complete a storage tank for the receipt of butane at

Nador Port, and to complete loading centers at Errashidia Tetouan, Skhirat, Sidi Kacem, and Taza.

The National Oil Materials Company group made important investments regarding the loading of liquefied gas by completing new loading centers at Ouarzazate, Safi, and Meknes. It also invested in the construction of a unit for the manufacture of gas bottles at Nador.

The Africa Company undertook important programs to refurbish and strengthen its reserve of gas bottles of different sizes.

The group comprising the National Oil Materials Company, and private companies, including the Africa Company, the SOMIBI Company, the Ziz Company, and the Slalma Company, made important investments in the expansion of the national oil distribution network and in the upgrading of land and maritime oil transport means.

In general, the oil sector, which includes refinement, loading, transport, and distribution, was strengthened in 1989 by an investment of 435.6 million dirhams.

Oil Consumption

Oil consumption increased by about 5 percent compared to 1988, i.e., about 4.8 million tons.

The oil bill totaled 6.21 billion dirhams, of which 94 percent was for crude oil and 6 percent was for liquefied petroleum gases. Exports of surplus oil totaled 578 million dirhams.

Electricity

The total amount of energy ordered in 1989 was 8,217.1 gigawatts/hour, i.e., an increase of 6.1 percent compared to 1988. Total received energy, which is a better indication of consumption trends, increased by 7 percent, compared to an increase of 6.4 percent in 1988. Hydroelectric production totaled 1,157.2 gigawatts/hour, or 14.2 percent of total production, compared to 936.3 gigawatts/hour, or 12.4 percent of total production in 1988.

Thermal production increased by 5.8 percent, compared to 1988, to 6,976.4 gigawatts, or 85.8 percent of total production.

Regarding material achievements, the National Electricity Bureau is continuing its programs regarding equipment for production, transmission, and distribution, in order to fill needs in the best way and to extend the network to the entire country.

Regarding electricity production programs, activities included:

- The continuation of civil engineering works and [the installation of] industrial equipment for the Hassan I Station, which is linked with the Ait Chouarhit Dam on Oued Lakhdar in the district of Demnat.
- The start of construction works at the Matate Station on Oued Inaouene in the district of Fes.

- The completion of the preparation of a deal to complete the Mjara Station on Oued Ouergha in the district of Ouezzane.
- The start of works to complete a small station for Tabant (Azilal Province).

Regarding thermal production projects, the production equipment program included the following in particular:

- The completion of construction works at the Laioun Station, whose three groups began operating at the end of last November.
- The start of works at the Mohammadia and Tantan gas stations.
- The continuation of a study of tenders for the completion of the large station at El Jorf Lasfar, which will be the largest national accomplishment in this field before the introduction of nuclear energy.

The Bureau is also continuing to study the preparation and mobilization of the available electricity stock, and thermal equipment for the future, in particular:

- The preparation of cost proposals regarding the Imezdulfane and Tajmout plants on the Oumer Rbia River, and the capacity of the Ait Messaoud plant project on the same river.
- The continuation of works to prepare the final site for the first nuclear power station at Sidi Bou Lbira in the Essaouira Province, and economic benefit and technical analyses regarding the station.

Thus, the National Electricity Bureau has allotted investments totalling 668.55 million dirhams for electricity production programs, of which 489.09 million dirhams are for thermal installations.

Regarding transmission, 1989 witnessed: the expansion of the 225-kilovolt and 60-kilovolt grids and their extension to behind the Atlas Seghir and toward the desert provinces; the connection of the Hassan I Hydroelectricity Station to the national grid; and studies on the distribution of the production of programed stations and the introduction of a 400-kilovolt grid.

In addition, studies were continued regarding the electrical connection between Morocco and Spain and the strengthening of the existing connection between Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Thus, investments allocated for the electricity sector during 1989 totaled 1,169 million dirhams, distributed as follows:

- Hydrothermal production installations: 668.55 million dirhams.
- Transmission: 296.92 million dirhams.
- Distribution: 47 million dirhams.
- Miscellaneous numbers [a'dad]: 156.41 dirhams.

Oil Drilling

Our country was able to attract its share of foreign investors interested in oil drilling despite the glut in supply on the world market, which led to a sharp reduction in exploration and drilling activity undertaken

by oil companies at the international level, and to a drop in prices and financial resources directed internationally at this activity.

Research activities undertaken by the Bureau mainly included studies to evaluate oil possibilities in Morocco. They entailed the performance of 596 km of seismic extracts [maqati' zalzaliyah] in the areas of Ouarzazate, Errachidia, and Essaouira, either separately or in cooperation with the al-Sharifah Oil Company.

The al-Sharifah Oil Company made important investments in oil exploration in the framework of the operations that it is undertaking in cooperation with the National Bureau of Oil Explorations and Investments.

Drilling activity benefitted from the investment of 22.15 million dirhams for new works of the Bureau and for the concessions of Moroccans (the al-Sharifah Oil Company) and foreigners.

Bituminous Coal

"Interasset" Jerada constitutes a sure energy resource that is worth conserving and developing, especially inasmuch as our bituminous coal needs are continually increasing. Our imports exceeded 1.3 million [presumably tons], an increase of 12 percent compared to 1988.

Therefore, the efforts being made in the Jerada basin aim to increase production.

Oil Shale

In the medium and long terms, oil shale constitutes an important energy resource. Therefore, efforts are continuing to prepare the technical and economic conditions needed to exploit oil shale.

Ongoing studies in a number of industrialized countries indicate that the appropriate solution at present is to use oil shale to produce electricity through direct combustion in small plants. Thus, efforts are being made in Morocco in this regard in cooperation with a number of countries and organizations, such as the United States and the European Economic Community. In addition, cooperation is continuing with foreign companies regarding the distillation of oil shale to produce oil.

Nuclear Power

Considering the current growth of consumption, national electricity consumption will total 25 billion kilowatts/hour in 2005. It will be impossible to mobilize all of our domestic resources (bituminous coal and hydroelectric power) to cover these needs, and we will be compelled to import the equivalent of 7 million tons of bituminous coal as of that time. Therefore, nuclear energy constitutes an inescapable alternative for fulfilling our needs, especially inasmuch as Morocco, because of its deposits of uranium, which accumulate in phosphate, has an important incentive that justifies this choice.

Thus, the National Electricity Bureau is continuing an economic, technical study, and the selection of the site for the first nuclear station, in cooperation with the French Superatom Company. For its part, the National Center for Energy and Nuclear Technologies and Sciences—which will have at its disposal suitable equipment at its final headquarters in the suburbs of Rabat before the end of the course plan—is continuing to make efforts to encourage the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes, especially in medicine and agriculture, and to train the cadres needed to ensure the operation of the national nuclear power program.

To create the necessary legal environment, the Energy and Mining Ministry is continuing to prepare legislation on the establishment, exploitation, and supervision of nuclear installations. In addition, given the importance of these activities, it may create a supreme nuclear energy council that would be tasked with supervising and coordinating our activities in this area.

Renewable Energy

The development of renewable energies can, in the medium term and in the long term, constitute a considerable support in covering our needs, because of the availability of such energies at the provincial level and the role they can play in the development of rural areas, which are a basic pivot in the policy of his majesty's government.

The Center for the Development of Renewable Energies focused its efforts in 1989 on research and development activities, including various studies, data collection, the monitoring and technical and economic evaluation of renewable energy projects, the evaluation of the stock of these energies in a number of provinces, and the start of new programs to encourage the use of different energies and available capabilities.

Rural Electrification

Rural electrification is essential to laying the foundation for the provincial development policy.

The program for 1989 aims, in the long term, to cover all of the bedouins' electricity needs.

An ambitious program including 600 new centers has been authorized. Measures have been taken in the framework of the state budget and the local communities [jama'at], which have become a primary source of financing for this program. The year 1989 saw the start of the first half [of the program], which includes 128 centers.

In addition, 1989 saw, parallel with the national rural electrification program, a new program concerning isolated areas whose linkage with the electricity grid is problematic. This program aims to electrify 240 villages through the use of motors and renewable energy simultaneously.

Energy Economy Measures

In the area of energy economy, ongoing activities aim at optimal energy use at electricity stations and several large consumer units, especially industrial and tourism units.

Efforts supported by new, advanced technological means and the promotion of the use of other energy resources have made it possible in recent years to reduce the share of energy in production costs considerably.

Energy Investments During 1989 (in Millions of Dirhams)

- Oil refinement, storage, and distribution: 453.6
- Electricity: 168.88
- Oil drilling: 221.5
- The development of other energy resources: 16.8
- Rural electrification: 30
- Energy studies (the Energy Administration): 24
- Total: 1,896.78

2. Geology and Mineral Resources

Regarding the development of underground resources, the processing of our mineral products continues uninterrupted. Our income in 1989 from mineral (raw and processed) exports totalled 10.3 billion dirhams, of which 50 percent was from processed materials, which is a considerable drop compared to 1988, which is attributed to the exceptional environment created by the Indian crisis and inclement climactic conditions in importing countries.

However, 1989 was marked by an improvement in the prices of most minerals due to the increase in demand and the contraction of supply at the world level.

The policy regarding the domestic processing of our raw mineral resources will continue in view of its unquestionable beneficial effects domestically and its positive impact on the country's trade balance.

Thanks to efforts that have been made and the results that have been achieved, the minerals sector has strengthened its position as a primary foreign trade component, quantitatively and qualitatively.

Geology

During 1989, the Geology Administration continued its program in the field of general geology, stratified deposits, and mineral exploration. It extended its geological planning activities to a large portion of the national territory by publishing a number of geological maps of various scales.

In response to the pressing needs of different economic sectors, mining exploration included energy materials, industrial stones, and several basic materials required by national industry, such as sulphur, and basic clay and sand.

The Geological Administration is also continuing to equip its laboratories to fulfill their needs and those of public and private organizations.

Minerals

Mineral Exploration and the Development of Mineral Deposits

The promotion of mineral exploration was a primary concern of mineral activity in 1989. Activity in this field took the form of an ongoing review of the structure and function of the the Bureau of Mining Explorations and Shares in the framework of the reform of public organizations pursuant to the royal monarchy's directives.

Regarding works, in addition to basic studies and activities undertaken by the Geology Administration, which has at its disposal workers in the sector, who are incorporated in the results of its activity, public organizations and mining companies are continuing their exploration efforts.

Investments allocated to the minerals sector for mineral exploration during 1989 totalled 285.2 million dirhams.

Exploitation and Evaluation

The mining sector's recovery in recent years is due primarily to its ability—thanks to the development of its investments [istimarat] and means in recent, difficult years—to benefit from the improved position of the world market for raw and processed minerals immediately upon the first signs of a recovery.

1. Exploitation

Preparation continued regarding phosphate in 1989:

- It has been decided that the Sidi Chenane Mine in the Province of Khouribga will begin production in 1991; its production will total 5 million tons at the end of the course plan.
- The start of works at a new surface mine south of Khouribga, which will produce 2 million tons starting in 1990.
- A new surface mine at Bin Jrir 2, which will enter into production in 1991 and will produce 2.9 million tons in 1993.
- The contour mine at Youssoufia for the extraction and processing of black phosphate at Youssoufia at a production rate of 4.2 million tons.
- The Miskala Mine in the Province of Essaouira.

Regarding other materials, it is worth mentioning the following in particular:

- The continued strengthening of extraction means at the Jerada Mine in the framework of the coal production development plan.
- The start of an equipment and infrastructure project at a multi-metal rock mine in the district of Mar-rakech.
- The start of the exploitation of lead, zinc, and copper at the Msidira Mine in the district of Touissite.

2. Evaluation

Regarding evaluation, the al-Sharif Phosphate Bureau is continuing its ambitious program to evaluate raw phosphate for the production of processed and semi-processed material. A project to renovate units of Morocco Chemical 1 in the Safi area is continuing with the completion of an additional line with a capacity for 165,000 tons per year of phosphoric acid, and two fertilizer lines with a capacity for 1,000 tons per day of high-grade triphosphates and 650 tons of triple nitrophosphorous potash. It has been decided that these lines will begin operating in 1992 and 1993 respectively.

In the El Jorf Lasfar area, initial works have started with regard to units of Morocco Phosphorous 5 and 6, which include eight lines for phosphoric acid production with an annual total capacity of 1.4 million tons, and four fertilizer lines with an annual capacity of 1.56 million tons.

These operations will make it possible to double the current capacity of Morocco Phosphorous. The new units will begin producing in 1992.

In the scope of supplying all provinces of the kingdom with fertilizer, it has been decided to establish three plants for the receipt, storage, loading, and distribution of fertilizers at Nessar, Fes, and Sidi-Slimane.

Regarding other materials, it is worth mentioning the following:

- The completion of the construction of a metallic silver purification and smelting plant at Imiter, with a capacity of 120 tons per year.
- The start of a silver smelting plant at the Bou Azzar Mine (Ouarzazate Province), which will enable the Tounfit Tiranimine Company to increase its production of silver bullion to 13 tons, at a rate of 98 percent.
- The establishment of a purification unit at Tiout to recover gold and accompanying metal byproducts by means of a mixed metal treatment unit.

Thus, the minerals sector invested 2,619.3 million dirhams in exploitation and evaluation.

Investments in Minerals During 1989 (in Millions of Dirhams)

According to Type of Operation

- Mineral and geological exploration: 285.2
- Extraction: 1,526.2
- Evaluation: 1,092.5
- Total: 2,904.5

According to Organization:

- The Geology and Minerals Administrations: 16.7
- The al-Sharif Phosphate Bureau: 2,154.8
- The Bureau of Mining Explorations and Shares: 147.8
- Mining companies: 585.2
- Total: 2,904.5

The Training of Cadres, Vocational Training, and Employment

Regarding training in 1989, organizations subordinate to the ministry and the sector continued to develop their operating programs and diversify their branches with emphasis on pivotal areas suited to the sector's true needs.

The number of students engaged in advanced studies abroad, at the National Minerals Industry School in Rabat, and the Minerals School in Marrakech totaled 572 in 1989. The number of graduates during the 1988/1989 season totalled 177, of which 103 are state engineers from the National Minerals Industry School and 49 are high-level technicians from the Minerals School in Marrakech, in addition to 25 engineering Ph.D.'s and a Ph.D.'s of the third cadre trained abroad. A total of 820 technicians and qualified workers graduated from the Applied School of Minerals in Touissite, the training center subordinate to the al-Sharif Phosphate Bureau, and the National Electricity Bureau.

Regarding employment, the energy and minerals sector, like other sectors, is particularly concerned with creating maximum employment opportunities at the different occupational levels. The sector was able to create 1,683 jobs, including 827 in the mining sector and 746 in the energy sector. The upper cadres represent almost 10 percent of this total, technicians about 12 percent, and qualified workers about 78 percent.

Total Investments in the Energy and Minerals Sector for 1989 (in Millions of Dirhams)

- Energy sector: 1,896.78
- Oil refining, storage, and distribution: 435.6
- Electricity: 1,168.88
- Oil drilling: 221.5
- The development of other energy resources: 16.8
- Rural electrification: 30
- Energy studies (Energy Administration): 24
- Minerals sector: 2,904.5
- Geological and mineral research: 285.2
- Exploitation: 1,526.8
- Evaluation: 1,092.5
- For central and provincial administrative equipment: 26.07
- Overall total: 4,827.35

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN**Overview of Opposition Groups**

91AE0297A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
27 Feb 91 pp 24-26

[Article by Matar al-Ahmadi (London), AL-MAJALLAH Cairo Bureau, and Muhammad Mukhtar al-Fal (Jeddah): "25 Parties Constitute Crisis, Reject Dialogue With Government"]

[Text] Since the 1990 signing of the Aden unification agreement, the ruling regime in Yemen has come to face an urgent new crisis that is now making itself felt in earnest. This is the crisis posed by the proliferation of political parties. The crisis has imposed itself noticeably on the Yemeni political street, because there is no constitutional basis in either of the two parts of the country to deal with it. The northern constitution prohibited political parties, while the southern constitution instituted a one-party system. This has caused constitutional confusion in both Aden and Sanaa. The question of political party activity has become a leading subject threatening the Yemeni leadership, which still has not succeeded in drafting a new law to encompass all the political organizations and parties, now numbering 35. In the meantime, a new crisis has risen to the surface of political life in Yemen—the difficulty of completely merging the People's Conference and the Socialist Party, both of which organizations are ruling in a united regime. Furthermore, there is the difficulty of separating the military leaders in the People's Conference from political activity, with many problems having appeared within the People's Conference. 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih has had considerable difficulty in dealing with this. He believes that the interest of unity and of Yemen require that the armed and security forces stay out of the political struggle and that any military leader who insists on politicizing the armed forces should leave his post and devote himself to political activity. This request has been met with emphatic rejection. Some military leaders have insisted on carrying on political activity, just like some prominent figures and party leaders whom 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih's government fears and to whose wishes it continually accedes for fear of a coup against the government.

Opposition Groups

The overseas Yemeni opposition is composed of deep-rooted political forces with a long history of militancy. They have their bases and their roots, and continued to resist misrule in Yemen for over 20 years, until the regime found itself in an unenviable position.

The regime has found no other way than to choose the two ruling parties in Aden and Sanaa. Each is to buttress the other, the situation is to remain as it was previously, and the national forces are to remain outside the circle of government as in years past.

Now, more than at any time in the past, the opposition rejects any further monopolization and hegemony by the Yemeni Socialist Party and the General People's Conference. These two parties have held sole power and have marginalized all national political forces. They have failed to carry out the daily needs of Yemeni citizens. They are incapable of realizing citizens' aspirations for security, safety, stability, and development. The Yemeni government still forbids all the Yemeni national parties, linking this to a transitional period during which the government is trying to order its affairs.

Militant political forces that played the fundamental and largest role in freeing Yemen from British imperialism have found themselves excluded from carrying out their national role of serving the people. These forces include:

1. The United National Front, led by 'Abd-al-Qawi Hasan Makkawi, who served as general secretary of the South Yemen Liberation Front during the British occupation.
2. The League of Sons of the South, led by Shaykhan al-Habashi. These two organizations are leading the Yemeni opposition against the government's misrule and corruption.
3. The League of Leaders of the Independence Process Through Armed and Political Action, which brought the liberation issue before Arab and international courts.
4. The People's Organization, which participated in commando action against colonial rule.
5. Other political and national forces and other figures of political and social importance include Ibrahim Ibn-'Ali al-Wazir, 'Abdallah al-Asnaj, Dr. 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Baydawi, Dr. Muslih al-Sayyid, Shaykh Muqbil al-'Azab, and Riyad al-Qadi, general secretary of the Yemeni People's Revolutionary Front.

Also on the Yemeni political scene is the Grouping for Reform, which includes Yemeni shaykhs and tribes, Islamic forces, and the Muslim Brotherhood. It is considered to be the largest political party outside the Yemen agree with most of its ideas and goals. Led by Shaykh 'Abdallah Ibn-Husayn al-Ahmar, it constitutes a not-to-be-underestimated human weight against government misrule and irresponsibility.

Opposition Rejects Dialogue

Before signing the Aden agreement, 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih's government tried to form what was called a political organization [committee] to take charge of establishing new principles for political organizations and parties in Yemen and to start what was called a dialogue with them. However, most organizations and parties rejected all the decisions of this committee—the so-called Political Organization. Formed at a time when two entities still existed in the country, the committee was given powers unsuited to the current situation and which therefore have no relation to the unity constitution.

Most of these organizations have insisted that a charter of national action should be drawn up incorporating their differing points of view. The demands can be summed up in three points:

- A law and charter committee should be formed from the organizations and parties desiring to be members.
- The committee should draw up a plan for its work and set a time frame for completing its tasks.

- All the organizations should present an outline of the law and the charter.

However, five other Yemeni parties quickly appeared: the Popular Nasirite Unification Organization, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, the Democratic Septembrist Organization, the United Democratic Front for Reform, and the Front of Forces for Yemeni Unity. These demanded the abolition of the Political Organization Committee, which, as a committee formed when the country was still split into two parts, no longer had any constitutional, legal, or political existence after unification, just as the unification committees formed under the unification agreements had no function after the signing of the Aden unification agreement on 22 May 1990.

The two ruling organizations in Yemen are not striving to establish democratic life in Yemen as they promised, and therefore their efforts are not to be taken seriously.

In an energetic step, leaders of the Yemeni political parties and groupings inside and outside the country have warned that any attempt to hinder the establishment of sound democratic life based on freedom to form parties, political pluralism, a democratic press, elections, and peaceful devolution of authority will have evil consequences.

The opposition leaders have called on the leaders of the People's General Conference and the Yemeni Socialist Party to realize how dangerous the period is and have demanded that they abandon the previously dominant mentality of a leading party.

Observers believe that the call to the Yemeni leadership by leaders of the Yemeni parties and organizations constitutes a final warning. Organizations hostile to the Yemeni leadership have already begun to move energetically outside the country and regroup, now that the condition of Yemenis has worsened under the rule of 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih. He and the members of his government have espoused positions at variance with Arab and European countries, thereby affecting economic life in Yemen. Yemen's relations with most countries and peoples have worsened. Yemenis have become fully convinced that nothing can now save Yemen except the earthquake of the opposition, which is expected to occur at any time.

Opposition Figure on Change, Gulf Crisis

91AE0297B London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
27 Feb 91 pp 27-28

[AL-MAJALLAH interview with Ibrahim Ibn-'Ali al-Wazir; place and date not given: "I Expect Important Changes in the Government"]

[Text] Ibrahim Ibn-'Ali al-Wazir (59 years old) is considered the most important, energetic, and active figure of the Yemeni opposition, despite his poor health. He spent a large part of his childhood in prison, after his

father, 'Ali Ibn-al-Wazir, and his uncle, 'Abdallah al-Wazir, led Yemen's first revolution in 1948. He now spends his life moving between Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Europe, and the United States, where he receives medical treatment. Al-Wazir has expressed his opposition to the position of the government of Yemeni President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih supporting the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. He predicts that Yemen will see important changes, as becomes clear from the following interview with AL-MAJALLAH.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What are the probabilities of change in the Yemeni government?

[Al-Wazir] The government in Yemen is the legitimate son of the previous regimes. The forces capable of really changing things are those that actually opposed past regimes and offered the flower of their men as martyrs so that we would not arrive at our present state under the military. However, it needs to be said that the government in Yemen after unification is not what it was before unification. Before unification, the government in the north represented the dictatorship of an individual, with his whims and inclinations. In the south, it represented the dictatorship of the party, with its false ideology. Unification took place as part of a world-sweeping wave moving toward freedom, democracy, and pluralism. In unification lay the salvation of the two leaderships. It created a kind of balance between the different forces inside and outside the government. Iraq's overwhelming of Kuwait has revealed that the government at the presidential level stood alone among all institutions in having suspicious links that prepared for the disaster. Its dreams disappeared in the face of the decisive awakening in the Gulf and among Arab, Islamic, and international peoples who were optimistic about a new era of peace and freedom on earth and who therefore saw the dangers of aggressive one-man rule casting its hateful shadow over a region where the interests of all mankind meet. I think the countdown on the plotters has begun and that sooner or later a new era of restoring what they corrupted is going to correct conditions.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What is the Yemeni opposition's position on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait?

[Al-Wazir] I cannot speak for all tendencies and wings in the Yemeni opposition, although I have the honor to lead the largest and most authentic opposition force—the one closest to the concerns, aspirations, and values of Yemeni citizens. It needs to be said that there has been a continuation of the oppression and a prolongation of the corruption and despotism that the current military government inherited from the dark ages that caused all this confusion and injustice. It should also be said that the opposition in Yemen is basically an extension of the revolution of Rabi' II, 1367 [February-March 1948]—an Islamic reformist revolution led by the nation's ulema. The revolution's goal was to establish Islamic rule based on consultation (*shura*) and on the way of the Prophet and the rightly guided caliphs. In an atmosphere of rabble-rousing and demagoguery unprecedented in history, the nation marched in noisy parades until the great setback of 1967 occurred. Only an alert minority awoke to see clearly. The period was marked by flattery. Iraq's overwhelming of Kuwait has been the dividing line at the level of the [Arab] scene, exposing the nakedness of the regimes that were said to be progressive and revolutionary. These regimes came to power in the name of the reversal in Palestine, but never for a single day did they attend to the fundamental problem of Palestine, a problem threatening the very existence of the nation, except with more and more rabble-rousing and demagoguery. We awaited them from the east, but they came from the west. Kuwait became the road to Palestine. They are the great farces. Even worse, you find people in this nation who listen, if only for a single moment, to this inane prattle. Since the constitutional revolution, the position of the Yemeni opposition has been and remains on the side of the nation's constant principles—justice, freedom, consultation (*shura*), and decisionmaking that expresses the nation and operates through the nation's institutions. This was the message of the martyred leaders of the constitutional revolution, may God be pleased with them: decisionmaking by institutions, not one-man decisionmaking. The opposition believes that the dark past has formally and objectively ended, never to return, and that the residues of former times and the military men who are heirs to those times will not be able to drag this country backwards.

BANGLADESH

Composition of Electorate Studied

Demographic Details

91AS0752A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 19 Feb 91 pp 1, 8

[Text] Eighty-eight percent of the candidates contesting the coming parliamentary polls are graduates and above indicating an overall high educational status among candidates, according to preliminary findings of Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS), reports BSS.

The survey conducted by Mr. Mahabub Hossain, Mr. Hossain Zilur Rahman and Mr. Binayak Sen in 61 upazila and 30 district headquarters between January 16 and February 1 revealed that only two percent of the candidates are below SSC [expansion not given].

A total of 1,265 households, 2,925 respondents, 605 candidates and 151 constituencies had been covered during the survey, Dr. Mahabub Hossain, Director General of BIDS said at a seminar at the Institute's conference room in Dhaka.

He said large and small traders and professionals dominate the ranks of candidates (82 percent) while those associated with sectors (agriculture and industry) constitute a distant second of 18 percent.

There is little difference in the terms of the class-occupational background of candidates among Awami League, Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Jatiya Party, the survey said.

The ranks of Jamaat candidates are dominated by professionals (60 percent). The ranks of Left Alliance candidates are evenly divided among professionals (38 percent), agriculturists (23 percent) and small traders (21 percent), findings said.

The survey further said that 69 percent of all candidates are from higher income groups and they belong relatively more to Awami League, BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] and Jatiya Party (75 to 85 percent) as compared to Jamaat and Left Alliance (38 to 41 percent).

An overwhelming urban [word indistinct] is noted in the residential status of the candidates which constitute 72 percent. Only eight percent regularly resident in villages and another 20 percent in upazila headquarters, it said.

The survey pointed out that Awami League, BNP and Jatiya Party candidates are relatively less rural based i.e., 18 to 25 percent as compared to Jamaat and Left Alliance candidates with 31 to 47 percent.

On the question of candidates patronising muscleman, the survey observed that one-fifth of the candidates are alleged to be associated with criminal elements.

Absentee Politicians

Regarding the involvement of the candidates in development activities in their respective constituency, the survey observed that nearly one-quarter of all candidates (24 percent) have no active involvement in development affairs of their constituencies. "Like absentee landlordism, this points toward a serious problem of absentee politicians," it observed.

The figure showed that 17 percent of the candidates belonging to Awami League have no developmental role while both Jatiya Party and BNP accounted for 31 percent each, Jamaat for 30 percent, Left Alliance 21 percent.

Ninety four percent respondents showed their interest to go for voting.

It was revealed that 90 percent of the women voters are also willing to vote but 23 percent will vote only if the situation is favourable.

It said that 65 percent of the electorates are hopeful that a fair election will be held while 12 percent expressed their doubts and 23 percent reserved their comments.

On the constraints to fair election, the survey observed that 37 percent of voters had expecting [as published] constraints in the coming election in the form of use of mastans [thugs], false voting, patron influence and vote buying.

It observed that 75 percent of upazila chairmen are playing active role in coming election.

Regarding their allegiance, it noted of the upazila chairmen elected from Jatiya Party, 50 percent still remain active JP [Jatiya Party] supporters, the other 30 percent of inactive and 20 percent support other parties.

The electorates expect that the newly-elected government would ensure price stability and create employment for the poor.

The survey said a significant percentage (30) will be willing to pay tax if results follow.

Stand on Issues

91AS0752B Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 20 Feb 91 pp 1, 8

[Text] An independent survey revealed that 63 percent candidates contesting the election are in favour of parliamentary system of government and 65 percent of the candidates protested against state religion. Of the candidates 92 percent are against any role of the armed forces in civil administration, the survey observed.

Conducted by two Non-Government Organisations, Democratic Forum and Market Research Consultants of Bangladesh (MRCB), the survey report was presented at a Press conference on Tuesday. They interviewed 522

candidates from 100 constituencies of Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi Divisions. The constituencies were selected by stratified random sampling.

The survey pointed out that the candidates of Awami League, CPB [Communist Party of Bangladesh] and the Five-Party Alliance supported Bangalee nationalism while BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] and Jatiya Party candidates supported Bangladesh nationalism and the candidates of Jamaat-e-Islami favoured Bangladeshi Muslim nationalism.

The survey report said that 65 percent candidates rejected the provision of making Islam as state religion in the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. Jamaat candidates are divided on this issue and 87 percent of Jatiya Party candidates supported Islam as state religion.

The report revealed that 92 percent of the candidates are against any role of the Armed Forces in civil administration but the Jatiya Party candidates topped the list who opposed this idea. Of the Awami League, Five-Party Alliance and CPB candidates 43 percent are of the opinion that the defence spending should not exceed 12 percent of the Budget while the BNP, Jamaat and Jatiya Party candidates feel that this limit should be from 15 percent to 25 percent of the Budget allocation.

The survey report disclosed that though 63 percent of the candidates supported parliamentary system of Government 55 percent of BNP and 70 percent of Jatiya Party candidates are in favour of presidential system.

The report said that 47 percent of the candidates are in favour of reducing the dependence of foreign aid but the Jatiya Party candidates demanded to increase the foreign aid. Most of the candidates held the undemocratic governments responsible for misappropriation of foreign aid.

On the present world situation most of the candidates are against Bangladesh's participation in Gulf War in favour of the U.S.-Saudi alliance. Of the candidates 87 percent are in favour of taking diplomatic efforts by Bangladesh to play the role of a mediator in the Gulf War.

Allegations on Ershad Treatment Denied

91AS0751A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 23, 24 Feb 91

[23 Feb 91 pp 1, 8]

[Text] In a Press Note Friday night the Government denied and rejected all the allegations made by Mr. Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury, Acting Chairman of Jatiya Party in a public statement on February 20 at Rangpur as downright falsehood and politically motivated, reports BSS.

Following is the text of the Press Note: Attention of the Government has been drawn to a public statement of Mr. Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury, Acting Chairman of

Jatiya Party at Rangpur on 20th of this month. The government denies and rejects all the allegations made in the statement as downright falsehood and politically motivated.

The facts are as follows: 1. The allegation that there was no reason whatsoever for detention and transfer of the ex-President from Cantonment house to a house in Gulshan is totally wrong. The ex-President was placed under detention to protect national interest and to save the country from a great calamity. This fact was borne out from his own statement to S.B. [expansion not given] officers on duty in which he said that had he got half an hour's time he could not have been taken out of the cantonment. Mr. Mizanur Rahman's statement that ex-President could have flooded the country with blood by using the armed forces, BDR [Bangladesh Rifles], Police and the Jatiya Party has now clearly proved the calamity which was apprehended genuinely by the Government for his immediate detention on 12 December, 1990.

2. The allegation that he was given only one hour's notice is false, he was given two hours 45 minutes time. The detention order was served at 10.15 A.M. and he came out of his house with the Police at 1 P.M.

3. The allegation that the ex-President and his son were not given any food after he was put into the house of his detention is not correct. By the order of Government the food for him and his family was brought from Bangabhaban at about 1.30 P.M. and since then 12 December 1990 food was supplied regularly from Bangabhaban in a befitting manner. From 21 December 1990, his brother-in-law, Mustafizur Rahman, offered to supply the food daily for him and his family. The authorities agreed and supply of food by Mr. Mustafizur Rahman continued up to 3 Feb. 1991. But when the Civil Surgeon, who attended him and his family daily, opined that the food supplied by Mr. Mustafizur Rahman was of inferior quality and inadequate, food was being supplied from 4 February 1991 from the Dhaka Central Jail. In addition, Mr. Mustafizur Rahman and other relations of the ex-President, with the permission of the authorities, have been supplying him food.

Two attendants one from Dhaka Central Jail and one from the Dhaka metropolitan police, have been engaged to attend the ex-President.

Immediately after his detention in the Gulshan house, he sought permission to allow 27 persons to visit him. Some of those were not his relations, such as Enayettullah Khan of the UNB, and Golam Morshed of BCC Bank, London Branch. Authorities permitted 8 of his near relations including Mr. Mustafizur Rahman from the beginning to visit him twice weekly. Later on, 4 more relations were added to the list of visitors.

His two lawyers, Barrister Shadat Hossain and Advocate M. R. Mazumder, were given permission to see him, now almost daily, in connection with the cases filed by him as well as against him. (Incomplete)

[24 Feb 91 p 6]

[Text] Following is the remaining part of the Press Note issued by the Government on Friday night on the statement made by Acting Chairman of the Jatiya Party Mr. Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury at Rangpur.

Six daily newspapers are being supplied to him according to his wishes. Besides, he brought with him his own Radio and Television. He also brought from the Senabhaban two big suitcases and one briefcase with him. The allegation that he was not allowed to bring more than one wearing apparel is not correct, for, besides the things and articles in the suitcases, his brother-in-law Mr. Mustafizur Rahman was attending him from the very beginning and he could have supplied additional clothes, if urgently required. In fact, shortly after December 1990 as many as 13 apparels, 43 women apparels, 66 pieces of children wear, 128 apparels for the adults and 10 pairs of shoes were handed over to the ex-President through his brother-in-law Mr. Nustafizur Rahman.

Some of his relations made complaint to some Congressmen in the United States alleging that degrading treatment was being meted out to the ex-President which constituted violation of human rights. In that connection, clarification was sought by the State Department from our Ambassador in Washington. After ascertaining all facts, it was found that ex-President was being treated in a manner befitting his status and dignity as ex-President.

The previous Government collapsed in consequence of a massive countrywide popular movement for several years. It was not voluntary resignation. Hundreds of allegations of corruption and abuse of power were pouring in daily against the ex-President and his Minister. To examine these allegations a commission of inquiry, headed by a Supreme Court Judge, was constituted.

The Government had no intention to start any specific case of corruption before these allegations were examined by the Commission. But certain matters, unexpectedly revealed, led to institution of criminal cases. His Cantonment house was kept under lock and key, guarded by a Military contingent, and inventory of the articles in the house was made by an eight-member committee headed by the Chief Metropolitan magistrate. The committee also included Mr. Mustafizur Rahman, the ex-President's brother-in-law. Among the articles found, there was a cash amount of Taka one crore 91 lakhs, kept in 25 trunks, sixteen fire-arms, 8 with licence and 8 without licence along with a huge quantity of ammunition were also found. At that time, a country-wide drive was being carried out to recover unauthorised fire-arms and the Arms Act was amended providing for deterrent punishment for possession of unauthorised arms to facilities holding of a free and fair election. Secondly, possession of Taka one crore ninety one lakh in cash was obviously disproportionate to his known source of income.

In these circumstances, two specific cases were started, which are now pending. But people in general and students in particular started strong agitation demanding the shifting of the ex-President to the Central Jail from the Gulshan House, which was previously the residence of the British High Commissioner. People also demanded his open trial in the court of the Sessions Judge, Dhaka. The Government did not agree to these demands. The venue of the trial was fixed in another house in Gulshan, in which only a small number of visitors including pressmen could be accommodated. On the date fixed for trial of the Arms Case, the accused ex-President did not appear citing the ground of his illness. The court gave four days' adjournment and asked a 3-member high level Medical Board to examine the accused ex-President. The Medical Board gave report that the ex-President was fit to appear in the Court. The ex-President then got his trial stayed by the High Court Division. The order of stay was later vacated by the Court on hearing both parties. The accused then went to the Appellate Division for further stay of the trial.

But all sections of people including students and lawyers were blaming the government for delaying the trial intentionally. And even political leaders were criticising the government for such delay.

While preparing the inventory as referred to above, the inventory committee which included an officer of the T&T [expansion not given] Board discovered a 200-line Red Telephone exchange, installed in the ex-President's house through which any persons both within the country and abroad could be contacted. But only two numbers of that exchange were used. One such set bearing number 1211 was installed in the ex-President's room and in the other set bearing 1214 was installed in the residence of Mr. Musarraff Hussain, the then Secretary, Ministry of Industries. No other line, excepting the aforesaid two numbers was allotted to anybody. This additional Red Telephone Exchange was meant for the Army Headquarters. But nobody else knew about it. Since this matter was very complicated and connected with another project, VVIP [Very Very Important Persons] exchange, the Government did not think it proper to deal with the matter at that time. But kept all connected papers for future consideration.

The allegation that no Madrassa teacher was given any pay by the interim Government is also baseless. A general decision was taken by the Ministry of Education to withhold Government grant to all Schools, Colleges and Madrassas where percentage of pass in public examinations was nil.

The Government, therefore rejects the allegations made by Mr. Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury, Acting Chairman of the Jatiya Party, at his public meeting on 20th of this month in Rangpur as a downright falsehood and politically motivated.

INDIA

Shekhar Addresses Media Seminar on Integration

91AS0708A New Delhi PATRIOT in English
20 Feb 91 p 3

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar on Tuesday cautioned the media against distorting news coverage.

Speaking on the final day of the three-day national seminar on 'Role of media in national integration,' the Prime Minister charged the media with having failed to play the role expected of it during times of national crisis.

But, the media cannot be blamed for the vexed problems being faced by the country, he was quick to add. Certain powers with vested interests lead the media astray by misguiding it to cover up facts, said Mr Chandra Shekhar.

Media covers only those in power. It detested those who stood for national integration until the society accepted them, the Prime Minister said.

Had the media been on the right track it would not have overlooked Sikh traditions and history. Instead it should have brought to the notice of the people, the sacrifices of the Sikhs and the harm the army action would cause to the Sikh psyche, the Prime Minister observed.

"After all, why the same Sikhs who laid down their lives for the nation at the call of Mahatma Gandhi, have taken to arms and are now listening to the advice of the Prime Minister of a foreign country," he asked.

The bogey of a foreign hand behind attempts of destabilisation was a myth, he said adding that time had come for introspection into the causes of the unrest in various parts of the country and take immediate remedial action.

The latest the media could do was to understand and unravel the causes of unrest in various parts of the country whether it was in Jammu and Kashmir, or in the tribal areas from Tamil Nadu to Tripura, in Assam, in Punjab or of those who have been oppressed over the centuries and denied the basic rights.

He observed that now education was spreading and the oppressed had realised that their plight was not due to any "sin" of their's but because of the prevalent system.

The main issue, according to Mr Chandra Shekhar, before the media is to lead humanity to the ultimate destination of peaceful co-existence.

For a healthy existence of democracy, a free press is one of the essential prerequisites, said Mr Chandra Shekhar.

Media sadly lacks the power of synthesis. It cannot superimpose two versions of the same event as it is beyond the capacity of media to give directions to news, he said.

Mr Shekhar said the greatest service the media could do to the nation was to present facts without distortion and let the people judge and decide for themselves.

"As of today, distortions were ruling the roost," he noted. The Prime Minister exemplified his point by citing press reports that he had recently met certain people whom he had not even seen for months together.

He said just as the politicians should know their limits the media should also learn to respect its limits and should not remain under the misconception that it decided the course of history.

Later, CPI-M [Communist Party of India-Marxist] general secretary E.M.S. Namboodiripad called upon the media to "strictly" observe the guidelines laid down by the Press Council of India in the wake of communally-biased reports on the Ayodhya dispute.

Earlier, in his welcome address noted jurist L.M. Singhvi said the media was not merely a medium of entertainment and would have to identify itself with issues like national reconstruction, patriotism and human rights.

Code of Ethics

At another seminar on the same theme, speakers, who included leaders of political parties, academicians, editors and historians, observed that the politicians and the press should evolve their respective code of ethics to promote social cohesiveness, communal amity and national integration.

Gulf War Seen as 'Inevitable'

91AS0516A Calcutta ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA
in Bengali 19 Jan 91 p 4

[Article by Sunit Ghosh: "Saddam Husayn, a New Incarnation of Duryodhana, Invites Iraq's Destruction"]

[Text] This war, though not desirable, became inevitable. The two sides reached the point of no return in the wake of the fast-moving events after Iraq invaded Kuwait last August. Saddam Husayn held on to Kuwait after 15 January despite appeals from most world leaders, and he faced American and allied forces in the Arabian desert. After the 15 January deadline for the Iraqi troop withdrawal from Kuwait was over, many experts thought President Bush would bow to his domestic antiwar camp and resort to diplomatic means to avoid a conflict. But Bush did not give Iraqi President Saddam any time. Wednesday night, Bush gave the allied forces the green light to attack Iraq and showed that he means what he says.

Was there a way out of it? For six months Saddam's obstinacy has been causing great hardships to both

developed and developing nations. Meteoric rise in oil prices has hurt the Third World nations the most. People in poorer countries have to tighten their belts hard because of the mounting prices of petroleum-derived products. Iraq's hardheadedness has left its shadow all over the Middle East. Hundreds of thousands of people of this subcontinent who used to make a living working in Arab countries have had to return home because of the uncertainty in the Gulf. That has hurt the economies of every South Asian country. Besides, the people who had to flee the region have been subjected to great pains.

Iraq cared little about the United Nations Charter when it occupied Kuwait. Saddam's initial argument was that he wanted to free Kuwaitis from the rule of selfish and corrupt emirs and introduce democracy in that country. But soon he declared Kuwait an Iraqi province, chased 80,000 Kuwaitis out of their country and proved that his real purpose was to maintain total Iraqi control over Kuwait's oil wealth and establish his preeminence in the Arab world. Saddam had promised Saudi King Fahd and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak that Iraq would never attack Kuwait. Arab countries consider this breach of promise an act of treachery.

This conduct of the power-intoxicated Saddam scared other Arab countries—especially Saudi Arabia—and prompted them to invite the United States to deploy troops, just as Afghanistan had invited the Soviet Union a few years earlier. If the Soviet Union was right when it responded to the Afghan invitation, so was American President Bush when he dispatched U.S. troops to the Arabian desert. Of course, political analysts have variously interpreted the American decision. Some say the slump in the arms market following the end of the Cold War between the superpowers has created strong pressures on the U.S. economy. The Saudi king's invitation came just when the United States was scouting for new customers in the world arms market. From that angle, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a boon for the United States. The fledgling American arms industry has got a new lease of life after it received the Saudi requisition for armaments worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Other experts maintain that the United States had its eyes on Arab oil resources for a long time. Now with the pretext of arms aid, Americans can easily keep their fingers on Arab oil distribution. There are also those experts who believe that Arab capitalists want to help the Soviet economy indirectly by jacking up oil prices and so have prodded President Bush to send troops to defend Arabs. These experts argue that a few years ago, when the oil price dropped to \$20 a barrel in the United States, it undermined the marketing of oil from the Baku region of the Soviet Union causing a serious recession. That recession, coupled with the huge cost of the Afghanistan war, shattered the Soviet economy. To rescue the country from that crisis [Soviet President Mikhail] Gorbachev practically had to resort to capitalistic measures under the cover of "perestroika." Now it is necessary to ensure high prices for Soviet oil in the world market to help keep the Soviets on that course. If that can be

accomplished, the Soviet economy will be stimulated and the foundation of capitalism strengthened.

Leaving aside these arguments, the United States and other countries did not do anything wrong when they answered the Arabs' call for help. To accept the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait is to justify occupation of any small country by a powerful neighbor. Besides, who could tell that Saddam, emboldened by his victory in Kuwait, would not have attacked other Arab countries. The United Nations could not accept such a situation. For six months the United Nations passed one resolution after another, appealing to Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait. But Saddam would not budge. Finally, the Security Council gave Iraq the ultimatum to leave Kuwait by 15 January. For the sake of peace, world statesmen did everything to persuade Saddam, except that they did not touch his feet. The crafty Saddam tried to divert Arab attention by attempting to link the Palestinian issue with the question of [his] troop withdrawal from Kuwait. He threatened that if Iraq was attacked, he would destroy Israel in a counterattack, even though there is no link between Israel and the Iraq-Kuwait issue. In the interest of peace, certain countries acquiesced in linking the Palestinian issue to the Gulf crisis. However, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union took the unequivocal position that there is no connection between the two issues.

Happily, Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar also holds the same opinion. Even though nonalignment has been a basic principle of India's foreign policy, India's Middle East policy has always been pro-Arab. In the 1950's and 1960's, although Arab states attacked the only democratic country in the Middle East, Israel, several times without provocation, India did not criticize them for it. In fact, in order to placate the oil-rich Arabs, it has unnecessarily criticized Israel on the Palestinian question. Long after Iraq had occupied Kuwait, India reluctantly issued a statement rebuking Iraq. Although thousands of Indians suffered because of Iraq's obstinacy, India was cautious in its posture on Iraq. The nations of the world are dependent on Arab oil to varying degrees. Yet few countries have pampered Arabs so much as India has. For the first time an Indian prime minister has said without hesitation that the Gulf problem has no bearing on the Palestinian question. Instead of trying to play the ludicrous role of a self-appointed bigwig on the world stage, Chandra Shekhar has held his government's position firmly, the firmness that past Arab-loving prime ministers failed to demonstrate.

After all his [Saddam's] strategies have failed, the socialist revolutionary Saddam at last has imprinted his flag with "Allahu Akbar" [God is great]. Saddam is trying to convey that he is fighting a holy war. Muslim troops from Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco would find it hard to fight against a flag bearing "Allahu Akbar." In an attempt to confuse and divide the Arab world, Saddam has complained that the Saudi king has dishonored Islam by inviting foreign troops. But no Arab state has been deceived by Saddam's trickery.

The war in the Ramayana became inevitable because the megalomaniac Ravana turned down all pleas to return his hostage Sita honorably. The result: the death of Ravana and the destruction of Lanka. The vain Duryadana refused to give up an inch of territory without war precipitating the bloody war at Kuru that proved his undoing. It seems Duryadana has reappeared in the guise of the rash and megalomaniac Saddam and probably has made Iraq's destruction inevitable.

Shekhar's Policies Elicit Strong Praise

91AS0588A Calcutta ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA
in Bengali 26 Jan 91 p 4

[Article by Sunit Ghosh: "Chandra Shekhar Is Proving That He Comprehends the Nature of the Country's Problems"]

[Text] In two short months Chandra Shekhar has proved his competence and expertise. The way realist Shekhar has been trying to solve the country's complex problems since coming to power is doubtless commendable. He did not try to hide his failures behind bombastic rhetoric. To be prime minister in a minority government has both its advantages and disadvantages. Despite its dependence on others, only a minority government can take risks. Shekhar has the advantage of not having much to lose. If he is tactful, he has a lot to gain. In two months Shekhar has shown that he knows better than Rajiv Gandhi and Vishwanath Pratap [Singh] how to play the game of politics.

Gandhi had two main problems: Kashmir and Punjab. He could not make any progress toward the solution of either. Instead, by opening the lock of the Ram Temple in Ayodhya he took the lid off a can of worms. Like Gandhi, V.P. Singh was big on rhetoric and got trapped when he tried to make political capital out of the issue of backwardness. If, during the past year, the secessionist ULFA [United Liberation Front of Assam] has surged under the protection of the AGP [Asom Gana Parishad] Government, V.P. Singh's ostrich policy is largely to blame for it. Despite having a majority support, V.P. Singh chose to seek popularity through cheap slogans; he not only failed to assuage Sikh anger but created new unrest throughout the country over the Mandal Commission [Report].

In two months, Shekhar has proved that he is well aware of the different causes of the different ailments and is determined to apply appropriate medicines [for each]. The ULFA was getting out of hand because of the direct and indirect support of the AGP Government, and, on the northern frontier, Pakistan took advantage of the [Indian] central government's misguided policy and instigated the secessionists in the Kashmir valley. The medicine appropriate for them would be counterproductive in Punjab. The ULFA terrorists, indirectly prodded by the AGP Government, had undermined the law and order situation; normalcy in that state could not be

restored without dissolving the Prafulla Mohanta Government and without pitting the army troops against the ULFA. In Punjab, Shekhar has taken a bold and well-thought-out step by avoiding that course and opening a dialogue with the Akali guerrilla leader Simranjit Singh Mann. For that, Shekhar faces a great deal of criticism from opposition political parties. Yet he did not let that criticism derail the dialogue. Gandhi tried to solve the Punjab problem by punishing the guerrillas and failed. He could not take any steps to erase the Sikh suspicion created by his failure to transfer Chandigarh to Punjab. Besides, Gandhi was unrealistic when he discounted Mann's rise in Sikh politics. Neither could V.P. Singh fathom the Sikh mentality. If he did he would have talked with Mann, which he did not do. Maybe his dependence on the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] and Left Front inhibited V.P. Singh from opening a free dialogue with Mann. Now, despite the obstacles created by self-seeking opposition parties, Shekhar has not given up [on his dialogue with Mann]. In fact, the leftist parties do not have a legitimate reason to meddle in Punjab politics; in Punjab the only two parties, besides the Akali Dal, that have political standing are the Congress [I] and BJP.

Rapprochement after a fight requires the two parties to make compromises. The Sikh demand for self-determination that Mann has raised may not be wholly acceptable, but it would be unrealistic to reject that demand out of hand and stop the dialogue after three Akali groups have united under Mann. Rather, to heal Sikh wounds, Chandigarh should be given to Punjab. That would ease the current tensions and might even help nudge Akali leaders away from their demand for self-determination. If he is sincere, Shekhar should persuade Devi Lal and immediately hand over Chandigarh to Punjab.

Shekhar should also be commended for his effort to steer the two parties to the Ramjanambhoomi-Babri Masjid issue away from the political arena in an effort to heal the vicious [Hindu-Muslim] communal atmosphere; he has tried to bring them around a table. The progress of talks between the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Babri Action Committee indicates that a way could be found before long to solve the problem. Without making a fuss Shekhar said in Parliament, "Babur did an outrageous thing when he destroyed the temple. Yet to try to take revenge for that after 500 years is also reprehensible." It was the first time an Indian prime minister declared publicly that Babur had destroyed a temple. Neither Gandhi nor V.P. Singh had shown the courage to say it lest the Muslim vote bank should fall apart. And yet both believed in their bones that Babri Masjid really was a Hindu temple. After Shekhar's forthright comment a debate about Ramjanambhoomi-Babri Masjid seems unnecessary. Nevertheless, Shekhar did not impose his personal belief and thinking on others. Instead, he paved the way for the two feuding parties to come to a compromise and has been able to ease the level of tensions. On the Mandal Commission issue, too, Shekhar's views are well-reasoned. Some time ago, he said the

problem is not one of high and low but it is one of poverty. Although the so-called lower classes are beset with greater poverty, higher-class people are not free from it. V.P. Singh did not delve deeply into the problem. He is using the Mandal Commission report for narrow political gains, and by encouraging politics based on classes and castes, he is trying to create a vote bank among the Backward Classes with his eyes on the next elections. The leftists, believing in a classless society, have also taken to his coattail and engaged in caste-class politics in the Hindi Belt hoping for a few seats.

In spite of all this, the successes that Shekhar has scored in a short time can be blurred because of his ultraliberal views on some moral questions. It seems Shekhar sometimes forgets that morality has a bearing on politics. He has included murder suspect Sanjay Singh in his Cabinet and defended his contemptible conduct. He has spent a night at the home of the so-called "mafia" of Dhanbad. What example is this onetime "Young Turk" creating for today's youth? Before publicly defending Sanjay Singh's shameless conduct, Shekhar should have realized that politicians cannot claim the privacy in life enjoyed by people outside the political arena. In the past, many politicians had to pay for ignoring this precept. Similarly, his decision to keep five Cabinet ministers on their jobs after they were declared disqualified as members of Lok Sabha is also totally contrary to the principle. This decision of Shekhar has undercut the law barring party desertion. By having party defectors on his Cabinet, Shekhar has assumed a heavy burden. Unless he extricates himself from the burden in time, he could collapse under its weight.

Shekar Stands Firm On His Decisions

91AS0588B Calcutta ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA
in Bengali 30 Jan 91 p 4

[Editorial: "The Prime Minister's Decisions Are Appropriate"]

[Text] The Congress party and leftists are enraged by the Indian Government's decision to let U.S. planes make refueling stops on Indian soil. Reports say that since two days before the outbreak of the Gulf war U.S. C-141 military cargo aircraft have been landing at the Bombay international airport. So far, 38 aircraft have been helped here on their flights between the Philippines and west Asia. Some critics say that has hurt India's policy of nonalignment. Some see this as an indication of a shift in India's traditional foreign policy. Others have accused India of aiding the U.S. joint [war] effort. The Congress [I] and leftist parties are political parties. They certainly have the right to express their views or criticize the government. The opposition will also try to pressure the government into following a policy of its [the opposition's] choice. Notably, the prime minister has not changed his decision in spite of these criticisms. The government has announced that its policy will stand. According to a special adviser's spokesman, U.S. aircraft have been permitted to land in the course of their flights

under a bilateral agreement between the United States and India. And they have been allowed to buy oil on humanitarian grounds. Central Oil Minister Satya Prakash Malaviya has said it is not true that India's policy has changed during the Gulf war; allowing U.S. planes to refuel does not mean that India has joined the war against Iraq. "If anybody seeks our help in a crisis, we will be helpful," [the minister said].

Happily, the prime minister did not rush to alter his policy because of the criticisms. The critics have pursued policies in which they believe. Prime ministers, too, have the right to make administrative decisions in light of their beliefs. People expect firmness and openness from prime ministers and governments. Once a government makes a policy, it ought to have the courage to implement it, even if that policy is unpopular. It is undesirable to have a government that does not listen to criticism. But the government cannot rule the country if the prime minister, who is the head of government, is wishy-washy in making decisions or gets nervous over criticisms. People have such experiences, which are not pleasant at all.

Besides, on this issue the prime minister has made the correct decision. The prime minister's decision may upset those who believe the war against Iraq is terribly unjust or that Saddam Husayn did nothing wrong by invading Kuwait. Maybe they also make no distinction between warplanes and passenger aircraft. Maybe they cannot stand the word "America." It is clear that the prime minister is not among them. He is not afraid of sticking with his belief; that is borne out by the fact that he even has brushed aside the criticism of the Congress [I] whose support is crucial for the survival of his government. Objection can be raised in one respect. The government could have announced beforehand that it was going to let U.S. cargo planes refuel. Then it would not have the need to defend its action.

In fact, Congressite critics did not hesitate to remind the prime minister that his government's existence hinges on the support of the Congress [I]. Young Congress [I] leaders may not be aware that their party had to run the country as a minority government for a year. But it does not behoove the Congress [I] to complain that a minority government is changing the country's traditional foreign policy or feel distressed or angry about it. One, it is foolish to challenge the legitimacy of the central government, even if a minority government. Any effort to limit its functions should be denounced. Secondly, is the Congress [I] not largely responsible for the present central government? Thirdly, only the paranoid and the nearsighted can say that foreign policy is too sacred to be changed.

BJP Leader Supports Presidential System, Judicial Process

91AS0530B New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi 16 Jan 91
pp 1, 10

[Article: "Advani in Favor of Presidential System"]

[Text] New Delhi, 15 January—Mr. Lalkarishan Advani, president of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), said on Saturday that India should have a presidential system instead of the legislative system. He also emphasized that this law to stop party-hopping should be studied carefully.

Mr. Advani was speaking at a press conference held in the Press Club of India. He said that the legislative system was causing "instability." According to him, political parties have gotten stuck in the quicksand of the present political situation. He said that the presidential system would be very helpful because of the large number of political parties in the country now. He added that the tendency to desert [parties] had become so strong that only a presidential system could control that. He further said that if all political parties agree, it would be of great help to examine the presidential system.

Mr. Advani reminded us that he had endorsed the presidential rule in his presidential speech at the 1987 BJP convention held at Vijayawada. He said that he had not pushed it hard at that time fearing that the president might abuse it because of the "autocratic nature" of this system. He added that he was repeating his proposal now because the political situation has changed a lot since then and the Congress (I) was not controlling the government anymore.

Mr. Advani bitterly criticized the five ministers who were still in office even though they were declared ineligible for Lok Sabha membership. He said that he could not defend the prime minister's statement that these five ministers did not have to resign after they were declared ineligible by the Lok Sabha. He added that this minority government has challenged the president and the constitution by not removing these five ministers.

Mr. Advani expressed his opinion that the law to restrict changing parties had some flaws and needed a close analysis by the legislative council. "I am not demanding that we cancel it because this law has given some stability to our politics. The main flaw is that it declares a member ineligible and omits giving a warning. This article should be used only when someone ignores a warning during the no-confidence proceedings. Making it applicable at all times will restrict Lok Sabha members' freedom."

He shared his program and said that the midterm elections for the Lok Sabha would be held in 1991. He added that the opposition parties had run for elections on the anti-Congress [I] sentiment, but the situation has changed now. The time of anti-Congress [I] feeling has been long gone now and the people will evaluate each party on its own merit during the next elections. He cautioned that even though the campaign against the BJP was very strong, it has only made the party even more popular.

Mr. Advani said in an answer to a question that the BJP has never said that it would abide by any court decision on the Ram Janambhumi issue. He said that the

Ayodhya issue was such that could not be determined by a court and needed to be solved by mutual talks. Mr. Advani denied ever demanding to destroy the Babri Masjid. He said that the Hindus and the Muslims should respect each others' feelings. The Rama temple in Ayodhya is a symbol of faith for the Hindus and it should be respected.

Discussing the Gulf War, he said that he never wanted a war and that this war should be stopped. However, the effort to remove Iraqi army from Kuwait should continue.

Mr. Advani said in answer to a question that any politician has the right to be a member of any religious organization and members of religious organizations have the right to be members of any political organization. This is their right. He added that religion and politics could not be separated in the present situation. "I have never said that I represent the hundreds of millions of Hindus in the country. I only represent the Hindus who believe in the BJP."

Statistical Office on GDP Growth

91AS0690A New Delhi PATRIOT in English
20 Feb 91 p 8

[Text] Gross Domestic Product (GDP) registered a higher increase of 5.2 percent than anticipated in 1989-90, the last year of the seventh Plan, taking the average annual growth rate in the plan period to 5.6 percent against the target of five percent, according to the quick estimates released by the Central Statistical Organisation, reports UNI.

National income rose by 5.2 percent during 1989-90 while per capita income registered an increase of 3.1 percent.

The saving of public sector declined by 1.5 percent mainly due to large negative saving of the Government administration.

GDP at factor cost at constant (1980-81) prices in 1989-90 is estimated at Rs [rupees] 197,419 crore as against Rs 187,725 crore in 1988-89, registering a growth of 5.2 percent during the year as against the record growth rate of 10.4 percent achieved during the previous year.

Thus the average annual growth rate for the seventh five year Plan works out to 5.6 percent.

At constant (1980-81) prices the national income (i.e., net national product at factor cost) in 1989-90, is estimated at Rs 174,798 crore as against Rs 166,200 crore in 1989-89 [as printed] showing a rise of 5.2 percent during the year.

At current prices, GDP in 1989-90 is estimated at Rs 395,143 crore as against Rs 351,724 crore in 1988-89, showing an increase of 12.3 percent during the year.

At current prices, the national income in 1989-90 is estimated at Rs 346,994 crore as compared to Rs 310,015 crore in 1988-89, showing a rise of 11.9 percent during the year.

All sectors of the economy, except forestry, contributed to the positive growth of GDP during the year. The agricultural sector registered a growth rate of 2.3 percent over and above the unprecedented growth rate of 16.3 percent during the previous year.

According to the all India final estimates of the foodgrain crops for 1989-90, released by the Ministry of Agriculture, the production of foodgrains was 170.6 million tonnes in 1989-90 as against 169.9 million tonnes in 1988-89.

The marginal increase in foodgrains production was mainly due to the increase in production of rice (5.1 percent), jowar (27.0 percent), maize (14.3 percent) and ragi (15.4 percent) notwithstanding the fall in the production of wheat (-8.2 percent), bajra (-14.9 percent), barley (-14.7 percent), gram (-17.5 percent) and other pulses (-5.7 percent). There was a significant increase in the production of chillies (15.1 percent), sugarcane (9.6 percent) and kapas (30.5 percent) also. The production of oilseeds on the other hand showed a decline (-7.1 percent).

The fishing sector registered the highest increase of 14.4 percent during the year, which was mainly contributed by the increase of 25.0 percent in marine fish production.

In the case of all other sectors, the increase during the year varies between 10.3 percent registered by electricity, gas and water supply (mainly electricity) and 1.2 percent registered by storage.

The per capita income in real terms is estimated at Rs 2,142 for 1989-90 as against Rs 2,078 for 1988-89, registering an increase of 3.1 percent during the year. The per capita income at current prices is estimated at Rs 4,252 in 1989-90 as against Rs 3,875 for the previous year.

In order to derive the GDP at market prices, the GDP at factor cost is adjusted by adding indirect taxes net of subsidies. As the various components of gross domestic expenditure, for example, consumption expenditure and capital formation, are normally measured at market prices, the discussion in the following paragraphs is in terms of market prices only.

Private Final Consumption Expenditure (PFCE) at current prices works out to Rs 289,640 crore in 1989-90 as against 261,603 crore in 1988-89. PFCE thus formed 65.4 percent of GDP at market prices. At constant (1980-81) prices PFCE works out to Rs 151,974 crore in 1989-90 as against Rs 146,306 crore in 1988-89.

The per capita expenditure in 1989-90 works out to Rs 3,550 at current prices and Rs 1,862 at constant (1980-81) prices as against Rs 3,270 and Rs 1,829 respectively in 1988-89.

The expenditure on almost all items of expenditure in 1989-90 both at current and constant prices increased as compared to the previous year.

The share of food items as a whole in the total consumption expenditure showed a further decline in 1989-90 as compared to previous year, while the share of clothing, furniture, furnishing, appliances and transport services showed an increasing trend.

Gross domestic saving at current prices in 1989-90 amounted to Rs 95,917 crore as against Rs 83,298 crore in 1988-89, constituting 21.7 percent of GDP at market prices as against 21.1 percent in the previous year.

The saving of the household sector went up by 17.0 percent from Rs 67,439 crore in 1988-89 to Rs 78,913 crore in 1989-90 and that of the private corporate sector by 15.6 percent from Rs 8,116 crore in 1988-89 to Rs 9,379 crore in 1989-90.

The savings of the public sector, on the other hand, showed a marginal fall of 1.5 percent from Rs 7,743 crore in 1988-89 to Rs 7,625 crore in 1989-90.

This is mainly due to large negative saving of the Government administration which increased from Rs (-)8,453 crore in 1988-89 to Rs (-)12,208 crore in 1989-90.

The net domestic saving has correspondingly gone up from Rs 44,208 crore in 1988-89 to Rs 50,387 crore in 1989-90 and constitutes 12.7 percent to net domestic product at market prices as against 12.7 percent in the previous year.

As in the case of gross saving, the net saving of the household sector has gone up by 18.2 percent from Rs 52,109 crore in 1988-89 to Rs 61,605 crore in 1989-90 and that of the private corporate sector by 3.5 percent from Rs 1,881 crore in 1988-89 to Rs 1,947 crore in 1989-90.

The net saving of the public sector, on the other hand, showed a steep decline from negative saving of Rs (-)9,783 crore in 1988-89 to negative saving of Rs (-)13,165 crore in 1989-90.

The decline in the net saving of the public sector is due to large negative saving of Government administration and the increase in the consumption of fixed capital from Rs 17,525 crore in 1988-89 to Rs 20,790 crore in 1989-90.

Gross capital formation at current prices increased from Rs 94,432 crore in 1988-89 to Rs 106,501 crore in 1989-90 and at constant (1980-81) prices from Rs 47,121 crore in 1988-89 to Rs 48,605 crore in 1989-90.

The rate of gross capital formation at current prices increased from 23.9 percent in 1988-89 to 24.1 percent in 1989-90.

The rate of capital formation in 1988-89 is higher than the rate of saving because of the substantial net capital inflow from abroad which declined marginally from Rs 11,134 crore in 1988-89 to Rs 10,584 crore in 1989-90.

The net capital inflow from abroad constituted 2.4 percent of GDP at market prices. The rate of gross capital formation at constant (1980-81) prices declined marginally from 22.2 percent in 1988-89 to 21.8 percent in 1989-90.

The rate of net capital formation at current prices in 1989-90 was 15.3 percent as compared to 15.5 percent in 1988-89 and at constant (1980-81) prices, it was 13.9 percent in 1989-90 as compared to 14.4 percent in 1988-89.

Within the gross capital formation at current prices the fixed capital formation amounted to Rs 94,837 crore in 1989-90 as against Rs 83,205 crore in 1988-89, thus showing an increase of 14.0 percent over 1988-89. All the three institutional sectors contributed to this increase.

Tamil Nadu: Interim Financial Status Viewed

91P40189B Madras *DINAMANI* in Tamil 8 Mar 91 p 4

[Editorial: "Financial Status Report of Tamil Nadu"]

[Text] The financial report of Tamil Nadu was prepared by the governor's office and submitted to Parliament by Central Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha. Even while Congress(I) was creating a crisis by boycotting Parliament in order to bring down Chandra Shekhar's government, other opposition parties were trying to get the fiscal plans passed in Parliament for states like Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry, which have been placed under the president's direct rule. These opposition parties have displayed more responsibility than Congress(I) in this important matter.

The Tamil Nadu fiscal report has requested appropriations to cover a period of six months. This is only an interim report similar to the Center's. The new government that will be established after the elections to the state legislature can be expected to introduce a new fiscal plan.

It is not surprising that there are no new taxes nor any new benefit in the interim plan. A new plan introduced by a new government may very well include new taxes.

The noteworthy item in the currently submitted report is the increase in revenues of Rs[rupees] 609.38 crores more than that of the 1990-91 fiscal report. The collection of commercial taxes, including excise duty on liquor, is supposed to have resulted in this increase. It is comforting to note that a deficit of Rs 510.10 crores in the 1990-91 budget has now been reduced to Rs 179.10.

The expenditures seem to have increased. Income expenditure had been estimated previously at Rs 4,814.09 crores. This has increased to Rs 5,266.33 crores. Bonuses for government employees and salaries for teachers in government-run schools are said to be affecting this increase in government expenditure.

There are some welcome items in this fiscal report. The increase from Rs 26 crore to Rs 525 crores for power and energy generation will help industrial development. The Rs 75 crore appropriation for the Telugu-Ganges project will please the people of Madras City, since they are confident this will expedite the flow of the Krishna river's waters to satisfy [the needs of] the Madras population.

Editorial Berates Treatment of New Economic Minister

91AS0462B New Delhi *JANSATTA* in Hindi
5 Jan 91 p 6

[Editorial: "Is Forgiveness Enough"]

[Text] The country can take solace in the unconditional forgiveness granted to the Economic and Justice Minister Subramaniam Swami. But, in reality, should the matter of his so-called threat to have the speaker of parliament arrested be considered respectfully closed? The position of and respect for the speaker of the parliament is the basis of our parliamentary democracy. A small fly like Swami, intoxicated by his first-time acquired political power, cannot do anything useful. But to save him we can not let the necessary respect for our parliamentary traditions and legislative workings be destroyed. Based on the unconditional forgiveness given to Swami after three days of uproar in the parliament, and the prime minister's personal request to the speaker to forgive the minister's misconduct, it is clear that the situation is serious.

But in spite of the long debate and uproar in the parliament, it was not decided whether the news that appeared in the Wednesday's *HINDUSTAN TIMES* is true or false, or it was simply an incomplete description of the conversation between Swami and Rabi Rai in the speaker's chamber. The third person in the chamber at the time of the conversation was Minister Satya Prakash Malviya and he was quite hesitant to say that the news was far from the truth.

If that is the case, then why did the prime minister ask for forgiveness and why did the speaker forgive him out of grace and magnanimity associated with his position? And why did they not file a privilege case against the newspaper which printed the news? If Swami did indeed threaten to have the speaker arrested, then he cannot be freed on an unconditional forgiveness.

That is why the opposition has demanded Swami's dismissal. The prime minister was ready to do anything if the speaker confirmed that he was mistreated by Swami in a way which cannot be forgiven. Speaker Rabi

Rai did not take Swami's remarks very seriously and wanted to ignore them. This behavior of the speaker was in line with [the magnanimity associated with] his position. But the government and the House should also worry about the interrelationship between parliamentary behavior and legislative workings. Rabi Rai who sits at the seat of the speaker could not suggest any action against Swami which could be considered as an act of revenge. The speaker cannot come down to the level of a small fly like Swami. Therefore, any action against Swami had to be taken either by the government or the House. Mr. Chandra Shekhar did not consider it appropriate to take any action because of the excuse of the forgiveness by the speaker. Therefore, The House took the responsibility. The debate lasted two days and Swami neither defended himself nor his party and supporters in Congress [I]. Swami was all alone in his despicable act. If voting was done on the insult motion against him [Swami], it would not have led to the fall of the government or the speaker. Congress [I] had claimed to be the protector of the grace and respect of the position of the speaker but it is also the protector of Chandra Shekhar's government. The insult motion could have passed only if Congress [I] had agreed to vote for it. If it voted against the motion, then it would go against the speaker. The situation in Congress [I] and the House is such that in spite of public opinion against Swami, it was difficult to take the matter to its logical conclusion. Therefore, it was decided that Swami should request unconditional forgiveness. Even this was not acceptable until the last moment. But at the end, the House showed its magnanimity and a difficult situation was averted. But will this be sufficient penalty for the likes of Swami? There should be a debate on this issue outside of the House.

Constitutional Crisis, Rushed Elections Blamed on Congress (I)

91P40189A Madras DINAMANI in Tamil 8 Mar 91 p 4

[Editorial: "Constitutional Crisis and State Elections"]

[Text] The immature behavior of Congress (I) in Parliament has created problems in the present government of certain states besides creating a major constitutional crisis. Specifically, it has affected the election process. Both houses of Parliament will be adjourned until Monday as the members who belong to various political parties might wish to convene a meeting to resolve this issue. Elections to the legislative assemblies of Tamil Nadu, Pondicherry, Punjab, and Assam states must be held. The prime minister has already announced that the elections in Tamil Nadu will be held in mid-May. The Pondicherry elections also might be held at the same time. It will not be a major problem if these elections were to be temporarily postponed. The governments of these areas will not suffer.

It is, however, not possible to postpone elections to the Punjab and Assam legislatures. In the state of Punjab, the president's term ends on 10 May. In Assam, the

president's term ends on 27 May. It is doubtful that conditions favorable to holding elections will prevail in these states.

Normalcy has not yet returned to Punjab; terrorists' atrocities are lingering. Professor Kaur, a female relative of former Minister of the Interior, Bhuta Singh, was recently abducted by the terrorists. Simranjit Singh Mann, the leader of the Siromani Akali Dal, along with two of his associates, were arrested while trying to convene a meeting to condemn the police force for allegedly killing six farmers. This shows that normalcy has not yet returned to the state.

In Punjab, political parties are not functioning normally either. There is no unity in the Akali Dal, which is the major political party there. The expectation that the factious Akalis might come together under Mann's leadership has not been fulfilled. It is not wise to conduct elections there under these circumstances.

In Assam as in the Punjab, normalcy has yet to return. Although the army has concentrated all its efforts toward controlling the extremist and terrorist movement ULFA [United Liberation Front of Assam], it has not been completely successful. ULFA is keeping up its murderous and terrorist acts, and has also ordered Assamese politicians to cut off relations with political parties in India.

Thus there is no alternative to extending the president's rule in these two states by six more months. The crisis created by the resignation of Chandra Shekhar's government is another reason for extending the president's rule there.

The Constitution will have to be amended to effect this change. The opposition favors this move. We will have to wait and see if Congress (I) party will cooperate or continue to act in an irresponsible manner. The opposition will adhere to any decision taken by the president of the Republic.

Relation of Religion to Politics Critically Examined

91AS0532A New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi
19 Jan 91 p 6

[Article by Jawaharlal Kaul: "The Political Parties' Tradition of Saints"]

[Text] Chandar Sawami has pulled the stakes of his tent from the Paryag Fair and has returned to Delhi. He could not gather a satisfactory crowd there. He had thought that some famous saints [holy men] would join him on his stage and declare him their leader. He even had invited Rajiv Gandhi to lure the crowds; however, he failed in all his efforts. Now, after consultations with his friends and followers, he is planning to go to Ayodhya next month to build a temple there! He may or may not succeed in building the temple, he will keep trying in starting his Sant party. He had visited Ayodhya before

with the government motorcade and all the pomp and circumstance. He had also visited the controversial building in the company of some local sadhus. He had declared that this building was a temple and a temple must be built right there. His next campaign led him to Haridwar, aiming at all those large religious organizations and well-known religious leaders there. He had hoped that two or four big names might join him to help his cause. However, this campaign also proved fruitless. After noticing the attitude of Akhada Mahaparishad and other sadhu organizations, he decided not to pursue this matter any further. There were some rumors about various sant organizations thinking about deserting the Vishwa Hindu Parishad [VHP] and joining him. After some planning sessions in Delhi, he went to Paryagraj, from where he has returned now.

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) often has been accused of using sadhus and saints. However, these accusations had a different tone in the past. It is commonly said that the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) uses the BJP as a political crutch and since the VHP has been a partner of the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS), the BJP has been blamed for being at the beck and call of the RSS. This accusation was usually levied by the Congress party. However, when the Janata Government was established with the Jana Sangh as a broker, some socialist and former Congress leaders argued over this issue and declared that the BJP leaders and legislators were in cahoots with the RSS. This issue is called the issue of dual membership. In other words, they demanded that the Jana Sangh people should leave the coalition. Since the coalition was presented as a coalition of communal groups for a long time, its member Jana Sangh was also being cursed. The coalition was the real culprit and Jana Sangh became guilty by association. The equation has changed some now. The VHP and Ramkar Simiti are being called bad because they have joined the BJP. The sant would have remained a sant if he had not joined his forces with the BJP. Well, the politicians are always forced to change equations and move elements. The bottom line is, or should be, that political parties should not use religious leaders, holy men, maulvis, and faqirs. It would be interesting to find out which of our political parties meet this criterion.

Let us start with our oldest party, the Congress party, which has passed more than a 100 winters. Let us leave [M.K.] Gandhi out since he was a holy man himself and, in the eyes of the Muslims, a communal Hindu. We will start with the leaders who got to power through his help. In addition to the Muslim League, a new party—Jamaat-i Islami (JI)—had emerged then. This organization was founded by Maulana Modudi as a pure Islamic organization and its goal was to establish an Islamic form of government. The Congress party established another party by the name of Jumiat-i Ulema-i Hind (JUH) to counter it. This was also a party of maulvis. The Congress leaders knew that only religious leaders could be used to keep the Muslim away from separatist movements. They were using maulvis to fight

maulvis. Also, the Congress party had an imam in the form of Maulana Azad as an important member. This continued for a few years until Modudi, the founder of the JI left the country and his party was politically inactive for many years. Thus JUH ruled the roost in the political arena.

Mrs. Gandhi had also chosen some holy men and maulvis for her support. Her son, Rajiv Gandhi, also tried to cash in on this inheritance. He used it last year in the Ayodhya conflict. The credit to bring four Shankaracharyas [Jain leaders] on one platform goes to RSS' Madhawrao Gololkar. Most of the [Hindu and Jain] holy men united on the VHP platform. However, the Congress party succeeded in getting one Shankaracharya to support it. Shankaracharya Sawami Swarupanand Saraswati, who is used to controversies, declared last year that the foundation stone laid in Ayodhya in 1989 was laid during an inauspicious hour. He announced that he was going to lay the foundation stone appropriately and headed toward Ayodhya with this mission in mind. However, Mulayam Singh arrested him en route to Ayodhya. Some secular people, especially English journalists, praised Mulayam Singh profusely and went as far as to say that had Narayan Dutta Tiwari demonstrated such firmness when the foundation stone was laid last year, the whole issue would have been nipped right there. This flattery was enough for Mulayam Singh Yadav to start showing his prowess here and there. He had already stolen Maulana Muzaffar Hussain Kachochvi, a Congress supporter from Kachochua Dargah [Muslim shrine]. He thought that he had taken the fort over after arresting Sawami Swarupanand. It is rumored that he had commissioned a poet to write and record a song with the words, "the name is Mulayam [soft] but he works like steel."

Why should Raja V.P. Singh remain behind the Congress party in this race? He tied himself to the maulvi of maulvis, Jama Masjid's Shahi Imam Abdullah Bukhari, who claim that his ancestors had arrived in India with the Moghuls. One reason for taking this support was to leave English-supporters like Shahabuddin behind. It was Mrs. Indira Gandhi who had appreciated Maulana [Bukhari's] value. First she had tried to dethrone him from his hereditary throne and later, when she failed in this effort, she became his friend. Hemvatinandan Bahuguna had become his special disciple after the emergency. Mr. V.P. Singh was still a Congress adherent during those days and noticed the increasing influence of Imam Bukhari and had embraced him when he arrived [as the prime minister].

Then came Chander Shekhar's government. As per his habit, how could he do with just a sadhu living in solitary or an imam of a large mosque? Even though Chander Shekhar had tried to support a Muslim religious scholar from Lucknow to cut Abdullah Bukhari off before the Janata Dal split, when he did not succeed in this effort, he encouraged his "Jet Sawami" to enter the stage. How could Chandar Sawami miss this opportunity? Is not friendship something to count on? If Indira Gandhi

could remain friend of that windbag Dhirendar Brahmachari even after being criticized by him millions of times, why should not the prime minister bear with Chandar Sawami who has been his friend since they were young? Chandar Sawami keeps saying that he is not doing all this on behalf of the government. He says that he is trying to bring the Hindu and Muslim religious leaders to an understanding for personal reasons. However, no one is willing to believe that. The people were startled to see Chandar Sawami arrive in Ayodhya like a government official. However, those who believed him previously had their illusion broken when Chandar Sawami visited Allahabad. Those who participated in his holy conference were equally known to the people in Allahabad as well as the whole country. The local Congress [I] leaders and the leaders of the majority party played an important role in organizing this conference. The question arises: If Chandar Sawami is traveling to the controversial site for building a temple for Rama, who is stopping the central government from announcing this trip? Also, if the government has no such plans, then why is it not countering Chandar Sawami's statement? Why is he being allowed to travel to many places as a government representative? It is obvious that Chandar Sawami is not going to build any temple. All he wants to do is to break up the holy men in the VHP and jeopardize their campaign. Only time will tell us if he will succeed in his efforts. One thing is clear: All our so-called socialist and secular political parties are using saints, faqirs, and maulvis.

Our communist parties were not involved in it. Their new religion, Marxism, did not allow them to mention any old religion. The time has changed, however. Christianity was used as a weapon to destroy the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Religion has become fashionable even in the Soviet Union. Karishan Consciousness Movement members have started singing "Hare Karishana" and "Hare Rama" in the streets of Moscow. Last year, the Soviet trade attache stationed in Calcutta had participated in a religious procession taken out by this group in Calcutta. This wave of worshipping Rama has spread everywhere. When governments were being shaken up, the communists in West Bengal thought why should they not use the potent weapon of religious emotions. In a recent meeting, the communists decided that they too have to depend on holy men to counter the movement of Hinduism. They cannot find live saints, and even if they did find one, their social status will become suspect. Therefore, they have decided to use the historic saints. They will use the words of Kabir, Raidas, Nanak, and some Sufi saints for propaganda. It is still risky. If the people liked this religious campaign of the communist party, its weapon of religion-free politics will be blunted. There is another problem. If they use Raidas to pull the Harijans, what would happen if they demand that the party should use Balmiki also. Making Balmiki, the author of the Ramayana and responsible for bringing Rama to everyone's heart, popular is very dangerous. Making Nanak popular is also dangerous. There will be problems if someone began to read Nanak seriously

because Nanak had gone to Ayodhya as he considered it Rama's town. He had gone to Lahore because he had heard that it was Rama's son, Lav's, city. He had returned very depressed from Lahore when he saw a cow being slaughtered there. The fact is that it is very difficult to use holy men without having religious faith because the holy men used by the government for their purpose lose their effectiveness. This is especially true in the case of Chandar Sawami. The people become suspicious when he is presented as a super saint because they know that such saints are used more for destruction than for development. There is also the issue of popular support when we think about using these holy men on a wider scale. After all, the sphere of their influence is limited to their hundreds of thousands of disciples. If the followers are not with them then the holy men become obsolete.

Commentary Warns Congress (I) Its Future Domination Doubtful

91AS0530A New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi
24 Jan 91 p 6

[Article by Gharau Sukul: "The King and the Parrot's Strength"]

[Text] Just like the fable in which the soul of the king was kept hidden in a parrot, the Congress party is keeping its life in its leader. It still believes that despite all the political pressures, it will not suffocate because its life is protected in its leader's body which is immune to all these pressures. Their leader will never be influenced by these pressures and the party will have infinite life. Unfortunately, just like in the fable, the parrot has been recognized and the king's life is in danger now. The Congress (I) has finally realized that Rajiv Gandhi is not in a position to be for the Congress (I) the axle on which the wheel of Indian politics moves. It has begun to realize that many new political powers have emerged that are making the whole capital that the Congress (I) has collected obsolete. It has started to doubt if it will have any role in politics in the future.

This development is not Rajiv Gandhi's fault. After all, he is not the leader, rather he is just playing the role of the leader. We can expect as much from him as we can from a leader with average talents and skills. He can save his image only if the Congress (I) keeps its prominent role in politics. What can he do if the era of the Congress (I) stronghold is on its last legs? It is unrealistic to expect Rajiv Gandhi to change the direction of the wind and pull the people back into supporting the Congress (I). Who can stop time and the changes that go with it?

Any old Congress adherent can say that the Congress (I) believes in practical politics and adjustment according to the situation. The king should be the way his people want him to be and if the people change, the king must change. This role is not that simple since the people have already divided into two factions. The Congress (I) has been helping one faction to grow in the name of modern India. This faction, which developed with the modernization of

India, considers itself different and remains separate from the rest of the people. In order to keep its special status intact, this group keeps its political beliefs separate from the common Indian people and gives theoretical framework to it.

Then there is the majority, the common people. This group considers that its number is large enough to preserve its existence and character. It has the easy confidence that is natural for any large majority and this very confidence has proved to be harmful to it until now. It has been ignoring the group that runs the government machinery and has been using it [the government] for its own gains. It [the majority] saw what they [the group that runs the government] did and what they wanted to do and, after seeing and understanding it all, still did not bother to check them. This group [the majority] considered them [those in the government] as its friends, not enemies.

The Congress (I) did not have any problem in playing its role because of this contentment of the majority. The Congress (I) has been very open in declaring itself the party of the modern people who consider themselves members of the international community. It has been looking for ways to expand these beliefs and had used all kind of approaches from education to government. At the same time, it also took practical approaches. Whenever it needed to ignore these beliefs in order to gain votes, it did so without any problem. This practical approach had helped Indira Gandhi instigate the Hindus in Jammu and Rajiv Gandhi to pat the backs of the Christians in Mizoram.

Actually, this role is not against the Congress (I)'s modern thought. Two main tendencies can be seen in the secularism adopted in the name of modernization. First, keep the people involved in their worldly life so that the government can control their habits easily. Second, whenever it is necessary, push the people toward narrow factionalism to facilitate formation of groups. This helps remove any uncertainty that might come during the Great Festival of democracy—the general elections—and the party which is certified to remain in the government gets enough votes to remain in the government!

The Congress (I) has to be worried when the time comes to take off the mask of being modern. The first problem is self-image. How can the Congress [I] adherents drop the image that they have lived with for the last 40 years? They had to work hard to develop this image. It had to remove itself from the Congress party of Mahatma Gandhi. They went as far as to say that there were some undesirable traditions that have alienated India from the superpowers. The party leaders declared that these traditions were eliminated and the Congress had emerged as a versatile modern party.

There is no limit on human ingenuity. Perhaps, the Congress [I] leaders who believe in practicality are right. The Congress (I) can decide that what was done and said during the last 40 years is not necessary to be done or

said in the future. How can the king avoid changing his side if there has been a change in the power structure of the people? If the followers of modernization are defeated, then why should it [the Congress party] remain with them? It can leave them and become traditional in nature. The Congress (I) never had and presently does not have any dearth of traditionalist leaders. They can be made the leading people if the opportunity calls. However, making them the leading people does not mean they would become leaders.

If the Congress (I) decides to follow this path, then it must give up the greed for power for a while. They need time to change the costume. They will not only have to change the costume but also the style. They have to learn to talk in a new manner. Its leaders will have to learn to give speeches in a different tone. The leadership has to decide on a new structure for the party staff. The people they deal with are not that gullible. They must be assured that the Congress (I) has not only recognized the direction of the wind, but also understood its flow and absorbed its message.

Of course, all this will take time and the only way to buy time is to remain outside the government for a while. The Congress [I] is out of the government now, but this is not the real "out." The Congress (I) is sitting outside the door prepared to make a dash. It is ready to rush inside once the present government comes out. It will not allow any other party to get in. The poor Congress adherents are trying to decide how many days should they let Chander Shekhar be the prime minister.

The Congress (I) wants Chander Shekhar to leave now as a satisfied person and let the Congress [I] sit in the chairs of power. Just like Rajiv Gandhi had helped Chander Shekhar establish his government, Chander Shekhar is expected to help establish Rajiv's government. This government would stay in power as long as it is not assured of winning the elections. Then the elections would be held and won under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi and the period of calamity would come to an end! The greatest flaw in this simple or simplistic strategy is that Chander Shekhar is not the kind of person to be satiated with holding the prime minister's chair so easily. He is not that obligated either to relinquish the throne to pave the way for Rajiv Gandhi.

The Congress adherents are feeling that the political changes have put a big hurdle in front of them. The Congress (I) was never worried when it was suffering from internal strife or when it was losing respect among the people because it believed that Rajiv Gandhi was the kind of person whom the people would elect as their real leader. It thought that the time would effect the party's body only and its soul would be safe in its leader's body. They thought they did not have to worry as long as the parrot was safe.

The problem is that neither the king nor the parrot can hide from death. Even in the fable, somehow they found out which parrot carried the king's life. The same thing

happened to the Congress (I). The character of our nation's politics changed so drastically that even Rajiv Gandhi got caught in it. It is not impossible to transform the modern Rajiv Gandhi into a traditional Rajiv Gandhi. He will have to be initiated for it, however. Initiation before entering the Guru's den is important, even when he can function without the education.

Initiation was carried out with a lot of ceremonies even in old times. Later, when those youth who could not be sent to the school were initiated, they were given the holy thread to wear around their necks just to save their face. Thus, the abbreviated ceremony only makes the youth wear the thread and beg for food at least once. It would be very helpful if Rajiv Gandhi is willing to forget at least one general election. He will not have to be afraid of anyone after that. Let the natural results of political changes take shape. He should wait for some time. His number will come the next time around if he really has the making of a ruler.

Writer Notes Pattern in Indo-U.S. Ties

91AS0700A Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English
20 Feb 91 p 8

[Article by Seema Sirohi]

[Text] A pattern seems to be emerging in Indo-U.S. relations over the past three months that is characterised by an obvious aim of give-and-take. These may be the first signs of a more pragmatic Indian foreign policy which floundered for more than a year in the face of a changing Soviet Union and the increasing irrelevance of the nonaligned movement. It is a long jump from the pro-Soviet tilt to an appreciably pro-western one being adopted by India in the Gulf war.

India is distinctly distant from some of the non-aligned countries that are becoming critical of its rather lacklustre role in the developing world. India supports the UN resolutions against Iraq but is disturbed by the relentless bombing of Iraq by U.S.-led forces. Yet India did not vote in favour of holding open discussions in the Security Council on the war. Indian diplomats say they are working on a peace initiative but never clearly state the details.

Is this the new face of Indian foreign policy—quiet and confused, instead of the openly pro-Third World and moralistic? The absence of a clearly defined bipolar world and the potential of regional conflicts replacing Cold War rivalries has probably given rise to a "malleable" Indian foreign policy stand—speak from both sides and hope the target will hit home. The statement by India's UN ambassador on 13 February is an example. India abstained on a crucial vote on whether to hold an open meeting in the Security Council on the furious bombing of Iraq. But the statement said India would have really liked to vote in favour of an open debate but if the majority decided to hold a close meeting, it would understand.

The new line of thinking is being defined as pragmatism and waking up to the post-Cold War era from which the Soviet Union has made a quiet exit except to issue occasional reminders and send out an emissary or two. India's taking of the Security Council seat in January has increased the level of dialogue with the U.S. The heightened bilateral activity led to India allowing U.S. transport planes to refuel in Bombay, a controversial decision considering India's efforts to launch a peace initiative in the Gulf. But Indian ambassador Abid Hussein is pleased at the benefits that have flowed from the United States as a result of the cooperation. So pragmatism pays.

In January alone, two major developments took place with ample help from Uncle Sam. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) gave a massive loan to India and the White House approved of the sale of the second supercomputer. The supercomputer application had so far been lost in Washington's mystical "inter-agency" reviewing process—a procedure by which top policy heads who can indefinitely weigh the pros and cons of granting technology to a developing country. But the cob-webs cleared in January and permission was granted from the White House. Activity also has been reported on the light combat aircraft (LCA) project which had been bogged down by delays and reluctance on the part of the U.S. defence department to share some types of sophisticated technology.

It may be pure coincidence that this marked improvement in Indo-U.S. relations comes at a time when U.S.-Pakistani relations are at a historic low. It is also likely that pragmatic elements in the Indian foreign ministry saw the opportunity and moved in to decisively mould Indo-U.S. relations for the near future. It is true that Indo-U.S. relations have been steadily improving since the Reagan years despite serious problems created by the Super 301 threats and India's testing of missiles and the refuelling may have been a logical conclusion to the ascending graph.

But greater warmth between India and the United States may create greater problems with Pakistan. Pakistan is openly hurt at the loss of its protector and financier, the United States. The politically cynical decision by the Pakistanis to send 11,000 troops to the Gulf despite the public opposition, has not paid off. The idea was to influence U.S. opinion but American officials openly deride the decision and mock its symbolic significance. The downward swing began with the U.S. administration's decision last year to drastically cut aid to Pakistan because of its nuclear weapons' programme. The law under which the aid was reduced had been ignored for years because Pakistan's cooperation in the Afghan war was of greater strategic importance.

The wiping off of Pakistan from the strategic map of the United States should give a pause to India planners. Now is the time for the Indian foreign policy pundits to find a useful balance between independence and a pro-West world view. Considering that the "new world order" will be run on rules invented by the United States and money

donated by Japan and Germany, it is almost necessary to have better relations with the dominant powers. The other option is for the Indian leadership to forge together an alliance of lesser developed but still ignored bloc of countries blundering for a voice. They are too poor to buy a subscription for the new world order. But given a shaky government, massive domestic problems and growing discontent in border areas, the challenge of taking on a real leadership role may be too forbidding for India and the returns too risky.

On the other hand, prospects for the "pragmatic" approach are bright. Improving relations with the West in order to secure a voice in the post-Cold War world before new alliances get forged without India would be a smart move. But it must be weighed against the risks of increased anti-Americanism at home and the tendency of Indian politicians to exploit anything and everything.

There are 12 Security Council resolutions to force Iraq out of Kuwait. And indeed the most disturbing question revolves around the future role of the United Nations. Would Indian pragmatism support the United Nations being used to force some nation's will against others? Especially when the will of poorer nations has almost always been ignored in the past?

Commentary Sees Left Front in Bengal Ready To Fracture

91AS0462A New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi
15 Jan 91 p 6

[Article by Pashupati: "The Left Front's Factions Are in Danger"]

[Text] After defeating Congress [I] in 1977 when the Left Front came to power, the Marxist Communist Party's (CPM) support groups had hoped that they would have equal participation in government because they had played a key role in the people's movement against Congress [I]. But they were taken by surprise when they realized how few in number their ministers were. The Marxist Communist Party and Jyoti Basu had foreseen this reaction. They had feared that the unrest, which was spreading among workers of the support groups, might cause the leaders of the party to lose their temper and break the coalition. This was why the CPM started to think seriously about the role the support groups should play in the committees in the implementation of various schemes.

Some committees were awarded chairmanships to carry out these schemes and were granted membership in other committees as well. As time passed, however, the CPM not only established a firm grip on the administration, but by virtue of its administration it also created a very strong organization and, one by one, expelled the members of the support groups from membership in committees [tasked with the implementation] of schemes. Afterwards, they realized this was a mistake, but by that time the political situation had turned against the CPM. Not only were they [CPM] hungry for power,

but the workers were becoming increasingly alienated from their leaders. Deeply immersed in their plan for obtaining more power, the pressure on the support groups increased when the CPM independently won a majority in the Vidhan Sabha election. They [CPM] began to interfere in the organizational and internal affairs.

In the 1989 Lok Sabha election, the CPM went too far in their reaction to Narayan Chobe, a parliament member of the Indian Communist Party (CPI), because in Madinipur he took a stand against the scoundrelism of the CPM. Also, he constantly fought with them [CPM]. Because of this, not only Congress [I] and the public started coming to Mr. Chobe, but also disgruntled members of the CPM started supporting the CPI, a move which the district leadership did not like at all. District Secretary Sukumar Sengupta complained about this to the state leadership and to Jyoti Basu, and requested that the CPI be pressured to remove Narayan Chobe from Madinipur and to bring a new candidate or vacate this seat for the CPM. The CPI was put under a lot of pressure and Narayan Chobe was replaced by Inderjit Gupt for the Madinipur candidacy.

On the other side, the Left Front and Janata Dal made an agreement concerning the seats. One seat was to be given to the Janata Dal. The Left Front was called to a meeting and the decision was made to leave the Calcutta-Northwest seat for the Janata Dal. But the Left Front told reporters, in response to a question, that this was not only for the good of the country but it was also in support of the agreement with the opposition and that it had been done as a sacrifice. But the truth was entirely different and there was a great deal of arguing about this in the meeting.

A similar incident also took place with the RSP [Revolutionary Socialist Party]. In 1988, soon after Yateen Chakervarty opened the Bengal Lamp Scandal, the CPM became very angry. This affair was most damaging to the respected chief minister, inasmuch as the allegation was directed at Chandan Basu. He was cashing in on his chief minister father's name and was seen to be immune to certain irregularities. For the time being, this political game turned out to be very costly for Yateen Chakervarty. He was forced to leave the Cabinet. The RSP became a silent spectator and the seat was reluctantly given to somebody else. But how could one expect Yateen Chakervarty, who was always in the headlines, to sit quietly? He kept on attacking the CPM and the government, and as a result their image continued to deteriorate. But the CPM kept up the pressure on the RSP to expel Yateen Chakervarty from the party and that is what happened.

It was then obvious that no member or supporter of these support parties would be happy. Because, on the one hand, scoundrelism in the CPM kept increasing among joint party supporters, and on the other hand, their leadership [support groups] kept on compromising with the CPM. Now the situation has deteriorated to the

extent that previously unhappy CPM workers are trying to form a partnership with these support groups and leave the CPM.

In Madinipur and Murshidabad, the CPI has had a strong base but after the political death of Narayan Chobe, their support is waning. Similarly, North 24 Paragana, South 24 Paragana, Hawara, Hugali, and Kuchbihar have supported Forward Block right from the start. But now the circumstances are beginning to change. Forward Block's state leaders, who are very close to the CPM, are considered untouchables among the party's lower level workers. This is why in the recent district and state convention of the Forward Block, Food Minister Nirmal Basu was not invited to any district of South Bengal. North-South 24 Paragana, Hawara, and Hugali district leaders told the secretary of the state organization, Mr. Ashok Ghosh, that no agent of the CPM should be brought to their districts. They were pointing toward Nirmal Basu because Mr. Basu is seen as being very close to the CPM.

The RSP is also in a similar situation. Nikhil Das, Kshiti Goswami, and Devbrat Bandopadhyaya played a key role in getting Yateen Chakervarty expelled from the party. These are also considered supporters of the CPM. This is the reason that their image in the party is quite bad. It was because of the anger of the members that Nikhil Das lost very badly in the Vidhan Sabha elections.

Under these circumstances, the party leadership should be in a state of confusion. On the one hand, it is necessary for them to stay in the government; on the other hand, they have to keep the Left Front together because, if they were to be blamed for breaking up the Front, then non-Congress [I] voters will be displeased and that would be very dangerous for the party. Even then, the manner in which the pressure is increasing on lower level workers is confounding them and they are beginning to realize their mistake because, if the will power of the workers is suppressed any longer, the party's existence would be in danger.

IRAN

Aid to Zambia For School Construction in Mushili

91AF0884Z Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English
25 Feb 91 p 3

[Text] Iran has donated K[kwacha]3.3 million for the construction of a primary school in Ndola's Mushili township.

Disclosing this yesterday Bwana Mkubwa Member of Parliament Mr. Lawrence Phiri said the school would be built by members of the community on self help basis.

He said Mushili which has a population of about 60,000 has more than 10,000 children whose future is dim because there was no school in the area.

He said it was for this reason that he was paying special thanks to Iran for coming to the aid of the children in Mushili.

Mr. Phiri called on residents who have planted maize and groundnuts on the site where the school will be erected to harvest the crop as early as possible to allow construction work to begin on 1 April.

PAKISTAN

U.S. Said Pushing Country Into a Corner

91AS0528A Peshawar MASHRIQ in Urdu 6 Jan 91 p 8

[Article by Khalid Parvez Malik: "A Realistic Analysis of U.S. Aid Suspension"]

[Text] The turn of the road at which the issue of U.S. aid has got stuck now is very important. This is a very serious issue. We can say that the United States-Pakistan friendship and relationship are hanging by a fine thread and it all depends on how appropriately or inappropriately this issue is resolved. According to various confirmed and unconfirmed sources, the U.S. aid will be stopped by March 1991, or it will be curtailed, or it will have several conditions. Whatever happens, U.S. prestige, which carries a long history of lack of trust, will be badly hurt. It will do an irreparable damage to the U.S. influence in the whole Middle East and Central Asia. Pakistan's economy has already been upset because of the situation in the Gulf. The U.S. Congress had doubts about Pakistan's atomic program even during the Afghan war; however, the U.S. Government ignored this at that time because Pakistan was considered a frontline country and continued its aid. The U.S. Government is questioning Pakistan's nuclear program again now because of its changed interests and the developments in the Gulf.

The era of pleasant friendly relations between the United States and Pakistan started soon after Pakistan was established. This friendship has gone through some inscrutable ups and downs analogous to fair weather friendship. Sometimes it was warm and sometimes it was cool. Occasionally it was pleasant and then it was unpleasant. During the early period of pleasant relationship we signed SEATO and CENTO pacts which resulted in a semimilitary bloc composed of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. This bloc was tied by the unbreakable bonds of common religion, geography, history, and culture. These pacts also had the economic, military, and psychological support from the United States and United Kingdom. Second, Pakistan's foreign policy became suspect in the eyes of the Arab world because of the Palestine issue. Third, the Soviet Union and its satellite communist countries started a campaign against Pakistan which continued until 1965. The war that started on 6 September 1965 showed that any expectation of benefits from these pacts was a false hope. The United States did not stop only the economic aid to Pakistan, but also the military aid. There was a strong reaction in Pakistan

over the U.S. action, and Pakistan opted for Tashkent as the site for a meeting to discuss the conditions of the pact. This was an open expression of mistrust of the United States.

Two incidents occurring in the last decade have destroyed the peace in the Middle East and caused political upheavals there. The first incident was the revolution in Iran which ended the reign of Iran's Shah Reza Pahlavi and caused confusion in the Middle East. The Iranian Revolution put an end to the U.S. influence in Iran. We can also say that the United States burned its own bridges because of its nearsighted foreign policy. The vacuum created by this incident helped accelerate the hitherto slow progress of the Soviet Union's expansionist designs toward the Indian Ocean. At the same time, the Soviet Union became worried about the influence of the Islamic wave in Iran and Pakistan over its southern Tataric province. This led to the destruction of Afghanistan's democratic government by the Soviet war machine. This catastrophe suddenly woke the United States from its slumber and made it realize the strategic location of Pakistan. This opened the doors of U.S. aid to Pakistan again. The basic purpose of the U.S. aid was to make Pakistan economically and militarily strong so that no foreign power could make Pakistan a target of its expansionist designs.

The ink on the U.S. aid agreement had not even dried when Pakistan's enemies and other malicious elements started to raise a hue and cry against this pact. Who else could be protesting against it? The pro-India lobby in the United States became feverishly active. The Soviet news media also started a false propaganda. The KGB, RA, and KHAD started their network of terrorist activities. The western borders of Pakistan were bombed to depress Pakistan's morale and will power. These activities are still going on; however, they have not affected Pakistan's ideal and commitment. It is unfortunate that our friends did not try to understand our political intent, believed the misleading propaganda, and fell to the trickery of our enemies. The drastic changes in Pakistan's foreign policy are the result of the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait and the resulting change in India-Pakistan relations, the Afghan crisis, and Pakistan's peaceful nuclear program, which is the target of U.S. criticism now. The United States and India are leading this poisonous propaganda, and are adversely effecting Pakistan's foreign policy.

Keeping in view the present international situation, Pakistan must strengthen its lobby in the United States to make it more effective. At present, this lobby is almost nonexistent. Conversely, the lobbies of Pakistan's number one enemy, India, and Israel are very active. The present situation does not encourage the United States to give any aid to Pakistan. The United States had offered military and economic aid in huge quantity to Pakistan in the beginning of this decade to counter the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, and Pakistan is still the third country after Israel and Egypt to receive the most aid from the United States. It is not possible for Pakistan to use the development in the Gulf to receive aid as it did

during the Afghanistan crisis. The "hot" region of the Gulf is far from Pakistan. Also, it is not possible for Pakistan to send its entire armed force to the Gulf to face the Iraqi missiles, tanks, and special military equipped with chemical weapons and, at the same time, defend itself from the Indian army here.

Even though most of the U.S. aid is reserved for Eastern European countries, African nations have succeeded in getting an additional \$300 million in aid by successful lobbying efforts. The Greek lobby is more active than the Turkish lobby in the United States. The Arab lobby is very weak. Most Arab embassies do not even have English-speaking attaches. All countries need experienced lobbyists. Should the strong government formed by Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad use prudence and diplomacy, it could remove the U.S. suspicions about Pakistan's peaceful nuclear program. Anything is possible in international politics. It was the Jewish pressure that forced the suspension of aid to Pakistan. The Israelis are facing many problems, and the United States is finding it hard to keep them satisfied.

The United States wants its relationship with India and Pakistan in a congenial and peaceful environment as part of its international strategy. Theoretically, Pakistan also shares this goal and wants to have cooperative understanding with India. Pakistan has tried its best to have this kind of relationship. The "no war" pact proposal, which India rejected, tops the list of these efforts. We are trying to have peace, and India is dreaming about "Akhand Bharat" [undivided India]. India wants to expand its geographical boundaries and influence. India wants to establish its superiority in South Asia, and its recent aggressive efforts are living proofs of its designs. However, Pakistan is neither Sri Lanka nor Bhutan. Pakistan is first and last Pakistan. Pakistan is a democratic and free country and it will defend its freedom at any cost. Pakistan is populated by a proud people with 1,000 years of history and with a rich and unique culture and civilization. We have a proud place in the international community and Pakistan's opinions on international issues is well respected. Pakistan cannot mortgage its foreign policy and independence to some foreign power. Our friends should realistically recognize Pakistan's traditional pride and feelings. However, India and the United States are together on this issue and the latter has always pressured Pakistan to accept India's superiority. Its efforts, however, are like beating one's head on a steel wall. Pakistan has no intention of taking any military action against a powerful country like India; however, if it is attacked, then it will fight until the last drop of blood is shed.

Efforts to establish peace in South Asia can be successful only when a balance in Indian and Pakistani military strength is a deterrent to war. A weak Pakistan will always invite invasion which would destroy the peace in the subcontinent.

Pakistan and the United States can both benefit from the Afghanistan issue. Establishment of a democratic, unbiased, and Islamic government in Afghanistan will not only benefit the United States and Pakistan, but also will help the Soviet Union. The Afghanistan problem for Pakistan does not end with the departure of the Soviet army. There will be permanent marks on this part of the earth. The problem of Afghanistan's future will be a permanent part of Pakistan's strategic planning. The Soviet and the U.S. international strategies will clash as long as there is oil in the Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia. The problem of establishing superiority will remain as long as there is the Indian Ocean. Pakistan will be a thorn in the Soviet side as long as it is situated between Russia and the Indian Ocean. This will also make the unwelcome friendship with Pakistan necessary for the United States.

New problems have surfaced since the U.S. intervention in the Gulf. The United States, regardless of the fact that it is capable of controlling Iraq by itself, wants support from other countries for moral and psychological reasons. Pakistan has no alternative but to remain neutral about the Iraqi occupation in the Gulf. It can fully cooperate with the United Nations and the Islamic Conference over the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait. If the United States is serious about stopping the Soviet Union from reaching the gulf and the Indian Ocean, then it should take steps in strengthening the Middle East area that includes Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan in addition to defending the Arab countries in the Gulf. Trying to ruin Iran would be detrimental to the United States in the long run as Pakistan would never support the United States in any aggression against Iran. The people of Pakistan would never condone such an action. Let us focus on the important issue of Pakistan's nuclear program. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has assured us that our nuclear program is for our economic development and that we have no intention of making an atomic bomb. Our friend, the United States, must have gotten entangled in the web of lies woven by our enemies if it still suspects Pakistan's intentions. The situation has reached the point where Pakistan is asked to give up its independence and autonomy for the U.S. aid. Will Pakistan sacrifice its pride, respect, and principles for this aid? Pakistan's prime minister told the nation clearly on the radio and television where we stand on this issue. This answer is appropriate for a proud country. The ridiculous thing about the recent suspension [of aid] is that it is pushing Pakistan in a direction in which neither Pakistan nor the United States wants it to go.

U.S. Blamed for Assassination

91AS0528B Peshawar MASHRIQ in Urdu
12 Jan 91 p 5

[Editorial: "Deplorable Assassination of Maulana Qasmi"]

[Text] Maulana Isarul Haq Qasmi, vice president of Anjuman Sipah Sahaba and member of the National Assembly, was shot to death in Jhang when he arrived in

Basti Gogian while visiting the polling booths in support of Sipah Sahaba candidate Mohammad Iqbal. Maulana Isarul Haq was a distinguished religious leader, a fiery speaker, and a good legislator. He was the former vice president of Anjuman Sipah Sahaba. The people were greatly upset at his assassination. In Jhang, where the situation was already volatile, this assassination caused a strong reaction. Demonstrations and riots broke out and the situation became so terrible that the local administration had to call on the military and implement a curfew. The administration and the police managed to control the situation by their timely action. Several persons were arrested and weapons and ammunition were recovered from them. Sheikh Zaffar Iqbal, an assistant commissioner under training, was one of the arrested persons. In any event, Maulana Qasmi's assassination was a deplorable act and it is a political plight for our country that such a respected and distinguished political leader lost his life in such a way. It is not only deplorable, it is shocking.

As Jhang is famous for religious riots, Maulana Qasmi's assassination was quickly blamed on communal problems even though this incident had nothing to do with factionalism. Some people get emotional very easily and see everything through the glasses of factionalism. Some antinational elements want to start nationwide riots between the Sunni and Shi'a sects. These people are actually the enemies of our country and are being encouraged by foreign powers. It has also been known that India is conspiring to start Shi'a-Sunni riots in Pakistan.

The United States is also trying to start a new crisis in Pakistan. Qazi Hussain Ahmed, leader of Jamaat-i Islami (JI) has also mentioned this danger and has advised the nation to be careful about India's conspiracies. Maulana Qasmi's assassination has shocked all groups. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Islami Jamhoori Ittehad's secretary general and Jamaat-i Islami's leader, Professor Ghafur Ahmed, and many other national and political leaders have expressed sorrow at this assassination and condemned it. They have demanded that the assassins be given exemplary punishments. The important thing to do at this point is to control emotions and not destroy peace in the country by giving a communal color to this incident. Only India, the United States, anti-Pakistan elements and enemy agents will benefit from the crisis. Leaders of all religious groups, especially the clergy, should help remove various misunderstandings among the people and try to establish peace in the nation, especially in Jhang.

Article Claims U.S. Will Target Us Next

91AS0598B Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 19 Jan 91 p 5

[Article by Malik Allah Yar Khan: "Pakistan Will Be the Next Target"]

[Text] At 0230 Iraqi time and 0500 Pakistani time, the United States launched an air attack on the Muslim population of Baghdad and its defense installations. This attack continued for five hours. First, the U.S. warships fired cruise missiles from the Gulf and then from the U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia, F-15 and other British jaguar fighters bombed Baghdad. After the bombing, clouds of smoke covered Baghdad. It is clear that the civilian population was the target of bombing. Similarly, four years ago, American robbers attacked Benghazi and Tripoli. The United Nations General Assembly deplored the U.S. attack on Libya and ordered the former to pay for the damages. To date, the United States is in violation of the order.

Similarly, in July 1988, a U.S. warship targeted the Iranian civilian plane flying over the Gulf. Two hundred and ninety people died in that incident. It is evident, from the circumstances, that the attack was a part of an organized plan. The reasons given by George Bush for attacking Iraq are to destroy Iraqi nuclear and chemical facilities. The United States and Zionist plans have been uncovered. They do not want to see any Muslim country become technologically self-sufficient. If it is Iraq's turn today, then tomorrow it would be Pakistan. The United States had threatened Pakistan that if the latter did not abandon its nuclear program, then the aid would be suspended. And when Pakistan, as a courageous and dignified nation, refused to accept Bush's dictatorial order, he terminated the military and economic assistance to Pakistan. If the United States succeeds in destroying Iraq, then it could embargo and invade Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan's war is being fought in Iraq. The United States has overthrown every Muslim leader who refused to place his nation's interests under the influence of the United States. Consequently, from Musadiq, Ben Bella, Dr. Sukarno, Field Marshall Ayub Khan, to Imam Khomeini and Saddam Husayn, all of them became targets of U.S. terrorism and intervention. The United States dispatched commandos to kill Imam Khomeini were burned in the air [sentence as published]. Bush, in his war declaration, stated that U.S. troops would not fight Iraq with one hand tied behind their backs. We have no doubt that the U.S. troops would not sit idle, they have used their terrorist capabilities on every corner of the globe and are pushing the world toward destruction. Upon reviewing U.S. history, interesting facts surface. When Columbus discovered America, 14 million Red Indians were living there. This humanrights champion nation treated them in such a way that there are only 900,000 of them left. Half of those are unemployed. These Red Indians were land-owners and oil used to come out of their lands. Americans forcefully took their lands away from them.

During the Korean war, U.S. troops used poisonous gas and killed Korean prisoners by throwing them off the helicopters. During the Vietnam war, the United States used poisonous gas and napalm bombs and in 1975, in a specified area, they used oxygen-burning bombs which caused the eyes and tongues of dying people to be boiled.

They destroyed the jungles with napalm bombs and, according to specialists, these jungles could not return to their previous state for another 150 years. The United States is supporting the racist regimes in Israel and South Africa to destroy innocent Palestinians and African people. If the Pakistani nation does not unite and fight the U.S. aggression and Zionist conspiracy, then once again, the Islamic world could be destroyed, just as during the world war the Ottoman Caliphate was destroyed.

Strategic Defense Policy Urged

91AS0598C Karachi JANG in Urdu 8 Jan 91 p 3

[Article by Niar Zaidi, special correspondent, Washington]

[Text] Should Pakistan adopt a strategic defense policy? This idea is so complicated that I would not try to translate it. Just consider a revolt for the sake of long-term consequences. A sort of noncooperation, with an objective to obtain long-term benefits. However, its short-term consequences can be disadvantageous. This is not my idea, but Chief of the Army Staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg's suggestion. He made this statement during the first week of December in front of audiences at the Wah Ordinance Factories. He was speaking in the context of the Gulf crisis. Announcement of such an idea by the Chief of Staff is in itself an important thing. But, after the resignation of the Soviet foreign minister, Mr. Edward Shevardnadze and the reasons behind it, this idea has achieved more importance. But, before this discussion, it is important to briefly explain the strategic defense ideology. I am not an expert in military matters; however, I believe that there were two incidents in Pakistani history when such an ideology could have been implemented. The first opportunity came around in 1962 when India went to war with China. India was being crushed for her mistake. This was a golden opportunity for Pakistan to free occupied Kashmir from the clutches of India. Pakistan considered this strategy but decided not to act on it after the United States promised that, provided Pakistan exercised restraint, President Kennedy would solve the issue of Kashmir through talks with India. India also agreed to the talks. During that time also, the Pakistani foreign ministry had pro-American elements in it. These elements warned that if Pakistan did not obey the United States, aid would be terminated. Under those circumstances, the implementation of the aforementioned policy would have rid Pakistan of several problems. In spite of this obedience, we did not get Kashmir and aid was terminated, and for 16 years Pakistan was considered bad and India good.

The second opportunity came around in 1987. The U.S. Government was hesitant to continue aid, and the nuclear issue was being exaggerated. At that time, under such policy, the United States should have been informed that Pakistan would not accept any aid until anti-Pakistan laws such as the Pressler amendment were canceled. This policy would have had two consequences.

The U.S. aid would have stopped. Between 1 October 1987 and 1990, it would have made a difference of US\$1.5 billion. But, along with it, the CIA would have had to cease its operations in Pakistan. The honorable Peterson would not have become the ambassador to Afghan mujahidins. A rift between the mujahidins would not have occurred. Probably, the Ojari camp would have been saved and Bahawalpur would not have achieved international prominence. Would the Soviet troops have left without U.S. aid? By October 1987, it was clear that in military terms it was not possible for the Soviet Union to stay in Afghanistan and they would have left. After breaking their relationship with the United States, the Soviet Union could have been told to leave Afghanistan in dignity in exchange for mujahidin's government in Afghanistan.

The second aspect is that the United States would have accepted Pakistan's demand and Pressler amendment-type laws would have been canceled to continue the aid. This was expected because the United States did not give aid to establish Islamic government in Afghanistan but to squeeze the Soviet Union, so that it could weaken the Soviet Union and take advantage at other parts of the world. If an Islamic type government had been established in Afghanistan, and if Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran had offered military cooperation with the Soviet Union, then the United States would have been at a disadvantage. Billions of dollars in aid would have gone to a waste. It was necessary for U.S. agents to remain in Pakistan and create civil war among the mujahidins to stop their victory. Probably, because of these selfish interests, the United States would have agreed to do away with the Pressler amendment and continue the aid. Either situation would have been beneficial to us. In the event of aid suspension in 1987, since the Gulf crisis had not taken place, some friendly countries might have been willing to provide aid discreetly. In this case, it was critical to determine the extent of the U.S. opposition to mujahidins and their efforts to establish a government, and whether there was a will to establish strategic defense against the U.S. President Zia-ul-Haq had to take certain steps in this regard. He was nine months late in taking those steps, and for some people it was so important to get rid of Zia-ul-Haq that they did not care about country's long-term interests.

Now, Pakistan is again facing two opposite paths: On one hand, there is the temptation of U.S. aid resumption and on the other hand it is the country's long-term interests.

Will this policy be adopted on a large scale in our relationship with the United States? Will it be confined to the subcontinent, and is Pakistan planning to take calculated military steps regarding Kashmir? These and other questions can only be answered by time.

Due to the resignation of the Soviet foreign minister, a new hope has arisen that the nationalist forces in the Soviet Union are not ready to allow their country to become inferior to the United States. In the coming few

weeks, if the supporters of a strong Soviet Union are able to increase their influence, then the U.S. Gulf policy could fail. Iraq can be supplied via Iran, and a military attack on it can be discouraged. In such a case, the U.S. policy would become trapped in the Gulf. To implement the strategic defense, Pakistan should inform the United States to recall Mr. Peterson, the special ambassador to the mujahidins. Aid to Pakistan and the mujahidins has been terminated. Pakistan and the United States have different ideas about the future of Afghanistan. Therefore, there is no need for a special U.S. ambassador to the mujahidins. We should demand that the number of U.S. diplomats in Pakistan be reduced. Once aid is renewed, these people can return at the expense of American taxpayers. From here on, we should adopt the principle that if at least one month before the beginning of the U.S. fiscal year, the aid situation is not clear, then all aid-related diplomats should be given notice to leave. Only those diplomats who are attached to normal diplomatic functions should be allowed to stay. That is how these gentlemen will understand what uncertainty is!

Report Alleges Indian Shelling Of Kashmiris

91AS0601A Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 12 Jan 91 p 5

[Article: "Indian Shelling Of Rural Areas"]

[Text] Muzaffarabad (KPI)—Ten homes were totally destroyed and dozens of others were badly damaged in villages near the border in Aathmuqam sector as a result of heavy shelling by the Indian artillery. Four shops in Aathmuqam's market were also destroyed. Eight villages and about 15,000 people were affected by these firings and shellings. The affected people include 2,000 persons belonging to the 506 families that had left the occupied Kashmir to migrate to Pakistan. It should be remembered that three people were killed in these attacks. The following villages were ravaged by the Indian shelling: Lala Chak, Bignapain, Rauta, Aathmuqam, Palari, and Shahkot. The Indian artillery fired over 500 cannonballs at various villages and dozens of houses were destroyed. A large number of people belonging to this area have left their homes and moved to Dharon to be far away from the border. They are leading a very hard life in the cold weather there. The whole area seems to be suffering from famine because of the cold weather and a total lack of transportation in cities. The people are begging for food. These people have neither warm clothes nor bedding to protect themselves from snow storms and are leading a very hopeless life. Mehmood Ahmed, secretary general of Jamaat-i Islami of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and Sheikh Aakilul Rehman, president of Jamaat-i Islami of Muzaffarpur district, have requested the government of Azad Kashmir to declare an emergency in this area and provide immediate assistance. A large number of lives would be lost if immediate steps are not taken to alleviate this situation. They requested that food and clothes should be procured by helicopters to the areas inaccessible due to heavy snow.

Political Parties in Kashmir Urged To Unite

91AS0651A Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 31 Jan 91
p 10

[Article by Kalim Akhtar: "Unity Consideration Among Kashmir Leaders"]

[Text] The Lahore-based Kashmir Studies Center has appealed to Kashmiri leaders in its recent meeting to end their differences and work fully united and keep in view the greater interests of the nation and the serious situation in Kashmir. A resolution passed in the seminar has especially requested Sardar Mohammed Abdul Qayum Khan, president of Azad Kashmir, and Prime Minister Mumtaz Hussain Rathore to give up their politics of confrontation immediately and work together to help the present struggle for freedom carried out in Jammu and Kashmir. It is important to mention here that the people of Kashmir are greatly perturbed by this struggle for power among the leaders in Azad Kashmir. According to some news coming from the Valley of Kashmir, the people in Kashmir have expressed their anger against these leaders by burning them in effigies. In other words, the people in the occupied areas have told the Azad Kashmir leaders that while they are fighting the war of life and death against India's tyranny and persecution, you are fighting among yourselves for power and money.

The main reason for the political unrest in Azad Kashmir is the change that has occurred since the state political parties started to affiliate themselves with national parties. It was expected, of course, because branches of major political and religious Pakistani parties were not established in Kashmir. Only state parties were active there.

It is true that state political parties were feuding among themselves even then. The reason for this was that the ministry of Kashmir affairs wanted to keep an atmosphere in Azad Kashmir that facilitated its own activities. This policy had divided state parties into many factions and a new political party was being created almost daily.

The state-level parties are being interfered with from two sides now—the ministry of Kashmir affairs and the national parties. At present, the government established by the Pakistan People's Party [PPP] is ruling Azad Kashmir. The leader of this cabinet is Mumtaz Hussain Rathore who is a member of the PPP central committee. Other members of the cabinet belong to Jammu and Kashmir Liberation League, Tehriq-i Amal, and Azad Muslim Conference. Some members are independent. Since the PPP, which plays the role of opposition party in Pakistan, has the majority of members in this coalition, the PPP policies are practiced here.

As for president of Azad Kashmir, Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan, he is also the president of All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, a state party. This party sits on the opposition benches in the Kashmir legislative assembly. The leader of this party in the assembly,

Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan, is the former chief minister of Azad Kashmir and his differences with Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan are known to everyone. Both have launched a strong campaign against each other. In other words, the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference is suffering from internal strife. Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan and the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference are both related to Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) which is the ruling party in Pakistan. Since the PPP and IJI are rivals in Pakistan's politics, this confrontation and political struggle has now reached Azad Kashmir. Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan, the Muslim Conference, and the IJI all want to end the PPP government in Azad Kashmir and they announce campaigns for no-confidence motions almost daily. Meanwhile, Mumtaz Hussain keeps announcing that his government is starting a campaign of no-confidence against the president of Azad Kashmir. Both sides are busy trying to defeat each other and the people view this tug-of-war very negatively. The Indian government is publicizing regularly that the leaders in Azad Kashmir do not agree about their support for Kashmiri freedom fighters and they have different points of view about the movement in occupied Kashmir. The refugees who arrive here to escape Indian tyranny are greatly disappointed to see this struggle for power. They are greatly perturbed by this situation. As for jihad on Kashmir, the president of Azad Kashmir has a different stand. He considers it the mandate issued by the IJI and Pakistan's government. The prime minister of Azad Kashmir is using the same line as the PPP has adopted. The purpose of the PPP is to weaken the present government in Pakistan. This is what all opposition parties do.

The campaign for freedom is very strong in the occupied Kashmir and the freedom fighters are giving a hard time to India. While the Indian animals are killing the freedom fighters, they in turn are also sending Indian soldiers to hell. They are fighting India together. The latest example of their efforts is the strike they carried out on 26 January, India's Republic Day. Kashmiri Muslims observed total strike and celebrated "black day." All activities in the state are suspended now and all offices and educational institutions are closed. The Indian government is harassed by this situation and is trying to start negotiations with the freedom fighters. Such efforts have failed in the past. All groups of Kashmiri freedom fighters have united, are organized, and have decided to carry on the struggle jointly. This unity has increased the freedom campaign even though the whole valley is under a blanket of snow. The roads to Jammu and Kashmir are blocked and the lack of food has shaken the people in Kashmir badly. They are not getting any help from anyone and the development in the Gulf has made Kashmir a minute issue. India has come up with a new trick and is instigating the people in Kashmir. It wants to change the path of the freedom fighters and start unrest among the people in Kashmir in order to end their unity. This is a very crucial time and the leaders of Azad Kashmir should be alert. This would

be a great calamity if the people of Kashmir are disappointed because of the power struggle among the leaders in Azad Kashmir. Therefore, it is important that:

1. All Jammu and Kashmir Conference must end their internal strife immediately, reorganize the party, remove dishonest and immoral members, and introduce new blood in its ranks.
2. The PPP must end factionalism and reorganize the party. Instead of using politics as a profession, it should use it for serving the nation.
3. Political and religious groups in Azad Kashmir should not offer themselves fully to the politics in Pakistan. They should make freedom of the country [Kashmir] their primary goal and provide economic and military assistance to Kashmir freedom fighters.
4. Political parties in Azad Kashmir should call an all-parties conference immediately to review the present freedom struggle in occupied Kashmir and form a strategy to counter Indian tricks.

Editorial Claims Capture of 'Indian Terrorists'

91AS0598D Karachi JANG in Urdu 6 Jan 91 p 3

[Editorial: "Arrest of Indian Terrorists"]

[Text] According to reports from Lahore, seven people trained to spread religious intolerance and plant bombs in different cities in Punjab were arrested. These people were trained by the Indian secret service "RAW" [Research and Analysis Wing]. Pakistani passports and identity cards were found in their possession. One terrorist stated that whenever he came to conduct an operation in Pakistan, he stayed with a member of the National Assembly. Similarly, other terrorists stated that their secret agency, RAW, used to instruct them to stay in a particular hotel in Lahore. In light of these revelations, the most important question is who was providing Pakistani passports and identity cards to these terrorists. These people should be discovered. We believe that this would not be difficult for the investigating officials to accomplish. Also, the current or previous member of the National Assembly who played host to these terrorists should immediately be included in this investigation. The report indicated that the Ministry of Interior has videotaped these terrorists' confessions, and would very soon show it on the television. If it is actually shown on the television, it would have a good impact. But, it is sad to say that, in the past, big claims were made after the arrest of foreign terrorists, but later the case was ignored.

It seems that the government is afraid to expose some terrorists. From time to time, news of the arrests of dozens of Indian terrorists have surfaced and even government sources have been behind these disclosures. But, afterwards, the news was deliberately suppressed. Consequently, due to the irresponsible behavior of our government, people conspiring against our nation were encouraged, and patriotic people became skeptical.

Obviously, these cases are a disgrace for any government. The whole nation knows that when the leader of the merciless hammer-group, who was implicated in the killings of dozens of innocent people by crushing their skulls, was arrested, he was later released as a gesture of good-will towards his country [India]. We cannot find such examples in any other country of the world. Anyone who commits crime should be given an appropriate punishment. No one should allow the concern for good-will towards the convict's home country to become an obstacle to law. Even when foreign fighter planes enter our country, we send them and their pilots back with dignity. Now, we suspect that, once again, this news of Indian terrorists will be suppressed, and our nation will become an object of ridicule. Governments of free countries should determine their strategies and decisions on the basis of the dignity and welfare of their people and country. We should beware of Indian leaders who use official level talks and contacts to disguise their operational strategy to spread terrorism.

The government should also be aware of the recent assassination of a foreign diplomat in Lahore in order to spread factional disturbances. Therefore, all those Indian terrorists who were arrested should be shown on the television and given exemplary punishments along with their Pakistani collaborators.

Editorial Alleges Israeli Agents to Destroy Nuclear Facilities

91AS0529C Peshawar MASHRIQ in Urdu 6 Jan 91 p 3

[Editorial: "Need to remain Vigilant"]

[Text] According to newspaper reports, agents of Israeli intelligence and terrorist organization "Mossad" have entered Pakistan for subversive activities. Their targets include nuclear and other sensitive installations. This information has been given to Pakistan by some Muslim countries. As a result, security arrangements for these installations have been further strengthened.

For a long time the Russian secret agency KGB and the Indian intelligence organisation RAW have targeted Pakistan for subversion and terrorism. Initially their aim was to stop Pakistan from helping Afghan Mujahidins. For this reason many parts of the country were subjected to bomb blasts. Pakistan was also bombed by Russian planes based in Afghanistan. However, Pakistan was not bullied by this blatant subversion. Finally, the Russians had to get out of Afghanistan. After that, agents of Indian RAW became very active in Sindh. They targeted this province to such an extent that conditions became so bad that voices of separatism were raised here. India even established refugee camps in the adjoining province of Rajasthan to tempt Hindus of Sindh into migrating there. Thus a drama similar to one in East Pakistan would be staged. But the Pakistan military and other security agencies defeated the Indian nefarious aims.

However, these agents are still active in Sindh and other provinces and now have been joined by the agents of Israeli Mossad.

Pakistan's Kahuta nuclear plant has been a thorn in the eyes of India and Israel right from the very beginning, and they have been conspiring to destroy it. Ever since Israel successfully attacked and destroyed the Iraqi nuclear plant in the dead of night in 1980, both Israel and India have been trying to bomb and destroy Pakistan's atomic plant. Israel even threatened to do this many times and Indian intentions are also clear. Due to the vigilance of Pakistani armed forces, Jews and Hindus have not succeeded in their designs. Now they have given up the idea of bombing and have developed other plans to destroy this plant by sabotage from within the country. Israel has sent her agents and their targets will include other important installations besides the atomic plants.

Both countries want to see Pakistan politically unstable and economically crippled by large-scale subversion and sabotage. They do not want Pakistan to continue her peaceful atomic program. Both Jews and Hindus should keep in mind that they will not succeed in their nefarious aims. The people of Pakistan are patriotic and they will never tolerate any subversion. The foreign agents will not receive any help or refuge inside the country. Besides, the armed forces of Pakistan and other sensitive institutions are keenly aware of their responsibilities. The government has taken extra security measures for the protection of these institutions. Such conspiracies have failed before and will meet the same fate again. However, we should not become complacent but be on our guard so that the enemy agents do not succeed in sabotage.

Nuclear Reactor Operation Said Slated for August

91AS0529D Karachi AMN in Urdu 16 Jan 91 p 8

[“Nuclear Reactor Will be Operational in August, No Foreign Assistance was Required—Muneer Ahmad Khan”]

[Text] Karachi, 15 January (Staff Reporter). The chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of Pakistan, Muneer Ahmad Khan, said that Pakistan will continue her atomic program. He revealed that a research nuclear reactor, built in Pakistan, will be operational this year by July or August near Islamabad. He ridiculed a news report that Pakistan has six atomic weapons. Speaking to a group of reporters this afternoon in a local hotel, he said that talks between Pakistan and France will start soon for a 950-megawatt nuclear power plant. Talks with China for obtaining a 300-megawatt nuclear power plant are in final stages.

About the atomic power plant in Karachi, he said that its performance has improved over last year. In 1990 about 419 million kilowatts of electricity was produced here

which was sold to KESC [Karachi Electric Supply Corporation] at very low rates. He said that last year the commission earned 210 million rupees from the sale of electricity.

Answering another question about the atomic reactor built in Pakistan, he said it was completely built by Pakistani scientists and no foreign expertise was required.

Nuclear Official Claims Reactors Being Produced

91AS0598A Karachi AMN in Urdu 17 Jan 91 p 6

[News Report: “After Manufacturing Nuclear Fuel, Pakistan is Manufacturing A Nuclear Reactor. There is an Organized Campaign Against Our Nuclear Program, But We Did Not Come Under Any Pressure, Munir Ahmad Khan”]

[Text] Karachi, 16 Jan 91 (Staff reporter) Munir Ahmad Khan, Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, said that Pakistan has achieved some extraordinary successes in the manufacturing of nuclear fuel and is now manufacturing a nuclear research reactor and power generating reactors. He was addressing the opening fair for electronic equipment from China at a local hotel. He said that the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has expressed his determination that Pakistan will not give in to any foreign pressure or threats regarding its peaceful nuclear program. He stated that China's backing for Pakistan's peaceful nuclear efforts is encouraging and praiseworthy. China has provided a nuclear research reactor to Pakistan, and talks with China are under way for the installation of a 300-megawatt power generating nuclear reactor in Pakistan. Munir Ahmad Khan said that like China, Pakistan has also suffered losses due to the lack of nuclear technology. Our peaceful nuclear program has been viewed with suspicion and an organized propaganda campaign against us was started, but in spite of it, Pakistan remains steadfast.

Domestic Production of Nuclear Reactors Urged

91AS0529A Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 23 Jan 91 p 5

[Editorial: “Need for Producing Atomic Energy”]

[Text] According to a report from the Federal Capital, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan inaugurating the National Power Control Center said that we should produce energy by harnessing nuclear technology alongside the traditional methods. The country is losing about ten billion rupees considering the ratio of energy resources to the needs of the population. Our experts have indicated the need for at least twenty atomic power plants. These will be sufficient to fulfill the current demand. In future, with the population growth, more energy resources will be required. Currently there is only one operational nuclear plant located in Karachi producing electric power. The reactor promised by China has yet to be installed.

Construction of Kala Bagh Dam is in jeopardy and so far no government has been able to develop a national consensus on this issue. Even if we develop and utilize all the hydropower resources in the country to produce electricity, we still cannot satisfy the power needs of the country. Producing thermal electricity is not cost-effective. Besides we have very little coal reserves and the bill for the imported oil is going up. Producing thermal power is very expensive. To mobilize extra resources for large-scale production of thermal power does not make economic sense. There remains only atomic technology for power production.

The western countries have adopted a discriminatory attitude towards Pakistan in this matter. In spite of Pakistan's repeated assertions and explanations that her nuclear program is a necessity to develop the industrial base and fulfill the energy requirements, we have been denied nuclear reactors. Their double standards force us to depend on conventional methods of energy production. Apparently, the only choice left to us by big powers is to make those plans noncontroversial which will allow us to increase power production.

Presently most of the countryside uses conventional fuels. As the villages become cities, it becomes essential for us to conserve energy and put more emphasis on developing atomic reactors within the country. Pakistan does not lack talented scientists to accomplish this. It is also imperative for us to start construction of Kala Bagh dam and develop the available energy resources.

Nuclear Deterrence Capability Urged

91AS0529B Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu
25 Jan 91 p 5

[Editorial: "The Atomic Deterrent—Need of the Hour"]

[Text] All India Radio, quoting the Indian paper, TIMES OF INDIA, has alleged that Pakistan will fight India using the concepts applied during "Zarb-i-Momin" exercises, and that India, stronger than ever, will retaliate effectively. India has often used such rhetoric—the apparent reason being her full readiness in nuclear and military fields.

From time to time, the Indian leadership makes protestations about Pakistan's nuclear program. This theme is then taken on by the Indian lobbies in the western countries who sing the same song.

One truth which the Pakistani leadership has explicitly declared is that Pakistan's atomic policy is not based on mere rivalry or stubbornness but on solid geopolitical realities and severe dangers to her existence.

India not only became a member of the nuclear club in 1974 by exploding an atomic device, but has more than a dozen nuclear research facilities working at a frantic pace for establishing "Hindu Hegemony." Indian atomic warehouses store 250 kilograms of ready plutonium and, within the next three years, it will produce one ton of plutonium, enough to make 100 to 150 bombs.

Israel is another country in the vicinity of Pakistan which is openly producing atomic weapons. When it comes to India and Israel, America's "Symington amendment" becomes ineffective. Pakistan becomes the only victim, notwithstanding her explanations which are rejected out of hand. The fact is that Pakistan needs a credible "nuclear deterrent" to avoid the dangers of war permanently in the subcontinent. Pakistan should not become susceptible to any blackmail in this regard. The atomic powers have no moral right to monopolize this field and Pakistan cannot accept such a principle. Therefore, if the United States creates a continuous problem for Pakistan on account of this reason alone, the people of Pakistan should unite to resolve this situation.

The Prime Minister has rightly stated that he will not stoop and "beg" for American aid. If we stop the loot of the national treasury and take measures against those involved, we will not need any foreign aid. Official circles admit that the bureaucracy steals about 40 to 70 billion rupees annually. If this thievery is checked, not only will we control the budget deficit, but we will also have a surplus of 42 billion rupees. This money can be used for national progress and defense.

We appreciate the need for reliable friends to defend us from present dangers surrounding us. But in spite of our good faith and effort, if our friends prove to be unreliable and stab us in the back, and if as usual, America leaves us in a lurch in times of need, then the nation will have to face the dangers with determination and self-confidence.

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